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Abstract
The focus of this work is on the formation and the development of the 
principles underlying contemporary Chinese political theory. The concern is with 
the definition of the categorical framework explaining the meaning of the adaptation 
of Marxism to China, and with the effect of these categories on the structure of the 
concepts of theory. Thus, this is a study of the ground of the condition of reason, 
and of the expression of this ground in the activity of thought.
This is brought out through an analysis of the dominant theoretical 
controversies of the two periods in which the philosophical principles of Chinese 
Marxism were first posited, and then established: 1935-1940 and 1949-1955. 
These two eras are linked by the publication in 1952 of "On Contradiction," which 
was the culmination of the attempt to define the categories governing this political 
thought.
It is the argument of this study that "On Contradiction" was Mao's 
philosophical declaration of China's Marxist independence. And that in the early 
1950s, this was recognized and understood by leading Party intellectuals, who, in 
turn, realized the postulates of theory by denying the applicability of a Soviet model 
for China.
This principle of a Marxist identity through opposition was informed, in 
part, by the contributions of Party theorists in Shanghai and Beijing, in the mid- to 
late 1930s. Therefore, through an analysis of the dialectic of formulation, of that 
which was both preserved and cancelled in the statement of intention, the character 
of this Marxism is made clear.
In conclusion, it is shown that, that the codification of principle which 
arranged meaning for theory has continuously represented the interests of the state. 
Reason has been defined instrumentally, as a philosophy of and for national 
construction.
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The discourse then turned upon the nature of dialectics. "They are, 
in fact," said Hegel, "nothing more than the regulated, methodically 
cultivated spirit of contradiction which is innate in all men, and 
which shows itself great as a talent in the distinction between true 
and false."
"Let us only hope," interposed Goethe," that these intellectual arts 
and dexterities are not frequently misused, and employed to make 
the false tine and the true false."
(Conversations with Eckermann)
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INTRODUCTION
The fundamental ideas of political philosophy are almost always enclosed 
within their own history. It is this sense of historical relativism that they maintain 
throughout time. And thus questions which seem timeless are actually defined by 
the moments of perspective. A contemporary moral philosophy, for example, 
which seeks a shared understanding with Aristotelian conceptions of the good, 
presumes the prior recognition that Aristotle's ethics were tied to the polis and not to 
the modern state.1
This in turn suggests that attempts at recollection rarely aim at restoration. 
Instead, they usually have as their intention theoretical conversation. The 
incorporation of an identity of interests within an awareness of difference most 
often aims simply at the creation of a dialogue. And it through such means that 
stance is clarified and made secure.2
This clarification which occurs through dialogue need not be found through 
antithesis. Though separated by time philosophies of the good may in fact share a 
substantive basis. And this is because, in part, reason is not assumed to be the 
subject of another assertive purpose. Instead, concepts are in a sense accidental, 
contingent and individual.3 And as knowledge is not part of an absolute program, 
ideas retain a freedom of movement.
There are no such liberties in Marxism. Here, the meaning of an idea is 
inseparable from the social and political context from which it arose. It is this 
derivation, this tracing of the intellectual product back to the condition of its 
production that determines value. And this is because Marxist judgment represents; 
it acts as the agent of an historical telos. For history is to be understood dialectically 
as a materialist process of development; a continuum of successive stages of social 
and political-economic formation driven by the productivity of man. And it is this 
assumption of an ontology of labor which guides the Marxist project.
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The fundamental principle in this ideology is that men must labor to satisfy 
their needs, but that they do so in a particular fashion. In contrast to all other 
species beings who rely upon instinct, men plan their actions. But historically, 
Marxists argue, this teleological essence has been universally denied. Instead of 
expressing a general will, civic direction has always been the prerogative of an elite. 
And therefore for Marxists, the transcendence of all those exploitive forms which 
prohibit the development of human capability becomes an imperative. The demand 
of history turns into the duty to realize essence: to create that condition when all 
may fully and creatively realize their nature as laboring beings.
Thus every historical moment is to be understood in terms of the process of 
production: the manner in which men organize themselves, and the way in which 
they utilize and develop the means of labor. And it is through these constituent 
determinations that consciousness is able to recognize and order its own situation. 
This is because the forms of work are said to reveal the underlying set of principles 
which govern the course of human conduct. In turn, these categories of 
understanding are assumed to be generally applicable, and become more specific 
only as economic formations become more complex. Thus, for example, while the 
mechanisms of capitalism are distinguished by such laws as the tendential fall in the 
rate of profit, and the labor theory of value, all phenomena are said to comprise a 
unity of opposites, and all change is said to occur through the mutual transformation 
of quantity and quality. The point is simply that these so-called laws represent, and 
are supposedly embodied, in human agency. An agency which is historically 
determined, but which men must act out in order to fulfill. This truth is the 
foundation for this particular world-view, which presumes the role of philosophical 
science, and thereby assigns all phenomena a place.
This sense of location applies both to the present and the past. For the past 
is seen as a series of moments, of negations of negations, preparing the way for a 
future of affirmation. And it is this sequence to history that makes it clear why
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previous forms of knowledge have no meaningful place within the Marxist corpus.
This is because their truths are inextricably bound with moments which have been
surpassed. Ideas are not simply limited to, derived from a particular circumstance;
thoughts are instead so segmented within their moments that they are in effect to be
buried with them. At best, a philosophy may express a partial truth. But the
exploitive nature of each moment—and all non-socialist systems are declared to be
exploitive—prevents any understanding from being more than just limited. "The
brilliancy of Aristotle's genius," Marx says,
is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the 
value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions 
of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from 
discovering what "in truth," was at the bottom of this equality.4
A thought of course may attempt to transcend its moment as an anticipatory 
promise, but in Marxism this is rejected as utopian: an idealized present projected 
as the future. The "dreams of a shop-girl,"5 as Marx said of Fourier. For Marx 
there was just the truth of the practical work toward socialism. And work is
damned serious and demands the greatest effort. The labor 
concerned with material production can only have this character if 
(1) it is of a social nature, (2) it has a scientific character and at the 
same time is general work, i.e., if it ceases to be human effort as a 
definite, trained natural force, gives up its purely natural, primitive 
aspects and becomes the activity of a subject controlling all the 
forces of nature in the production project.6
Thus, Marxism is that which offers a condition and an imperative: it 
explains how men have behaved and how they should. In this it explains both the 
history of the forms of reason and the reason of history. And this it does through a 
complex set of categories and laws which both reveal and guide the determinations 
of all (pre-socialist) moments. In short, it is a science of and for historical passage; 
a specific form of materialist logic which presumes an essential responsibility.
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This Weltanschauung is what was adapted in China. A set of concepts and 
categories which classified thought in terms of economies of production. But 
though it provided the criteria for the disposition of knowledge, this prior analytic 
was not all inclusive. There was that within it which remained, in this sense, 
indeterminate. And this was because the meaning of this tradition changed with the 
addition of Leninism.
The effect of the Russian Revolution and the rise of Leninism was to alter 
the meaning of some of the previous suppositions, so that Marxism now seemed to 
require a specific national embodiment: a novel form of synthesis. The proof of 
Leninism: the fact that a socialist revolution could occur in one state and under 
primitive economic conditions, meant that Marxism suddenly acquired an aspect of 
particularity. There were now doctrines whose precepts both arose from and gave 
license to a uniqueness to circumstance. This national identity was of course still 
prescribed; the truth of specificity could only be recognized with reference to a 
transcendent set of maxims. But what Leninism did was to broaden the subject of 
imperative as it allowed for a national expression of Marxism. At the same time 
Leninism added to the overriding idea of objective necessity by declaring the Party 
as the form through which essence was to be realized. It was the Party which was 
to define and lead the tasks of social construction. But this formal and objective 
determination still left open an area for individual choice. That which Leninism 
both justified and organized: the means to achieve a 'socialism in one country', also 
created the possibilities for a variety of particular theories of practice.
But this assumption of an aspect of self-determination was not clearly 
defined. Indeed, as applied to countries other than the Soviet Union, this premise 
remained basically unstated. And this was because the Soviet leadership tried 
continuously to appropriate all claims to truth from its declared position as the 
vanguard of the Socialist Revolution. In this, the idea of a 'socialism in one 
country', was both preserved and 'lifted-up': that which was contingent on
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circumstance in the Soviet Union came to be included within the imperatives of 
Marxism-Leninism. And thus, through the incorporation of its policies within this 
higher identity, the Soviet leadership was able to proclaim new laws and principles.
This identity between the singular and the universal could not of course be 
absolute. Irrespective of political desire, the criteria of Marxist principle could not 
simply be absorbed within the individuality of Soviet practice. There was that 
which had to remain outside as the subject for specific determinations. In other 
words, as an ideology of general tenets, Marxism could not simply be turned into a 
Soviet strategy.
The existence of this substrate meant that there was no maxim of objective 
necessity which would permit any course of action to be advanced as a constituent 
category of Marxism. Instead, the condition of particularity suggested, quite 
strongly, that all individual socialist theory and practice was as an object, 
constituted of the categories of Marxism. In this, the subject was fixed. At the 
same time, within these limits, there was no theoretical prohibition to the 
uniqueness of interpretation. The constancy of Marxist principles which persuaded 
all philosophical consideration, meant that the kind of creativity which was allowed 
in the Soviet adaptation of Marxism, was open equally to all socialist revolutions. 
Synthesis in Marxism was not a mimetic process. Instead, to some degree, it 
encouraged imaginative thought and action.
The Marxism that was adapted to China was thus a composite of diverse 
suppositions which needed to be classified as to whether they were necessary or 
conditional. The categorical imperatives of Marxism had, that is, to be 
distinguished from those constructs which were politically instructive, but could not 
command. In this, meaning assumed a national form. The very idea of synthesis 
signified that expression was to be mediated by the particularity of circumstance. 
And therefore, as consciousness sought to understand an adaptive set of tenets, so
was it guided by a desire to find them suitable. Here, the requirement of relevancy 
was true not only initially, where Marxism had to act as a force for persuasion, but 
it was also true as a constant principle, as that which had to be maintained 
throughout the whole labor toward socialism. The affirmation of telos in this 'un­
orthodox' setting meant that the reason of theory had continuously to apply to the 
practice that had been declared in its name.
And in China this was the task for Party political philosophers and for Party 
theorists of the political economy, It was their responsibility to codify presumption, 
and to help formulate the method for the achievement of socialism. Hence, 
statements on procedure were also statements upon the meaning of synthesis. It 
was not only that every interpretation necessarily revealed an understanding as to 
the basis of stance; it was also that the manner in which an (important) argument 
was received politically, whether, for example, it did or did not affect policy, or 
whether it could, gave expression to the character of this Marxism.
It follows, therefore, that an analysis of the contrasting interpretations and 
arguments of Party political philosophers and Party theorists of the political 
economy, should help to explain the meaning of this Chinese Marxism. And that an 
explanation as to the role and function of theory will make clear both the motivation 
and presumption inherent within its fundamental principles.
This is the focus for this work: the reason of praxis and the practice of 
reason; the essence and appearance of theory. The concern is with the ground of 
theory, and with the condition of that ground, the grid upon which specific theories 
of practice were articulated. Thus, the idea of influence extends beyond—though it 
does not slight—the question as to the relationship between theory and a particular 
practice. For of most concern is that which was always present: the ground which 
structured the forms of knowledge.
In effect, the focus is on two kinds of necessity: on that necessity which 
constituted the framework, the principles of theory, and on that necessity which
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comprised a particular argument. But this must not mislead, since theory could 
never be pure, abstracted from its political reality. On the contrary, theory was 
always in a sense immediate and public, in that all philosophical reflections were 
expressed through the mediums of the Party. It was the Party which entered 
directly into the formation of discourse and mediated the definition of imperative. 
And thus authority became integral to the tenets of theory as both means and as an 
idea.7 As means, this was signified by the fact that all discussion, debate and 
analysis took place within its strictures and organizations. Rules were Party rules. 
At the same time, since the Party was accepted as that institution which should lead 
the course of construction, theory was guided by an assumption of value. Thought 
had to incorporate the realpolitik of a political order, as a normative basis.
This is not to suggest, however, that the full character of theoretical inquiry 
in China could be defined through adherence to Leninist organizational principles. 
For even if it were stated beforehand that theory was reactive, was dependent upon 
a prior policy articulation, the content of this reaction would still be open to a variety 
of interpretations. To assume otherwise not only turns a proposition into a maxim, 
it also ignores the fact that Party announcements could be general and ambiguous, 
allowing fo r-if not directly encouraging-a relative freedom for Party thought.
This claim, however abstract, of an intellectual ground for theory 
nevertheless requires a more definite sense of location, since the meaning and 
function of Marxist thought in China has been somewhat discontinuous over time. 
This is most obvious and dramatic with respect to the nature of concerns both 
before and after the seizure of power. The focus of theoretical responsibility clearly 
changed once an idea became in part, real. There was, of course, a sense of 
continuity insofar as theorists determined that their role was to educate and to 
popularize a new philosophy, that it was to support and to legitimize the Communist 
Party, and the ideas that it was said to represent. But what clearly had altered was 
the substance of conceptual concern. Issues were now centered upon questions of
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political consolidation and economic construction. Yet, at the same time, the 
approach to formulation, to understanding, had to have precedence. And this was 
so because the essence of this Marxism lay as much in its method: dialectical 
materialism, as it did in providing political notions for power.
This dialectic was supposedly the expression of the truth both of nature and 
of human society. It was that which unveiled human history as a sequence of 
political and economic exploitation, and, in this, appeared to demand an alternative 
social vision. But this in turn seemed to suggest that the very condition of Chinese 
Marxism was grounded in an untenable state of antinomy. For, in theory, at least, 
the essence of the dialectic lay in negation, in critically unfolding the complexity of a 
moment in order to reveal the truth of power. From its stance as the value of 
reason, and through denial, the dialectic posited true consciousness, presumed 
social and political rights, as it continuously gainsaid the pre-socialist order of 
things. In this preservation of intention through cancellation, the dialectic comes to 
signify movement, the process of revolution.
There is clearly a question then as to how this kind of critical methodology 
could be reconciled to the affirmative needs of an economically underdeveloped 
socialist state. The requirements of stability and legitimacy were seemingly 
contradicted by a philosophy which kept declarations of assertion in reserve. 
Unless, of course, the dialectic was given another definition; or that there were 
other definitions, all acceptably Marxist. This, however, demands concretion.
Thus far, this has been about an idea of an idea: a theoretical consideration 
as to how to approach a political theory. The attempt has been to frame the 
constellation, the referential matrix—intellectual and political—which apparently 
constituted this philosophy. But here, as a propaedeutic of sorts, the concern has 
not been to insist, rather it has been to suggest a sense of conceptual accountability; 
a proposition as to what these constructs would seemingly have to incorporate in an 
embodiment as a Marxist political theory.
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In this regard, inference does suppose an historical location. The discursive 
ground of categories and constructs needs to be, as it were, mapped out And here, 
as has already been noted, the rooting of a political axis acts as a truly meaningful 
signpost in that, as a (the) source for theoretical intention, it always provided, in 
reception, a statement upon legitimacy.
Understood in its broadest sense, dlite political judgment was, in one 
constant respect, a comment upon the status of reason. At any moment, a 
theoretical exposition revealed beyond itself the rules, the political arrangement for 
meaning. And thus, the calculus of account, the subject of the modes of thought 
has in effect to be extended to include or to be seen more fully as itself the subject of 
accountability; as the demonstration of political responsibility and order. But when, 
specifically?
In order to set out the purpose (intended and otherwise) and the ground of 
this Marxist thought, and in light of the previous discussion as to the dialectic of 
continuity and discontinuity, it is both logical and necessary to compare and contrast 
the two periods: 1935-1940 and 1949-1955, that were critical for its formation and 
development.
These were the two moments of theoretical ascension: the former, the 
crystallization of an idea of adaptation, the latter, the codification of this very 
principle. What connects them is the process of classification, the structuring of the 
ideological statement of sinification into an epistemology. As an historical 
movement, this process found its embodiment in an object, in the document of 
Chinese Marxist philosophy—"On Contradiction," which itself claimed to represent 
the determination of practice, through affirmative negation.8 For, it was this essay 
which lifted Chinese Marxist reason out of its generality as a condition of national 
ought into its realization as necessity incarnate; as particular because required.
Officially, however, this document is dated as having been written in 1938. 
But this insistence upon a continuity of purpose misleads. For in 1938, Mao's
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philosophical argument denied the very idea of a sinification of Marxism, At that 
time, his theoretical reflections betrayed his political intention. Therefore, the idea 
of sinification that "On Contradiction" came to define, must be seen as the product 
of an intellectual environment, a general moment rich in differing propositions and 
controversies. And thus to look back, or to begin with these inferences of thought, 
is both to understand the basis of principle and the dialectic of formulation. It is to 
see the territory of theory in the consciousness of setting; the vicissitudes of its 
theory of practice in its theories of praxis.
The following is an account of the definition and role of political theory in 
two of the most formative periods of Chinese Marxism. Thus, and for reasons 
already discussed, it is in two parts. The first is centered upon the debates 
concerning the attempt to provide a meaning, a context for the Sinification of 
Marxism; while the second focuses upon the philosophical turn of this supposition 
into categorical law, and its consequent effect upon theoretical argument. The 
division is not chronological but occurs with the publication of "On Contradiction," 
and the subsequent controversies surrounding the initial stage of socialist transition. 
The reasons for this will become clear, though they have already been suggested. 
And thus the first part begins with the theoretical disputes in Shanghai and Beijing 
in the mid-1930s, and ends with the close of "New Democracy."
Finally, a note of qualification; a setting, as it were, of the parameters. This 
charting of the landscape of categories and concepts has no pretence to exhaustion; 
it does not include all that was written or discussed during these two periods. 
Analysis, instead, focuses upon those arguments, hypotheses, and contentions 
which either contributed directly toward the formulation of synthesis-Sinification— 
or which later, were clearly illustrative of a specific attitude and pattern of thought. 
This rigorous narrowing of approach details the nodal points of reason, thereby 
allowing the expression of an idea truly to be grasped as it unfolds.
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Notes
1 The critical importance of the polis as that which provides the condition for the 
proper development for character through education and habituation is made 
clear in the Nicomachean Ethics. Book X, Chapter 9. It may also be noted, in 
passing, that Aristotle believed that his philosophy would only find completion 
through time, and supposed the work of others. N icom achean Ethics 
(1908a20). The translation used here is that of W. D. Ross and J. O. Urmson, 
J. Barnes (ed.), Complete Works of Aristotle Revised Translation. Vol. 2, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
2 The idea of a dialogical process to understanding has been influenced by the 
argum ent of Hans-Georg Gadamer in P lato 's D ialectical Ethics: 
Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus. Robert M. Wallace, 
trans., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
3 The importance of the accidental, as that which protects the character of the 
individual from absorption within absolutist programs, has been argued by Odo 
Marquard in In Defense of the Accidental: Philosophical Studies. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press Oddon, 1991. Marquard's thesis goes much further 
than the point developed here, but it is interesting to note, particularly with 
regard to the discussion of Marxism that is to follow.
4 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 60; Karl Marx, Capital. Fredrick Engels (ed.), 
New York: International Publishers, 1967.
5 Karl Marx, Selected W ritings. David McLellan (ed.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977, p. 368.
6 Ibid., p. 368.
7 The interrelationship and interdependence between power and knowledge has 
been discussed and developed by Michel Foucault. See, for example 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. 1972-1977, Colin 
Gordon (ed.), London: Harvester, 1980, and Michel Foucault, Politics. 
Philosophy. Culture: Interviews and other Writings. Lawrence D. Kritzman 
(ed.), New York: Routledge, 1988.
8 The concept of an affirmative negation refers to the idea that contradictions may 
be codified in such a way that they reinforce and legitimize an existing state of 
affairs. In this 'positive' function, negation would represent an idea, that would 
be denied in essence by the more immediate needs of the state.
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PART I
STATEMENTS OF INTENTION
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CHAPTER 1
THE CONCEPT OF THE DIALECTIC: 
THEORIES OF MARXISM
It is perhaps only in the unity of primary concerns that the particularity of
Marxist definitions is most clearly revealed. For in the development of
interpretation, analyses share a common basis in regard to the fundamental question
as to the relationship between Hegel's conception and use of the dialectic and that of
Marx. In China, this problem, that which Marx posed in the Manuscripts when he
asked "how do we stand as regards the Hegelian dialectic,"1 found its specific
political expression in the dispute between Ye Qing and Ai Siqi.
Ye Qing, in his article "Commemorating Hegel," and in the introduction to
his book on Hegel, argued that there was no qualitative distinction between the
function of the dialectic in the theories of Marx and Hegel; that their methodologies,
though tied to different conceptual systems, were essentially the same. Indeed, he
maintained that Marx had found in Hegel's work the complete method of dialectical
materialism. Central to this notion was Ye's belief that it was possible to segregate
a method from its theoretical basis within a philosophy, and in turn use it to
supersede that philosophy. Marx and Engels, he said,
recognized that we critically use Hegel's method to destroy his form 
and save his content. His revolutionary aspect was his dialectics, 
that which Hegel called logic . . . materialism received dialectics 
[while] naturally stripping it of all its external spirit.2
According to Ye, Hegel's notion of the dialectic was based upon the 
understanding that all matter contains within itself its own contradiction, and that it 
was through the self-movement of this internal contradiction that matter evolved. 
Thus history, both natural and human, progressed within the continuous dialectical
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transformation of quantity into quality; or, as Ye also called it, the negation of the 
negation. In its ability to "explain the phenomenon of nature, society, and 
thought," the dialectic was for him the "universal formula," "the necessary tool 
which discovers the central relationship between things and events . . .  constituting 
the highest point in the historical method";3 "the special logic within universal 
logic."4 And it was this idea of a dialectical pattern to movement, that, he argued, 
Marx took directly from Hegel. "In Hegel, the dialectical movement is reason, in 
Marx it is matter."5
Therefore, as Ye understood it, the dialectic was an independent and 
invariant law of motion; the cause and effect, as it were, of the linear process of 
historical development. He saw, for example, the internal logic of capitalism—the 
qualitative transformation of "commodities into money and then into capitaF-as the 
necessary correspondent to the movement of history from "man's property to 
capital's property to the future of social property."6 What is most important, 
however, is that underlying this concept of the dialectic was the belief that man's 
consciousness is a passive reflection of the objective laws of history; and that self- 
consciousness is revealed in its ability both to understand these laws and to adapt 
creatively to them. This becomes more clear when it is recognized that Ye was 
restating a basic conceptual argument of Engels; one that had also been accepted by 
Lenin, and which had governed subsequent Soviet Marxist discourse. And as it 
was this inheritance that provided, in part, the precondition for the development of 
Ye's and Ai's argument, it is important here to sketch, briefly, the lineaments of this 
tradition.
In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy Engels 
argued that the material basis of thought had been established through the inversion 
of the Hegelian conception that nature and history were a copy of the absolute idea.
Thus dialectics reduced itself to the scheme of the general laws of 
motion both of the external world and of human thoughts—two sets 
of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their
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expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously 
while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human 
history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously . . . thereby the 
dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the 
dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel 
was placed upon its head; or rather turned on its head, on which it 
was standing, and placed upon its feet.7
The difficulty with Engel's conception of the dialectic was that it posited the 
rise of revolutionary consciousness as an unmediated relation.8 The substitution of 
matter for spirit objectified the dialectic into a determinist telos in which the 
proletariat became in theory the identical subject and object of history. This clearly 
seemed to suggest that the reason of history at some historical moment necessarily 
became manifest in the realization of socialism. Yet, it could also be argued, as 
Lenin did, that the dialectic of necessity implied only the possibility of 
supersession, and that it was only through the mediation of a Party that class 
consciousness could be actualized. In other words, the idealization of a dialectic in 
nature allowed for its verification as a desirable myth. It was the Party, as Lenin 
stressed, which became the subject of truth in that it alone grasped the objective 
dialectic at that critical moment when negation could be realized. Moreover, 
because the seizure of power could occur before the full development of the laws of 
capitalism, the Party, in the period of the transition to socialism, had of necessity to 
continue to guide the proletariat in the long course of self-fulfillment.
Thus, after the Revolution and the victory in the Civil War, Lenin 
maintained that the task of philosophy was to further the understanding and the use 
of the dialectic in nature. The source of their methodology was to be Hegel; for 
their duty was to explain "Hegelian dialectics materialistically."9 As Lenin said in 
1922 in a letter to the main Soviet philosophical journal "Under the Banner of 
Marxism":
The group of editors and contributors to the magazine . . .  should in 
my opinion be a kind of "Society of Materialist Friends of Hegelian 
Dialectics." Modern natural scientists will find (if they know how to 
seek and if we learn to help them) in the Hegelian dialectics
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materialistically interpreted, a series of answers to the philosophical 
problems that are being raised by the revolution in natural science, 
making the intelligentsia who admire bourgeois fashion stumble into 
reaction.10
The task which Lenin had defined for philosophy reflected his continuous 
concern to place natural science within an historical materialist philosophy; to prove, 
as Engels had argued, that in nature "the same dialectical laws of motion force their 
way through as those which in history govern the apparent fruitlessness of 
events."11 Here, it is important to remember that developments in the natural 
sciences, particularly in physics, had led to mechanistic theories (empiro-criticism) 
which, in arguing that there was no distinction between appearance and reality, and 
that the world was a complex of sensations where the physical and mental were 
merely different organized elements of the same experience, had rejected the attempt 
to define a philosophical conception of matter and a theory of epistemology based 
upon it. Lenin therefore tried to distinguish the philosophical category of matter 
from the scientific, and to argue that whereas science was concerned with its 
physical properties, in philosophy, it was a "category denoting the objective reality 
which is given to man by his sensations while existing independently of them."12 It 
was upon this basis that Lenin strove to deepen the understanding of Engels' theory 
of knowledge through a study of Hegel.
Throughout the 1920s the dispute against mechanism, and the struggle for 
an alliance between natural science and dialectical materialism, was carried on by 
Abram Deborin and his followers. Deborin believed that the fundamental virtue of 
the dialectic was that it provided an immutable methodology to guide and to explain 
the facts of empirical investigation. Basing himself upon Hegel, he argued that a 
scientific fact could only be understood within the context of a philosophical 
concept. As a Deborinite stressed,
to express oneself in Hegel's language, the subject of dialectical 
materialism is the most general determinations of being: matter, 
quality, quantity, measure, causality, subject-object etc. All the
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concepts we have indicated are applicable in equal degree both to 
natural and to social science, but at the same time they do not merge 
with either one.13
In the emphasis upon the independent quality of particular natural phenomena, 
Deborin felt that he had not only responded to the mechanist notion of monism, but 
at the same time had established the primacy of dialectical materialism. In 1931, 
however, Deborin was attacked by Mitin (an erstwhile disciple) for creating a 
metaphysical system—in that in Deborin's stress upon the dialectic as a theoretical 
method, he had divorced it from practice. He was further criticized for 
underestimating Lenin, and for overestimating Plekhanov; for Deborin believed that 
since conscious matter was also organic matter, and since living matter was, as it 
were, matter, the unity of subject and object would eventually be achieved through 
conciliation rather than struggle. (This was of course what Plekanov had argued in 
his theory of the evolutionary growth to socialism.) For these sins Deborin was 
labeled a Menscheviking Idealist, and with his followers, branded as having laid the 
basis for left deviation-mechanism being understood as right deviation. In the 
future, according to Mitin, the value of a philosophical work in the Soviet Union 
would be decided by the Central Committee, "under the leadership of our dear and 
beloved teacher, Comrade Stalin."14
What it is important to note is that by 1931 the philosophical texts of Engels 
and Lenin had become sanctified within the Soviet Union. Engels' three 
fundamental laws of dialectical materialism: the mutual transformation of quantity 
and quality, the law of the unity of opposites, and the law of the negation of the 
negation, were canonized categories which structured theoretical argument. This 
was true not only in the Soviet Union, but also in China, for no Chinese Marxist 
could openly attack either Engels or Lenin. And it is within this context that Ai 
Siqi's criticism of Ye Qing must be seen; for in this controversy Ai was forced to 
come to terms with that philosophical tradition with which Ye had allied himself.
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In the article, "On the Theory of the Reversal of Hegel," Ai begins his 
analysis of accusing Ye of having adopted Deborin's position in separating Hegel's 
method from its theory. Instead, he says, this philosophic relation must be seen 
dialectically, as the unity of contradictions. The role of the dialectic as idealist 
reason is determined and structured by its conceptual idealist system. Therefore, Ai 
says, though there is a dialectic between a method and its tenets, and though in 
Hegel's philosophy there are elements of materialism in both its expression and its 
basis, "one cannot treat the potential of negation as having been realized."15
In the Phenomenology of M ind, for example, where Hegel 
explained the theory of knowledge, there is already the important 
declaration that knowledge cannot be separated from practice; [and] 
in his Philosophy of History. Hegel had realized the determining 
significance of the production of tools in human society. These 
constituent parts [of materialism] however, are still suppressed by an 
idealist system. ^
Thus, Ai argues that a materialist supersession of this philosophy 
presupposes a different conceptual framework; for an attempt to transform the 
constellation of materialist principles and complexes, implicit and explicit, through 
Hegel's categories themselves will necessarily result in the abstraction of dialectical 
movement as reason or matter.
According to Ai the logic of materialist dialectics was reflected in the law of 
the mutual transformation of quantity and quality. This, in turn, was to be 
understood not as "the movement of reason, but as the movement of existence 
itself, such that it becomes the highest stage of consciousness."17 And it was upon 
this basis that he criticizes Ye's economic theories. Ye, he says, conceives of the 
idea of negation mechanically; he does not recognize the function of the law of 
transformation.
In capitalism the change from commodities into currency and from 
currency into the re-production of capital, is a qualitative process 
which has as its prerequisite a qualitative development. Within the 
three stages of this process, change does not occur through empty 
logic but is realized through the law of transformation . . .  to group
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only the logical movement of negation is to return to the grave of 
Hegel.18
This emphasis upon the historical concretization of the laws of 
transformation, as necessity mediated and revealed by man, was derived from Ai's 
understanding of the antinomic character of the Hegelian dialectic. What Ai 
believed was that despite its idealism, Hegel's concept of the dialectic offered, in 
part, a method for the analysis of the objective forms of society, because this 
dialectic was grounded in the historical process itself, in the dynamic relationship 
between man and nature. This is the significance of Ai's quote as to the 
"determining significance of die tool," as that which is necessarily produced as men 
produce their own history. For, it helps to recall that there were two different levels 
of alienation in Hegelian philosophy: the first was the alienation of man from the 
World Spirit; the second was the alienation of man from nature, and it was in the 
non-identity of this relationship, the dialectic between subject and object, that 
human history was created. It was this materialist premise to Hegel's philosophy 
which Ai understood to be that which Marx had critically transformed. This is 
made clear in Ai's essay, "Human Subjectivity as Seen by the New Philosophy," 
where he explains the meaning of the dialectic between man and nature.
Here, Ai states that what is fundamental to man is that he is an objective 
natural being; the objects of his essential needs exist outside of himself. Unlike 
other natural beings, however, the objects of nature do not immediately present 
themselves in such a way as to satisfy human needs; thus through labor man 
mediates his relationship with nature. It is through teleological projection, and the 
creation of the means to realize it, that man fulfills his biological needs in a human 
way. "That which is called historical movement," Ai writes,
has as its fundamental essence the life-activity of material 
production, it is what Marx in the Theses on Feuerbach called 
"sensuous human activity, practice." [Man] under social conditions, 
through labour towards an object transforms that object to 
appropriate it; this is what is called historical activity.19
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The concept of labor as the essence of man is one which Marx argued not 
only in the Theses on Feuerbach, but also in the Grundrisse and in Capital. Yet it 
was perhaps most plainly expressed in the Manuscripts, particularly in Marx's well- 
known statement on Hegel's Phenomenology.
The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology . . .  is thus 
first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, 
conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and 
transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of 
labour and comprehends objective man-true, because real man—as 
the outcome of man's own labour.20
Despite the fact that the Manuscripts had yet to be translated into Chinese 
when Ai published this article in 1934, and that this early work of Marx had only 
been published two years before, it is clear that from his readings of Marx and 
Hegel, Ai had grasped a critical philosophical aspect of dialectical materialism as the 
young Marx had defined it. Moreover, the notion of labor as the fundamental 
mediation, as that which makes man a specific natural being, is one which Ai 
repeatedly stressed. In the article "Do Animals Possess Instincts?," for example, he 
points out that while animals are purely instinctual, limited to the use of their 
physiological organs to satisfy their needs, "humans transcend their physiological 
organs to realize their goals, by creating tools and by making use of that which lies 
outside them."21 Human history, he says, is the process of changing the objective 
world.22
Here, what is most important is that for Ai, as for Marx, the development of 
consciousness, which arises through labor, is revealed not as that which reflects an 
internally determined movement that is maintained irrespective of its initial 
realization in the activity of intention, but rather as that which determines and is 
determined by its own dynamic relation with nature. In other words, the growth of 
individual consciousness, its particular expression in an historical moment as an
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exploration of means, does not conceal or make manifest, a dialectic in nature. 
"Human subjectivity," Ai says,
possesses a subjective element, its object is human life. Human 
subjectivity is humanity’s cognizance of its own life, its estimation, 
which results in ideals and desires. All natural phenomena move 
blindly under fixed laws, but human life has its own particular goal- 
orientation, has its own desires, will, thoughts and feelings. Every 
person towards his own life, within a certain internal sphere has the 
power of choice . . .  within certain internal limits, man relies on his 
own decisions in acting . . .  we cannot attribute mechanical 
causation as in natural phenomena to human subjectivity.23
"One cannot," he emphasizes, "treat the phenomena of will within human life as 
identical to the mechanical movement in nature."24
It is through labor therefore that man, recognizing himself "as a species 
being"25 (Marx) forms with his others human society. Thus, when Ai speaks of an 
"internal sphere" and of "internal limits," he means by this the restrictions imposed 
by the circumstances of a given social formation. Consciousness, that is, 
presupposes a materialist basis, which in turn dialectically determines it. The social 
mediation, and that between men and nature occurs not in abstraction, but rather 
within the concrete conditions within which men find themselves. And this is the 
reason why he stresses the law of transformation, because the process of negation 
and its realization is determined by a real historical situation. "The subject content 
to human subjectivity," he notes, "is defined inside historical circumstances, 
therefore it is limited, its ability is relative."26 (As Marx said, " . . .  circumstances 
make men just as much as men make circumstances.")27
It was this conception of the dialectic, as that which must be rooted in 
history, that Ai saw as Marx's inheritance from Hegel. For it was Hegel who 
argued,
to comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what 
is, is reason. Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his 
time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It 
is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its
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contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap 
his own age, jump over Rhodes.28
Therefore, what Ai emphasizes is that thought must be understood not as the 
movement of pure logic, but rather as that which expresses and is the expression of 
a real situation. Hopes and feelings can neither be mechanically determined nor can 
they 'voluntaristically' be willed into existence. There is, in other words, no 
absolute reconciliation between subject and object. "That which occurs as a result 
of human activity often is completely dissimilar from that which is desired," Ai 
writes, regarding Hegel's Logic. "And though Hegel is an idealist, if one strips the 
formula of the idealist categories of reason and the absolute, the content of the new 
philosophy can be seen. For Hegel, unlike all other idealists, does not see the goal 
as an invariant thing."29
According to Ai, the dialectic as a concept in historical materialism meant in 
turn that history had to be understood dialectically. A specific historical moment 
was to be analyzed in terms of the interactions of contradictions: their change into 
their opposites, their negation, and, at a higher stage, their realization as the 
negation of the negation. In this, what was basic to the concept of the dialectic was 
the principle of totality; the idea of the unity of complexes of social determinants, 
and the necessity of their change. As Ai explained in "On the Theory of Internal 
and External Necessity," the immanent character of critique lay, "in the grasp of the 
internal laws of development. It is the essence not the surface that matters; to 
esteem the appearance is only to understand the beginning steps."30 Since he 
defined the subject-object dialectic in relation to, in terms of, the various social 
spheres which comprise the notion of a totality, and as consciousness, at different 
levels, reflected (dialectically) its moment, he denied any theory that would redefine 
this consciousness in terms of simple correspondence.
One of his earlier essays, for example, "On Art's Eternal and Political 
Nature" written in 1933 (but included in a collection published after he joined the
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Party in 1935) was directed against a Japanese theorist, Hiroshi Kawaguchi, who, 
basing himself on Lenin (as Ai notes) had argued that art's enduring value lay not in 
itself, but rather in its technical ability to reflect a certain truth about objective 
reality. And Ai responds to this by noting that not only is this historically 
inaccurate, in that the value of great art has remained constant, irrespective of the 
discontinuities of history, but that this also reduces art to propaganda, as a "special 
example to serve a special example."31 Instead, he says, the eternal aspect of art 
must be seen as an inherent quality, as that which, though linked to and shaped by 
the political sphere, nevertheless derives its value from a unique process of 
reflection. For, unlike philosophy and science where the general is abstracted from 
the particular, in art the particular is threaded to the universal. To Ai, this signifies 
that art is remarkable in that it is unable to exhaust its object. And thus its lasting 
value is made manifest in its ability to encourage imagination, through the use of 
concrete example.
The eternal quality in art develops between the suitability of the 
reader and the work of art. It is not because the work is suited to an 
eternal humanity; it is because it serves a reader, suited to whatever 
concrete example, with unlimited possibilities.32
He emphasizes, however, that "the work of art is not a matter in which reflection is 
immediate, for it is the task of the reader . . .  to explore the social conditions in the 
concrete example of the work."33
What is important here is not Ai's theory of aesthetics; rather it is his 
argument that there is a dialectical relationship between the relatively autonomous 
complexes-art, science, philosophy, etc.-which are unified within a dynamic and 
changing totality. For, in this context, the clear suggestion that the relationship 
between the base and the superstructure was itself dialectical, composed of a 
multiplicity of interacting contradictions, meant, in turn, that the conception of a 
subject-object dialectic, and the idea of its reconciliation as revolutionary 
consciousness-or its reification as 'false consciousness'—needed to be defined not
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in terms of pure economic relations, as that which was determined by a specific role 
in the production process, but in terms of the totality of social practices. In other 
words, Ai's recognition of the underlying grid framing creativity, implied that an 
analysis of an historical moment, and the desire for its supersession, had to include 
within itself a dialectical understanding of the determined determinations of art and 
politics. And thus in his response to Ye Qing, and in his critique of the fundamental 
concepts governing Soviet dialectics, he not only begins to develop an alternative 
stance as to the meaning of Marxism, but in so doing, he also begins, quite subtly, 
to shift the focus of critical understanding from the base toward the superstructure. 
This becomes clear in his article "A Criticism of the Theoretical Method of Political 
Economy," written in 1935, which was an analysis of a Soviet textbook on political 
economy.
Here, he introduces his argument rather gently (and honestly) by noting that 
the study of economics usually gives him a headache; and he commends this book 
as both excellent and painless. He says, however, that it contains three major 
errors. The first concerns the book's scope; for the authors maintain that the 
methodology of political economy relates only to the laws of capitalist society, and 
are thus irrelevant to the functioning of socialist society. To this, Ai says that while 
it is certainly true that in Capital Marx was concerned only with the laws governing 
the development and destruction of capitalism, this does not suggest that Marx 
intended to restrict the subject matter of political economy. In fact, he says, Capital 
is directed precisely "at those vulgar economists who thought that they had 
discovered the laws governing all systems. "34 Maix, he says, wrote Capital from 
the stance of capitalism; and hence his purpose was not to trace its historical 
development through different stages; rather, it was to understand the basis for its 
realization as a continuous system. Accordingly, Marx's method must be applied 
flexibly, through an analysis of the differences and particularities within various 
economies. Ai notes, for example, that though the Soviet Union has reached a new
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stage in its development, "there are still in many places the vestiges of capitalism, 
feudalism, and primitive village organizations," and how "these are to be drawn 
together" is, he contends, "the Soviet Union's greatest practical problem."35 
Therefore, as "there are no general laws governing economic stages,"36 the only 
solution for Soviet theorists is to persist in the research into their specific economic 
situation.
The belief that the categories of political economy pertained solely to the
workings of capitalist society was first advanced in the Soviet Union by Bukharin.
In the Economics of Transition, written during the period of 'War Communism',
Bukharin argued that in the creation of a socially conceived planned economy,
where market mechanisms were no longer applicable, the "basic problems of
political economy" would cease to exist.
When "relations between people" are not expressed in "relations 
between things," and the social economy is regulated not by the 
blind forces of the market and competition, but by a . .  . plan, there 
can be no place for a science studying the "blind laws of the market" 
since there will be no market. Thus the end of capitalist commodity 
society will be the end of political economy.37
Though this view, articulated during a period characterized by Utopian thought, 
was later denounced, along with Bukharin, it nevertheless gave rise to extensive 
debate through the twenties. The problem was that Soviet economic theorists could 
not agree over the fundamental question as to how the economy should be defined. 
At issue was the role of the socialist sector in a mixed economy; whether, that is, 
there were two separate regulators: the plan for the socialist economy, the market 
for the capitalist economy, or whether the plan was dominant in both.38 As this 
problem was the source for continuous debate, and as stance determined an 
appreciation of the laws of political economy—whether, for instance, Marx's labor 
theory of value remained valid—it became increasingly difficult, indeed almost 
impossible, to structure a theoretical paradigm. By 1935, though, when Ai was 
writing his critique, this question concerning the claim (if any) of the categories of
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political economy had been answered, at least officially. The passing of a 
resolution at the Seventeenth Party Congress calling for a new Constitution, and 
Stalin's well publicized address to that Congress, in which he declared that
the colossal progress in the economy and culture in the U.S.S.R. 
during the period under review has at the same time meant the 
elimination of the capitalist elements, and the relegation of the 
individual peasant economy to the background
th a t," . . .  the socialist form of the economic structure now holds sway and is the 
sole commanding force in the whole economy";39 meant that for the leadership, the 
basic contradiction in Soviet society had been resolved. There was now 
correspondence between the base and the superstructure. Thus economists could 
occupy themselves with the purely technical problems arising from the planned 
application of the scientific laws of socialism.
Ai's insistence therefore on the mixed and contradictory character of the 
Soviet economy—the continuing problem of the integration of capitalist and feudalist 
'elements', and the primitive village organizations—suggests that he neither accepted 
the theoretical claim of a strict harmony between the base and the superstructure, 
nor did he endorse Stalin's particular analysis. Here, it should be noted that if 
Stalin's argument, which was stated in January of 1934 was not known in 
Shanghai by June of 1935,40 it was certainly known in its incarnation in the Soviet 
Constitution of 1936. And yet Ai's comments appear in his book Collected Studies 
in the New Philosophy, which was published in 1938, and which had its second 
printing a year later. Thus, irrespective of whether it was Stalin or Ai who was 
analytically correct, what it is important to recognize is that Ai had grounded his 
critical understanding in a theory of Marxism for China.
By defining Marxism as a method, as a theory of political economy whose 
continuing value presupposed its realization in a specific application, Ai not only 
refused to see its categorical laws (the negation of the negation, for example) as 
signifying a process of absolute transcendence, but, critically, he also implicitly
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rejected any attempt to import a fixed strategy for China's development. His 
emphasis upon the idea that history does not progress mechanically through a 
uniform path, and his understanding that Marx's writings simply provided the 
constructs for analysis, meant that the Chinese road to socialism could only be 
determined by the Chinese themselves. Thus, he calls for increased research into 
China's particular situation. Chinese theorists, he says, must recognize that 
although China remains dominated by feudal structures, "this feudalism has not 
been able to sustain itself under the yoke of Western Imperialism. At the same time, 
capitalism has remained in embryo, and [thus] China's future is not the same as that 
of eighteenth century France."41 Hence the duty of political economists is to 
"analyze correctly the feudalist system in China," and, specifically, to focus on 
"village relationships."42
For Ai, Marxism was a dialectical system which supposed a thorough 
investigation of the various spheres that, however, transient, unified a moment; 
created, as it were, an historical situation. And it is the problem of the use of 
dialectical and historical materialism that is the subject of the last two points of his 
criticism of the Soviet textbook.
Ai's second point, closely related to the first, is that the authors 
misunderstand the working out of the laws of political economy; they omit the 
negation of the negation from the method of practical dialectics. Following from 
their premise that the study of political economy relates only to capitalism, they 
argue that not only is this law, made manifest in the internal development of 
capitalism, superseded in the transition to socialism, but that post-capitalist society 
is itself the realization of the negation of the negation. This belief, which was 
shared by theorists such as Bukharin and Deborin,43 and which was later 
announced by Stalin in the fourth chapter of the Soviet Party History: A Short 
Course, was, of course, theoretically justified in terms of 'orthodox Marxism': 
Marx had made it clear that socialism was indeed the negation of the negation of
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capitalism. Therefore, in his response, Ai diplomatically avoids a direct criticism of 
Soviet 'socialism1, since this would have meant having to prove that it was still a 
non-socialist society where full negation had yet to be realized. Instead, he makes 
this point indirectly through a brief discussion of the meaning of this concept in the 
process of capitalist production as Marx had defined it.
Thus, he summarizes Marx's explanation as to how the sprouts of 
capitalism first appeared in feudalist handicraft industries, where the tools of labor 
were privately owned by the laborer; and how in the growth of capitalism, 
handicraft production was gradually replaced by that of industries and machines, 
where the ownership of those means were gradually assumed by the bourgeoisie. 
"Machines," Ai writes,
were not the laborer's, rather they belonged to the capitalist. That 
which is called deprivation of the means of production is that which 
had privately belonged to the laborer. Capitalist production is the 
maturation of this process.44
What Ai emphasizes is that the dialectical principle of negation, as that which is 
revealed in the development of capitalism as a series of qualitative and quantitative 
transformations, makes manifest the concept of continuity within discontinuity, and 
discontinuity within continuity. For, the growth of industrial production, and with 
it the socialization of labor, provided a basis both for negation, and for a positive 
realization at a higher stage.
According to capitalist development, that which the capitalist owns 
and the social form of production are in violent contradiction. The 
result is the reversal of capitalism. That which was formally 
concentrated in the hands of the capitalist, the means of production, 
returns to the laborer; it is that which is called 'expropriating the 
expropriators'; it is the negation of the negation 45
In the context of Ai's earlier arguments, the definition of the law of the 
negation of the negation as the expropriation of the expropriators, does not suggest 
a linear notion of course, but instead implies a qualitative transformation, the
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character of which is determined dialectically by the specific situation in which it 
occurs. There is, in other words, continuity within discontinuity. Thus, Ai's point 
is that though the Soviet Union has reached a new level of economic development, 
it still retains the vestiges of its pre-revolutionary social and economic formations.
Ai's discussion of the process of negation in capitalism was clearly drawn in 
large part from Marx's chapter "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist 
Accumulation" in Capital. And in this, it is interesting to note is that it is possible to 
see in Ai’s argument the beginning of an attempt to formulate a concept of alienation 
in Chinese Marxism.
Previously, Ai had shown that what was fundamental to man was that 
through labor he appropriated the objects of nature in a human way, and thereby 
recognized himself as a specific natural being. He now extends this notion by 
stressing the dual character of property. In the essential teleological process, 
property exists as objectification, as that which lies outside man and which he 
makes his own through labor. In capitalism, however, this dialectical relationship 
is itself mediated by private capital; teleology becomes the property of the capitalist. 
The loss of individual ownership over the means of production and over the 
positing of a goal, the fact that man's self-expression is revealed through an 
estranged form of objectification—private capital—signifies the alienation of man, in 
its broadest sense. And thus as a general concept, Ai establishes the reason for 
revolution in the breaking of the constraints on human appropriation.
Yet, if socialist revolution was the dialectical resolution of the contradiction 
between the relations of production and the forces of production, if it was to 
inaugurate, as he says, "a new period in human history"46 (repeating Marx), the 
meaning of this in Ai's writings at this time remained somewhat unclear. For 
though he defined consciousness in terms of its dynamic relation to both the 
political and economic spheres, he had not truly explained, at least theoretically, 
what this really meant; what the function of consciousness was with respect to the
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economy. This he does, in part, in his final criticism of the Soviet textbook, with 
his discussion of the role of historical materialism in the method of political 
economy.
He begins his analysis by observing that there are conflicting and incorrect 
theories as to the nature of the relationship between the relations and the forces of 
production. He says, for example, that though Bukharin argues that political 
economy is concerned with the form of transition in the history of the productive 
relations between men, that which Bukharin, "understands by the relations of 
production is just the equipment of man in the technological sector. The relations of 
production become an auxiliary of technology; the specific social relations become 
forgotten."47 This, Ai says, is why Bukharin is called a mechanist. Conversely, 
Ai notes, there are idealists, such as Rubin and his followers, who see the 
productive forces as both determinate and yet external to the relations of production. 
As they "consider the productive forces to belong to technology and not to the social 
sphere,"4** they maintain that the subject-matter of political economy relates only to 
the relations of production. They are idealists he says, because "they separate the 
relations of production from the productive forces, and consider the former to be 
self-moving, ignoring its material basis."49 The central problem, Ai contends, is 
that both mechanists and idealists define the productive forces as equivalent to 
technology; and in so doing, they fail to realize that technology is "only one element 
of the productive forces,"50 which presupposes the activity of labor. Technique, he 
stresses, is created by labor; it "functions within labor's goal projection,"51 and 
cannot exist apart from it. Therefore, Ai makes the critical point that the role of 
technology is not that which determines social and political development, but rather, 
that its role is determined by the structure of social relations.
It can be said, for example, that the technique in handicraft industry 
is the same. If the method of labor is different, however, then 
productivity will be different (the difference between household 
handicraft industry and workshop handicraft industry) [emphasis 
added].52
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Similarly, he notes that what is fundamental to the process of capitalist reproduction 
is the transformation of the economic and social position of labor, of which 
technical change is a part.
In the process of expansion and reproduction it is not only technique 
which is transformed, but there is, at the same time, a relative 
decrease in the change of capital (in the buying power of labor's 
capital). If one ignores the relative decrease in capital, then one 
cannot understand the significance of expansion and reproduction.53
This analysis recalls Marx's discussion in Capital of the transition from
guilds to manufacturing industry; a process, which in its early stages, involved a
change not of technique, but rather, in the number of people employed. It was only
with the structural transformation of that industry, and the establishment of a mass
market, that the social and economic conditions required the introductions of
machines. In other words, technological changes only came after, "the narrow
technical base on which manufacture rested came into conflict with the requirements
of production that were created by manufacture itself."54 It is, of course, clear that
with technology, economic development was thereby greatly increased;
nevertheless, what Ai, as Marx, emphasizes is that it is the formal organization of
labor extraction which determines the use of that technique. "The forces of
production," Ai says,
come to exert their power under a definite mode of production. That 
which is called the mode of production . . .  is the form of interaction 
between labor and technique; it cannot be separated from its 
determined social existence . . .  it is internal to society.55
Ai's criticism of the authors of the textbook is that they take a Bukharinist 
position, and thus fail to understand that the relationship between the economy and 
the superstructure is one in which the forces of production are dialectically mediated 
by the relations of production. "The relations of production," he says,
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are not completely and mechanically determined by the productive 
forces, they have a relatively independent movement. This relative 
movement, however, from first to last, cannot be separated from its 
expression of the forces of production. This expression is, that 
there are times that it is able to promote the development of the 
productive forces, and that there are times that it becomes a fetter to 
this development.56
It is the task therefore of political economists to analyze
how, at a given stage of development, the relations of production are 
determined by the productive forces, and how the relations of 
production realize their independence; how, from the function of 
promoting economic development the relations of production 
changes to obstructing this development, and how the forces of 
production can break through this fetter.57
What is important to note is that this definition of the dialectic between
economy and society is central to his argument that Marxism is applicable to China.
For, in stressing the role of the superstructure, its ability either to aid or shackle
development, Ai rejects the notion that economic productivity alone can bring about
socialist revolution. This, he contends, is true irrespective of the level of economic
development. Thus, as he wrote, a year after the seizure of power,
the fundamental question is one of controlling state power. If the 
old ruling group is weak and isolated, and if the revolutionary force 
is strong and is able to expand its alliances, then it is possible to 
seize state power even though the economy mav be relatively 
backward . . .  to deny this, even though the economy may develop 
to a higher stage, means that the revolutionary victory will still not 
be realized. This is one of the manifestations of the political 
superstructure vis-a-vis the economy.5**
Yet, in the 1930s, Ai was not engaging in revolutionary voluntarism. For 
though he locates the impetus of revolution in men's consciousness, in their 
recognition that they have created their own history (in circumstances not 
necessarily of their own choosing) which in turn is brought about, in part, by their 
grasp of the method of dialectical materialism, he does not suggest that capital 
accumulation is therefore an irrelevant prerequisite for the realization of socialism. 
To argue, as he does, that Marxism is a method, and that there are no invariant laws
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through which all societies must pass, does not imply an abandonment of the basic 
tenets of Marxism; since, as he makes clear, the method of dialectical materialism 
cannot be separated from its conceptual theory. Instead, what he has shown in his 
analysis of the role of technology in the labor process, and in his discussion of the 
complex dialectic of economic determination, is that the accumulation of capital does 
not necessarily presuppose a pure capitalist structure of economic and political 
relations. Therefore to understand the role of capitalism in the development of a 
particular economy, its function must be seen within the context of its historical 
moment. To make this clear as it relates to China, it is helpful to note two articles 
by Ai: "On the Problem of Internal and External Necessity," written in 1936, and 
"On the Problem of Ideological Culture," written in 1937.
"On the Problem of Internal and External Necessity" was written 
in response to an article by Ye Qing, which unfortunately is unavailable; and 
therefore it is necessary to rely upon Ai's summary of Ye's argument. According to 
Ai, Ye maintained that China's contemporary history proved that the tenets of 
dialectical materialism was inapplicable in China. Starting from the theoretical 
premise that the particular could be separated from the universal, and in turn negate 
that universal, Ye stated that China's domination by Western imperialism showed 
that external forces could define the movement of internal contradictions. In other 
words, in contradistinction to the universal principle of dialectics that it was the 
internal contradiction which was the primary cause of change and development, Ye 
believed that in China, that which was external—the Western powers—determined 
the progress of that which was internal. Thus, while European history was "in 
congruence with the laws [of dialectical materialism] . . . for China it is 
o therw ise ."59 He supported this notion with reference to the C om m unist 
Manifesto, where, he said, Marx demonstrated how Western capitalism extends 
itself from its home markets to "recreate the world in its own i m a g e . " T h e  cheap 
prices of commodities," Marx wrote (quoted by Ye),
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are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all the Chinese 
walls . . .  it compels all nationals, on pain of extinction, to adopt the 
bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it 
calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois 
themselves.61
Thus, Ye argued that though dialectics may perhaps explain the mechanisms of 
Western imperialism—how the West arrived at its position in China—it could not 
explain the contradictions produced internally in China, as the antagonisms were 
externally created and internally controlled.
There were three constituent elements to Ye's thesis. First, there was the 
theoretical assumption that the notion of the particular could be divided from the 
universal such that each became completely autonomous. The particular as & that is, 
could either belong to A or non-A, but it could not be both. Second, there was his 
definition of Marxism, discussed earlier, as a system of universal and invariant 
laws, where matter developed in linear motion. Here again, Ye made it clear that 
one either accepted these categories as absolute or not. Therefore to attempt to 
construct a theory explaining China's particularity through an acceptance of these 
universal laws became for Ye a self-contradiction: the universal was specific to the 
West. Concealed within this, there was what might be called the common sense 
aspect to Ye's thesis: the reality of China. For, to defend Marxism as applicable, 
required an explanation as to how principles grounded in developed Western 
capitalism could be used in a semi-colonial, underdeveloped country. And, it is 
important to remember that Ye was not engaging in a scholastic debate; rather he 
was directing his argument at those students and intellectuals in the cities, especially 
in Shanghai, who were far from clear as to either the meaning of Marxism and its 
role, if any, in China, or as to the position and function of Western imperialism. 
This underlined the third element of Ye's thesis, the belief in the absolute power of 
the West to be able to structure and restructure the internal mechanisms in China. 
Thus, a counter-argument to Ye not only presupposed a different conceptualization 
of Marxism, but it also demanded a sense that it was reasonable. Put another way,
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the task, for someone such as Ai, was, in part, to provide a theoretical justification 
for hope.
Ai's article "On the Problem of Internal and External Necessity" was a 
critique of Ye's understanding of Marxism. Ai's views as to the determinate 
character of Western imperialism will be discussed later, in connection with the 
problems involved in the attempt to concretize Marxism in China.
Ai begins his argument by emphasizing that the concept of internal 
necessity, as the particular, cannot simply be segregated from that which is external, 
or that which exists as a universal principle; instead, they must be seen dialectically. 
"The specific and the general exist in a dialectical unity; there is not a pure universal, 
and, similarly, there is not a pure particularity which exists outside this universal." 
Though the "internal progresses under the influence of the external," is mediated by 
it, "the internal cause is primary."62 This, he says, is made quite clear by Marx's 
concern in the Manifesto to provide a concept for the general direction of capitalism; 
and not to "research into specifics."63 Thus an analysis of the actualization of this 
movement, has "to rely on each country's internal contradictions; its dissimilar 
particularities. Marx did not indicate this point because his basic responsibility in 
the Manifesto was to indicate a general theoretical tendency."64 "If, one asks, why 
did American capitalism destroy the Indians, or why did capitalism in China result 
in a semi-colonial society, this can only be answered through research into the 
particular aspects of a situation."65 The basic argument here, is of course one 
which Ai had made previously, and thus the question here is how he saw the unique 
development of capitalism in China.
In his essay, "On the Problem of Ideological Culture," Ai contends that 
national capitalism began to develop during the period of the May 4th Movement. 
The celebration of individualism, and of science and democracy which typified that 
era, were expressions of a nascent bourgeoisie, which was attempting to break 
through the fetters of feudalism.
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China's new intellectual and cultural movement was at the same time 
a resistance movement against feudal traditions . . .  it was a 
movement of significant value, produced under the new conditions 
and new requirements of developing capitalism.66
Yet, he notes, that the task of capitalism, "to establish a capitalist social system and
culture,"67 could not be achieved by this Chinese bourgeoisie, as it was enfeebled
both by the international money market, and by infighting among imperialist powers
in China. Therefore, as opposed to Western capitalism, which was able to
supersede the bonds of feudalism, Chinese national capitalism has remained in
embryo. This is why Ai rejects any comparison of the May 4th Movement as a
cultural renaissance, with either the European Renaissance, or, most aptly, the
French Enlightenment. For, as he said in his notes on the Soviet textbook on
political economy, "whereas in France in the eighteenth century the problem was
primarily political, in China it is economic."68 Ai, of course, understood the
political crisis facing indigenous capital, but he emphasized that their particular
dilemma was inseparably bound with the overriding problem of national liberation.
It was precisely because the bourgeoisie was weak and ill-suited for its tasks, that
economic development presupposed independence. "We rely," he says,
on general historical laws, capitalism develops from feudalism. The 
process of development in Europe and America, however, took as 
its principle problem the struggle for civil rights in breaking down 
feudal privileges; the problem of liberation was secondary, and not 
of true significance. In China, although a new society requires the 
establishment of people's rights, the most important problem is that 
of people's liberation.69
Accordingly, Ai calls for a broad anti-imperialist patriotic movement, a New 
Enlightenment Movement, to gain independence, and to promote democracy for the 
people. This belief in democracy meant that for Ai, the movement's primary 
responsibility remained that of encouraging capitalist growth. "China's present task 
still is the task of capitalism. It remains that of desiring a democratic spirit, or 
desiring the people's liberation, [and of . . .] promoting the development of 
progressive capitalist elements."79 Though, at one level, he identifies the
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maturation of capitalism as positive, in that by its own logic it initially requires some 
form of democracy, he argues, that because of the distinctive situation of the 
Chinese bourgeoisie, the negation of feudalism can only be assumed by a broader 
based movement. And since the resolution of the primary contradictions of 
capitalism has a different historical basis from that in the West, it will therefore be 
given a different historical direction. What Ai stresses is that this new cultural 
movement exists in a dialectical relationship with that of the May 4th, in that it 
continues to pose the issues of the earlier period, but that it will, of necessity, 
resolve them at a higher stage.
The new cultural movement. . .  is a negation of the negation of the 
May 4th movement. . .  the meaning of the negation of the negation 
is to resolve at a higher basis the tasks raised at a previous stage . . .  
in China, because national capital is too weak to grow, because it 
itself cannot solve the problems indicated for it, it therefore must be 
earned through by the development of a counter force; and it itself 
will be resolved at an even higher basis.71
Writing in 1937, in a period of flux, when the main task was that of 
liberation, Ai could not define the precise mechanisms needed to restructure capital. 
Moreover, an attempt to sketch the constructs of a post-liberation society was bound 
to be somewhat meaningless, as it was dependent upon an awareness which, 
according to Ai's own understanding of Marxism, could neither be known or 
anticipated. Though it was this non-determinism which helped to provide the 
resistance movement with a sense of theoretical identity, it was precisely this lack of 
a notion of future certainty, which created the paradox over the relevance of theory. 
For, though in a broad sense, Ai's interpretation of the categories and meaning of 
Marxism fulfilled the responsibility of being immediately suited to practice, in that it 
offered the tools of analysis through which the movement could begin to understand 
and transform its historical situation, this Marxist theory could not be completely 
integrated with the strategies and tactics necessary for liberation. This was because 
the movement for independence, led by the CCP possessed a dual nature; it was
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both active and reactive. It was active, in that the leadership could advance and 
attempt to realize its proposals concerning the method for struggle; and it was re­
active in that these proposals were determined and mediated by a variety of internal 
and external events over which the Party had incomplete control. The Japanese 
invasion, the fight with the KMT, the growth of Germany and its position within a 
changing world order, the size of China and the consequent differences in social 
and political awareness, meant that military and political tactics became inseparable, 
each a function of the other, conterminous within their own dynamic. Despite a 
stated intent, the instability in China required a pragmatic response which could 
only loosely be tied to more abstract concerns. To put it crudely, Marxist theory 
was basically irrelevant to battle. Thus, the role of political philosophy became that 
of attempting to influence, however remotely, the political direction of military 
strategy; to provide the elements of continuity such that later practice-after the 
seizure of power—could conform at some level to pre-existing theory. The primary 
duty of philosophers was to train Party members in method and goals, so that a 
foundation would be created for the future struggle for socialist construction. Their 
task was to emphasize the importance and value of theory so that later, there would 
be an effort to concretize those notions posited by it. The critical relevance of 
philosophy lay in being able to guide the movement to the realization of its own 
theory, and as a consequence, to its own transcendence as praxis.
2
The antinomy in role clearly suggested that theory could be reduced to a 
symbolic object. The problem was that in attempting to establish its own 
significance, its hermeneutic value would degenerate into justifying, rather than 
informing the passionate response to the situation in China. Thus, before the 
seizure of power the intent of theory to serve would result in the dialectical negation 
of content.
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Ai recognized the vulnerability of theory from its defined function, and 
when he was co-editor of a leading left-wing journal in Shanghai, Reading Life 
(Dushu Shenghuof  he wrote numerous articles stressing the importance of critical 
reasoning. In a published letter to students, for example, he warned that those who 
wished to leave school and "go amongst the people,"72 needed to do so with their 
emotional certainty guided by thought. Otherwise, if
hopes are too great, then despair will be even greater. If ideals are 
too high, then the fall will be particularly hard. This comes from 
ignoring reality, from not understanding that our goal is the result of 
our struggle within reality.73
Therefore, he cautioned students that,
we should not develop our slogans and principles from our 
aspirations, but should develop them from the people themselves, 
from their specific concerns, and for their benefit. . .  we should not 
regard them lightly because their ideals are not ours 74
Yet the tension between theoretical and emotional awareness was not readily 
resolved. And the difficulty in creating a positive disposition toward theory is 
brought out in Ai's discussion of the critical question concerning the efficacy of 
resistance: how could China, as a semi-colonial country, be able 'to maintain its 
independent face'. This issue was first raised in a letter to him, written in response 
to his article "Four Principle-Philosophical Problems."
In this essay, Ai had argued that whereas formerly the principle 
contradiction in China had been externally determined and internally mediated-that 
there was a dialectical balance between the desire of the external powers to further 
their aggrandizement of China, and their recognition that to do so militarily might 
stir internal resistance, and thus jeopardize their existing privileges—that this had 
been superseded to become an internal contradiction, which therefore demanded an 
internal resolution.
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That China is able to maintain its independent face is due to the fact 
that it has already granted the imperialists special privileges, which 
(like taxation) they rely upon to obtain great economic benefits. If 
they were to advance a step and occupy China militarily, then these 
privileges would not develop. This is a kind of contradiction. This, 
however, is a thing of the past. This contradiction has developed to 
the present such that, due to the world economic crisis, the 
imperialists can no longer use peaceful means to resolve their 
economic problems. Thus there arises the urgent danger of military 
occupation; and as the strength of each imperialist power in China is 
not in equilibrium, the crisis of the Chinese people is reaching a 
head.75
This argument, which appeared in Reading Life caused some confusion among the 
journal's readership. For, it was thought that Ai was suggesting that military force 
would only be employed if economic benefits did not continue to accrue to the 
imperialists, but as military power had already been used to enforce financial 
development, this reasoning seemed rather fatuous. Thus, to clarify both his 
position and their own, those who wrote to him outlined three views on imperialism 
in China.
The first was that China was able to preserve its independence because of 
the equilibrium among the various powers; but this they rejected by noting the 
troubles with Japan. The second, which they understood to be Ai's point, was that 
it was not the parity of power, but the contradiction resulting from the need for 
economic control, which prevented full military occupation. This they said was 
also incorrect, because it neglected the fundamental contradiction, which was that 
between the imperialist powers and the unified desire of the Chinese people for 
liberation. "Every Chinese," they wrote,
is concerned with our own national situation; and when the 
opportunity arises [for struggle] they will all throw themselves into it 
. . . in the end, the fundamental contradiction develops from that 
between the imperialists and the semi-colonial people. This makes it 
clear why the people’s institutions have an independent form of 
existence . . .  moreover, this explanation is able to provide the 
Chinese resistance with a correct direction.76
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Ai replied to this by first expressing his basic agreement with the argument 
of his readers. He notes that it would be a mistake to suggest that there was a 
previous separation between the military and economic power of imperialism in 
China (though he says that this was not his intention), and therefore he accepts the 
contention that the fundamental contradiction is that between imperialism and semi­
colonialism. What he does not believe is that there is a unified consensus for 
resistance; instead he maintains, the people are deeply divided. "Dialectics," he 
says,
sees the internal contradiction as that which is most important; the 
internal contradiction determines the essence of all things and events 
. . .  the internal contradiction in China still is the disunity within the 
resistance line, and the strong existence of traitors.77
Thus, he calls for a counter-movement, a struggle against those who openly and 
covertly aid imperialism.
Ai's article was also designed as a response to the arguments of Ye Qing on 
internal and external necessity. The brief comments on the internal contradiction 
were intended to demonstrate that the dialectical method could both justify and direct 
the movement for liberation. Yet, when the question of the possibility of resistance 
was raised directly to him, in a letter concerned with the problem as to whether 
China would suffer the same fate as that of Abyssinia, he adopts basically the same 
argument, that of a deep belief in the people's desire for resistance, that he had 
previously criticized.
The students who wrote to Ai asked if the loss of Abyssinia did not signify 
that a nation which was ill-equipped militarily would inevitably fail to a superior 
power. And with sincerity, they pleaded for a suitable answer to use against those 
who were advocating non-resistance: "not only are we unable to conquer our 
theoretical enemies, we are not even able to conquer ourselves."78 To this, Ai 
replied less in terms of theory and rather more in terms of a pragmatism grounded in 
feeling.
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Thus having pointed out that historical conditions must be examined 
objectively, in their uniqueness, and not through some all-embracing formula, he 
argues that there are specific advantages to the situation in China-as opposed to that 
in Abyssinia. These are: that the Chinese people have "gained valuable experience 
in their several dozens of years of fighting imperialists";79 that "China's standing 
army is first in the world";80 and that the "Chinese people are politically more 
advanced than the people of Abyssinia, and have a close relationship to the army in 
the resistance struggle."81 Further, he says that the Abyssinian commander-in-chief 
made a tactical error in not pursuing a guerrilla war, one which would have 
expanded the people’s participation; whereas in China, it is precisely the strength of 
the people which has prevented destruction. This explains "why in the final 
analysis the enemy has gone to great lengths to avoid a direct war with the Chinese 
people. At the same time, it is possible to understand what road must be taken to 
save China."82
These kinds of arguments, on theories of imperialism and the significance of 
the loss of Abyssinia, might be seen as intellectual concerns removed from the more 
immediate situation in China. It might be said that during the middle 1930s the 
social and political situation in China clearly required direct political action; and that 
those who doubted not only the course but the meaning of involvement itself were 
merely a small and insignificant minority. The difficulty with this is that it obviates 
the complexities surrounding the creation of a resistance movement, and it 
presupposes the myth that a revolutionary or resistance movement necessarily 
reflects a unanimity of opinion. The tensions and conflicts which have 
characterized the French and Russian revolutions, however, have shown that a 
revolution is composed of groups with quite divergent attitudes, where there is only 
a primary level of common commitment. In the Russian Revolution, for example, 
Stephen Cohen has noted that,
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though Russian Bolshevism was only one small current of European 
Marxism before 1917, it included rival intellectual schools and 
political tendencies of its own. Some Bolsheviks had been 
influenced by other European Marxisms, some by non-Marxist 
ideas, some by Russian populism or anarchism . . .  in short behind 
the facades of professed political and organizational unity known as 
"democratic centralism" there was no consensual Bolshevik 
philosophy or political ideology in 1917.8*5
Indeed, Bukharin characterized the Party as a "negotiated federation between 
groups, groupings, functions, and 'tendencies.'"84 Moreover, it is not always true 
that those who engage in movements do so out of a clear awareness of their own 
self-interest. The support of the workers in both Italy and Germany for fascism, 
for instance, proves that the use of symbols, of historical myths, and of a variety of 
cultural elements, can be employed to persuade and determine consciousness. 
Therefore it is important to understand both the reality of the concern expressed by 
the students who wrote to Ai, their desire to root the possibility of practice within a 
social philosophy (which, as Etienne Balazs has observed, is one of the 
distinguishing features of Chinese intellectual history)85 and the crisis of theory; its 
own negative dialectic.
For, the contradiction between Ai's emphasis upon both the unity and 
division within the resistance movement, and the lack of a theoretical critique in 
either his article on imperialism or that on the fate of Abyssinia, shows not that 
theory and practice were irreconcilable, but rather that the necessities of analysis and 
encouragement required a basic theoretical synthesis. Indeed, if the function of 
theory as an anodyne could not be integrated dialectically within its heuristic role; if, 
that is, the basic appeal to the notion of 'internal contradictions' could only assuage 
fears, but not inform, then any notion of the dialectic would suffice to create the 
requisite feeling of momentum. In this sense, theory as ideology would become an 
object of both defined and ill-defined intentions. Therefore, within this period of 
internal disequilibrium, revolutionary theorists attempted to create a sense of 
organization through which theory could be integrated, at some level, with practice.
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And here, the problem of organization has to be seen both in a broad and narrow 
sense: broad, in that the CCP was not itself clearly set in terms of its strategies and 
tactics, and narrow, in that it was impossible for many intellectuals, particularly in 
Shanghai, to proclaim their allegiance to the Party for fear of the reaction of the 
KMT.86 And thus the task for theorists was directed toward the propagation of an 
auxiliary movement to the CCP, where theory could maintain some ability to affect. 
This, irrespective of the fact that it could only establish a belief in resistance from 
anticipatory categories, which themselves could only inform immediately at the level 
of preliminary response.
This sense of structure was to be realized in the New Enlightenment 
Movement,87 a campaign based upon the ideals of democracy and patriotism. But 
here, what is of importance is not the movement itself, that was soon abandoned 
under pressure from the KMT, but rather the diversity of opinion with which its 
founders, Ai Siqi and Chen Boda, conceived it. For Chen's understanding of 
Marxism and its importance for the Chinese Revolution differed significantly from 
that of Ai. And as his argument, as well as Ai's, helped to define the eventual 
statement on synthesis: Mao's concept of sinification, his views deserve some 
consideration.
The predominant theme in Chen's writings during this period of the New 
Enlightenment Movement was that of preservation: his concern was to cultivate 
China's cultural identity, and hence keep it safe. "The coming of a new historical 
period," he wrote, "means the creation of a new culture and a new ethics . . . 
nevertheless we are historians, and we recognize that the production of a new 
morality cannot be unrelated to the development of the old."88 Therefore, notions 
such as "loyalty, piety, benevolence etc. have a value in the content of this new 
history . .  . they become new ethical virtues."89 This dialectic of old forms with 
new content, the absorption of Confucian values into a contemporary framework, 
meant not only that these concepts would now "follow from the people, instead of
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enslaving them,"90 but that in so doing they would become a fundamental part of 
the struggle for resistance. Indeed he notes that the political direction of cultural 
movements is a distinguishing feature of modern Chinese civil society: "the 
outstanding vanguard of a cultural movement often is the loyal and energetic 
vanguard within patriotic movements."91 From this, he argues that the New 
Enlightenment Movement is discontinuously a continuation of the 1898 Reform 
Movement. "China's Enlightenment Movement began during the 1898 Reform 
Movement. . .  and this movement is similar to that of the present." The qualitative 
difference between them however is that the former, "reflected the capitalist 
relations of its time . . . and was thus not formed by the masses. It only 
represented the call of upper stratum ideologist."92 Conversely, the idea of the 
New Enlightenment Movement is to be sought in the coalescence of all the people; 
everyone, Chen says, must defend China.
We must necessarily place the success of the resistance struggle in 
the forefront. Our battle line of the unity of resistance, containing 
dissimilar social strata, dissimilar parties, and people of dissimilar 
beliefs, is a point that we must necessarily bear in mind.93
We . . . demand unity.94
It may be argued that this "cultural-intellectual"95 approach, as Lin Yusheng 
has defined it in terms of the May 4th generation, where culture is given primacy as 
the guide to political involvement, reveals the dialectic between past and present 
categories in Chen's thought. His desire for the integration of a new content within 
traditional moral forms would thus be seen as typical of a conceptual approach 
which maintained itself through a continuous process of synthesis. In this, Chen's 
method had, as it were, two levels: one traceable with respect to an historical 
(inherited) pattern, the other novel in relation to historically specific constructs. 
Though Lin’s argument appears justified, and is certainly imaginative, it must not 
obscure the pragmatic concerns underlying Chen's efforts to revivify, and hence re­
establish, upon a different basis, a cultural identity for China. For, as the New
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Enlightenment Movement occurred during a period of organizational vacuity, the 
notion of a connection with the past became for some the only means through which 
political activity could be encouraged. In fact, Chen declared that in the absence of 
a commonly recognizable ground, the idea of China's heritage would remain 
abstract, concealed, and therefore open to manipulation. "One must remember that 
at all times the enemy will use China's classics to deceive the people."96
To preserve our ancient culture, to preserve our ancient holy land, to 
ensure that the "classics" are not used by the enemy to dupe 
compatriots, we willingly approve of the unity of all compatriots 
who oppose the enemy. Moreover, we place them in the vanguard 
of the struggle.97
The conjuncture of the dialectic of thought with that of necessity in Chen's 
writings is perhaps most clearly reflected in his call for the propagation of a new 
popular culture based upon traditional local forms.
Because the people's culture in each area of China has its own 
particularity, our people's cultural movement not only desires 
"Sinification," but also "localization." We want to use each 
locality's traditional cultural form so that it will suitably benefit the 
needs of the people in each area.98
Thus, throughout his essays, Chen stresses that, "each area should fully utilize its 
own dialect and particular form in the writing and printing of books. Reading 
material which is veiy good should be reprinted in the version of the dialect and 
form of a particular area."99 This principle that "new wine could be poured into old 
bottles" first articulated by Qu Qiubai, accented both Chen’s belief in the 
transcendent nature of traditional constructs, and his practical awareness of the 
facility with which they could be used to express novel, and contradictory, ideals. 
"The great expanse of the common people's customs and habits," he writes, "come 
from old cultural forms. To propagate the new cultural content through the use of 
old forms will therefore make it easier for them to accept."100 Indeed, he notes that 
there has been a continuous problem when there has been flight from this historical
ground. "All our past cultural movements have proven that to ignore old cultural 
forms will make it extremely difficult for education in this new culture to penetrate 
to the masses."101 Thus, Chen emphasizes the intermediary function of past values 
and habits as a conductor for that which is new, and which will in turn create its 
own suitable mode of expression. "The new content," he says, "will develop and 
continuously conquer the old form, making it an appendage . . .  in the transition to 
a new form."102
The theme of historical awareness, of the amalgam of past with present as 
an educative device, indicates that at one level, the tensions between history and 
value, which Levenson analyzed, survived, but in a transfigured way. For Chen 
Boda, it was precisely because Marxism had remained ill-defined and insufficiently 
transmitted, that it became necessary to re-teach the past. The problem of historical 
dislocation arose not out of the psychological dilemma to find meaning to that past, 
but rather because this new conceptual framework remained inadequate in being 
able to provide in that meaning an identity for resistance. And it is this lack of 
concern with the exigency of historical teaching, and the over-certainty surrounding 
Marxism's hermeneutic role, that leads Chen to criticize the work of his 
contemporary theories. "Ai Siqi's attempts to popularize philosophy have been 
epoch-making," he says. "But within his work he has neglected certain areas, 
specifically he has not paid enough attention to the relationship between all of 
Chinese history and the present reality."103 "We still lack a great work concerning 
Chinese social history . . . Chinese intellectual history . . . and Chinese 
contemporary economics."104 Thus, he calls upon intellectuals to fulfill their 
responsibility by supplying the Chinese people with the essential works of their 
own social sciences so as to provide the people with the tools of enlightenment.
Yet, at another level, these tensions which Levenson discussed as 
characteristic for the early generation of modernizers, do seem to typify the thought 
of Chen Boda. Ironically, this is because M arxism remained an abstraction; and as
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it was unable to supersede the antinomy between history and value, the conscious 
understanding of the dialectic between past and present remained unresolved. 
Thus, the use of tradition provided not only a pragmatic solution, but, within 
Levenson's framework, a psychological one as well. This is reflected in Chen's 
attempt to give his present concerns a sort of indigenous genealogy, by trying to 
find in Chinese history the nascence of modern dialectics.
In brief, his argument is that the epistemic of dialectics, which he sees as the 
relationship between thought and action, was first given a materialist explanation by 
Mo Zi. It was he who "took practice and behavior as the criterion of 
knowledge."105 This understanding of some kind of unity between thought and 
being was developed throughout the dynastic period, in particular by Wang 
Yangming in his philosophy of Ji-liang-zhi. Wang, though, was an idealist; his 
theory of the moral mind, which translates thought into spontaneous practice, gave 
primacy to the power of ideas. Therefore, Chen says that to re-establish the 
materialist basis within his philosophy "one must reverse the reversal of his 
idealism."106 "Knowledge," he notes, "must be seen as developing from practice, 
for practice is the basic movement of history."107 This materialist conception, he 
says, was recognized by Sun Zhongshan, who advocated "learning by doing."108 
Moreover, Sun realized the importance of theory as a guide for practice, and thus he 
said that though the enemy could kill his body, it could not destroy the effect of his 
thoughts. According to Chen this is a crucial insight; for not only does it reveal the 
dialectic between theory and practice, but it also emphasizes the necessity of 
theoretical work. If, he says, "ideas can develop as a material force" 109 (quoting 
Marx), and that it is only through theory that thought may progress, then theorists 
must be cognizant of the roots of their philosophy. "One aspect of original 
revolutionaries is that they benefit from their inheritance of the best from the past, 
and from that which is outstanding in their intellectual and cultural tradition."110
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Without this kind of understanding, a revolutionary movement simply wavers in a 
vacuum.
The suggestion that materialist concepts were traceable, could be found 
within traditional epistemes, that the idea of the unity of thought with being found 
expression in the values of benevolence, virtue, loyalty, etc., demonstrates that for 
Chen there was a real and not significant content to history.111 Indeed, it was 
precisely in the historical concretion of the 'museum' that tradition would be 
superseded, and be realized as a new theory and practice. In this dialectic, old 
forms would be reconstituted at a higher stage, without either being completely 
negated or reduced to an abstract value. At the same time, it is equally clear that if 
theory were not to dissolve into an admixture of borrowed and rediscovered 
philosophical constructs, then the conscious integration of past forms within a new 
conceptual framework presupposed a basic understanding of historical and 
dialectical materialism. The ambiguity concerning the definition of Marxism, 
particularly as it explained continuities and discontinuities, could itself only be 
recognized, if there was at least a primary understanding as to its content and 
meaning. Although Chen's writings on Marxist philosophy are not extensive, an 
impression of his thoughts on the idea of the dialectic and its application may be 
drawn from two articles: "The Decline of Decadent Philosophy," and "On the 
Theory of China's Self-Awakening."
In "The Decline of Decadent Philosophy," which was written as an attack on 
Ye Qing, Chen contends that materialist dialectics are founded upon the recognition 
of historical necessity; on, that is, an awareness of the linear movement of an 
invariant logic. In other words, as with Ye Qing (though clearly for different 
reasons) Chen basically accepts Engels' interpretation of dialectical materialism. 
"Although one may consider oneself free," Chen argues, "in truth one is dependent 
upon the blind movement of necessity."112 He illustrates this with an example of a
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factor owner, whose independence in the planning of production is itself subject to 
the blind laws of development.
The contradiction between production and depreciation which occur 
under the anarchic conditions of commodity production as an 
historical necessity (one which is completely outside the 
consciousness and will of the capitalist, and which he does not 
understand) becomes a periodic crisis in capitalism, which leads to 
its dissolution.113
Conversely, what distinguishes dialectical materialism is that through it, there may 
be a conscious application of the laws governing the development of nature and of 
history.
Contemporary materialists are historical determinists; they recognize 
that nature and history are not confused and without system but 
progress according to fixed principles. Contemporary materialists 
are not, however, fatalists; they understand that man is produced in 
history, and that history is created by man. Although men receive 
the determination of necessity, when this is understood they can 
themselves determine that necessity.114
(As Engels said in the Anti-Duhring. "freedom therefore consists in the control over 
ourselves and over external nature, which is founded on knowledge of external 
necessity."115)
It was in the article "On the Theory of China's Self-Awakening" that Chen 
rooted his conception of the dialectic in the movement of Chinese history. 
Unfortunately, it is not available. There are, however, two independent summaries 
of his explanation, in both Ai Siqi's article, "The New Enlightenment Movement 
and China's Self-Awakening," and in He Ganzhi's contemporary account The 
Modern Chinese Enlightenment Movement.116 and as both descriptions are 
basically similar, and as both conjoin with Chen's definition of the dialectic, it does 
seem fair to summarize succinctly, Chen's Marxist interpretation of the New 
Enlightenment Movement.
According to Ai, Chen argued that this movement represented the second 
qualitative stage in the continuous dialectical progression, manifest through the
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negation of the negation, of the advance toward freedom and independence. The 
first stage, which culminated in the 1911 Revolution, was itself the negation of the 
negation of the Reforms of 1898, and was the realization, at a higher level, of the 
aims of the Taiping Rebellion [now Revolution], which, though it failed, marked 
the first organized attempt to overthrow the rule of the Manchus. For Chen, the 
1911 Revolution initiates a new period in Chinese history; one in which the Chinese 
people began to become aware of their destiny. And it was Sun Zhongshan, he 
says, who, with his Three People's Principles, provided this movement with the 
method, and the solution as to how to guide the people to full self-consciousness 
and freedom. The New Enlightenment Movement, in turn, was for Chen the 
negation of the failure of the Northern Expedition, and the concretion, at a 
qualitatively higher stage, of the process begun in 1911. It was that stage where the 
people, through Sun's principles and Marxism, participated in the resistance effort 
'in' and 'for' themselves.
The difficulty with Chen's understanding of dialectics was that, following 
Engels, he posited the subject-object dialectic in undialectical opposition. 
Therefore, his objectification of the dialectic as autonomous and invariant, and his 
rejection of the notion of fatalism, leads him to adopt the voluntarist approach of 
identifying the Chinese resistance movement as both the subject and object of 
history. Rather than ground his conception of the dialectic in the complex 
relationship between consciously directed activity and a given, objective historical 
circumstance, Chen simply hypostatizes thought such that it becomes its own 
material object. Hence his stress upon the Three People's Principles, which as the 
method for (and the result of) the grasp of the otherwise blind movement of the 
negation of the negation, becomes necessary and sufficient for practice. It is this 
definition and use of the dialectic that Ai directly criticizes. Chen, he says,
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has revealed the aspect of revolutionary means and measures; he has 
shown that the soul of the Three Great Policies are the Three 
People's Principles, and that they are the fundamental method 
through which to resolve the three problems of the people . . .  to 
discuss this, however, is only to explain the subjective aspect, it 
does not explain the objective basis for the resolution of the 
problem. We not only want correct measures from the subjective 
aspect, but we must also necessarily understand its objective material 
basis.117
Accordingly, Ai says that the origins of the New Enlightenment Movement lay in 
the weakness of nascent capitalism to establish itself fully during the 1911 
Revolution, which meant that though this movement was democratic, it was still 
forced to rely upon feudal structures in order to develop. Thus, "China became 
unified in name and semi-divided in practice."118 It was during the period of the 
Northern Expedition, however, that this weak bourgeoisie was able to assert its 
independence such that Chinese capitalism gave rise to a laboring class. The New 
Enlightenment Movement he says, is therefore characterized by the temporary unity 
of two distinct parties of conflicting interests; the product of a particular process of 
capitalist growth. It is clear from this that for Ai, the concept of negation derives its 
meaning from its historic context, from within; otherwise it would exist as a 
malleable category, whose function would lie purely in justification, invoked, in 
this sense, from without.
The contrasting interpretations of Ai and Chen concerning the idea of the 
dialectic, derived not only from their analyses as to the definition and use of Marxist 
categories, but also from their differing perceptions as to the relationship between 
theory and practice. For, implicit in Ai's understanding was the argument that 
theory could only play a positive role, if its function were first grasped 
philosophically. In other words, theory in and for practice: praxis, presupposed its 
own grounding in a systematic framework. Though this might seem obvious, or 
indeed a tautology, it was precisely because the form and content of the dialectic 
between theory and practice had neither been clearly recognized nor established, that
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Ai, through explanation, continued his efforts to create an appreciation for the 
importance of critical awareness.
In his article "One Cannot Relax One's Ideological Duty," for example, he 
again warned of the danger of a purely emotional response to the crisis in China. 
Here, he points out that passion without reason leads to emotive violence, and 
internal disruption.
The strength of the unified resistance movement cannot be based on 
blind and popular groups, but must result from clear consciousness.
People consider the immediate killing of a traitor to be satisfying; yet 
if one acts by relying on the momentary impulse of indignation then 
. . .  the danger, conversely, is that people will strike at their own 
compatriots. In the i*esistance movement it is not that we lack 
passion or anger, rather, one fears that there is too much of it.119
Consequently, he links the growth of false consciousness to the inability of 
organizations to provide a coherent direction to the efforts at resistance. This, he 
says, has been characterized by a structural alienation, where people are either 
forced back into their small group identifications—which some "curse as useless, 
and a waste of spiritual energy" 120-o r  where they become totally isolated: "there 
are those who cannot find organizations, and whose work thus becomes completely 
without method."!21 The supersession of this situation requires the rectification of 
organizations, and this assumes an understanding of the activity of ideology.
What Ai meant by this was made clear in the essay, "The Conceptual Form 
in the Time of Emergency," where he makes the critical point that the function of 
ideology in organization must itself be seen dialectically. Having defined ideology 
as the "theoretical representation of the consciousness of an organization,"122 Ai 
argues that an organization in turn is mediated by its own ideology: theory defines 
the intention of that organizational consciousness in praxis. "The conceptual form 
not only represents the common consciousness of an organization, but at the same 
time, even more clearly, it determines that common consciousness."123 He gives 
an illustration, the ideology of hedonism, with its fixed and thorough advocacy of
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enjoyment. "This conceptual form," he notes, "does not merely represent the 
consciousness of a group, rather it is the organizer of the group's 
consciousness."124 Thus, he emphasizes that if it is recognized that ideology and 
organization exist as mutual determinants, then it will be understood that "correct 
scientific philosophy and progressive art can expand our consciousness, can make it 
more resolute"; whereas "decadent ait and incorrect scientific philosophy can pull us 
on to the wrong road."125
Ai's argument was designed to state theoretical principles in such a way that
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the structuring of organizations would itself be rooted in the awareness of the 
dialectical function of theory. Because he saw ideology as, in part, the 
representation of a group's consciousness, he attempted to create in that 
consciousness a desire for theory, which would in turn become reflected in that 
organization; in, that is, theory's own presuppositions. In effect, he was stating the 
problem from both sides: from theory down, and from organization up. This form 
of argument mirrors the content of his article "The Democratic Principle of Mass 
Organizations," where he contends that the formal structure of organizations must 
be from the top down, and from the bottom up.
What we call the bond of democratic organization is that the 
leadership, from the top downwards, cannot be separated from the 
organizational relationship, from the bottom upwards. To break this 
kind of organizational relationship, means that . . .  all planning 
would then have to rely on the weak brains of a few high level 
individuals.12^
This notion of a "mass-line" in organizational structure makes it clear that 
for Ai, the responsibility of ideology lay in the constant reconstruction of that 
consciousness which in form it expressed. And this begins to suggest a broadening 
of his earlier analysis concerning the relationship between the base and the 
superstructure. For, whereas previously he defined the superstructure as that which 
dialectically reflects the base, he now extends this idea, to see the process of 
enlightenment and that of political practice as necessarily mediated by organization.
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Therefore the function of ideology, as the dialectical representation of a complex of 
mutually interacting complexes—art, philosophy; each with its own relative 
autonomy—as the dialectical synthesis of the form and content of conceptual 
consciousness, becomes that of judging critically its own form from that content, as 
it is revealed in practice. Its role becomes that of preventing, both in theory and in 
intended practice, the false reconciliation of subject and object. Thus, the critique of 
Chen Boda's conception of the dialectic, and the attack upon weak-minded 
functionaries, had as its object the recognition that theory without content, without 
the ability to negate and make clear the limits of its own form, simply adorns action. 
Categories which themselves lack a clear underpinning, become slogans. And 
therefore the preservation of dialectical theory requires in its acceptance as value, the 
understanding that its principle lies in negation, in the supersession of immediacy. 
This is why Ai emphasizes that as a method, Marxism is not tied to any set notion 
of linear progress. For, at this level, false ideas, whatever their intent (to convince, 
for example, that history is on one's side) lead to myth.
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CHAPTER 2
IDEAS CONCERNING THE DIALECTIC: THE
ATTEMPT TO 
DEFINE A THEORY OF CHINESE MARXISM
The writings of Ai and Chen during the mid-1930s were, in some respects, 
marginal to the more concrete concerns of the Party. The controversies in 
Shanghai, while clearly responsive to the crisis in China, were still separate from 
the disputes which were occurring in Yan'an. And thus, the removed quality to the 
problems of ideology and organization was, in a sense, superseded when these 
somewhat abstract concerns were concretized within the Party's formal structure; 
when, that is, Party philosophers were called to Yan'an.1
This gathering of theorists was part of a move by Mao toward the 
consolidation of power. It was a step in the process of assuming unquestioned 
leadership over the contentious pro-Soviet faction within the Party, through the 
affirmation of political and ideological solidarity. And it was within this context, 
among theorists who seemingly agreed only upon the importance of a federated 
Marxism, that Mao delivered a series of lectures on dialectical materialism. He gave 
three speeches covering categories and concepts, which were the cumulation of the 
essentially private study of two translated textbooks on Soviet philosophy. These 
were, A Course on Dialectical Materialism by M. Shirokov and A. Aizenberg et al., 
which was translated into Chinese in 1936, and Dialectical and Historical 
Materialism by M. B. Mitin et al., which was also translated in 1936. There were 
of course a number of other translated works which were available to Mao 
throughout this period, but it does appear that these two treatises provided the basis 
for his interpretation of the dialectic.
In one respect, these lectures were expected. A demonstration of theoretical 
ability, some knowledge of the workings of the dialectic, was part of the criteria for
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leadership in a Marxist Party. This had become almost law after Lenin's extensive 
writings on philosophy. And it certainly would have been important for Mao to 
show that he was not simply a military strategist, but that he was also capable of 
understanding theory.
His political situation, however, demanded something more than a standard 
speech. In the face of an opposition trained in Soviet Marxism Mao could not 
simply repeat Soviet definitions as to the categories of the dialectic. In order to 
impress and to support his claim to power, he had to offer a new interpretation.
Forced into creativity, Mao ended up denying the very premise of his 
political position. The lectures categorically denied the possibility, and the 
desirability, for a sinification of Marxism. And in this regard all these lectures were 
consistent. The irony is, that in attempting to manipulate concepts which he clearly 
did not understand, Mao undercut the basis of his own stance. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that years later he would deny any connection with these speeches.2
The problem with Mao's argument lies in his confused discussion of two 
related laws: the unity of opposites, and the negation of the negation. But in order 
to make this clear, it is important to understand how these laws are basically defined 
within the canon of Marxist dialectics.
In dialectical materialism, the law of the unity of opposites is founded upon 
the idea that negation is inherent within all positive determinations. And that it is 
through the internal conflict of opposites that there is a continuous development to 
higher forms. The concept of contrary opposition—what is called contradiction-is 
thus understood as the condition of the real: the state of all states of affairs. Each 
thing is said to contain within itself its own contradiction, and things are said to be 
in a state of contradiction with each other.
In both conditions, the premise of contrary opposition relates to the 
predicate. There is an assumption of a (temporary) unity of a subject. And 
therefore the conflict between opposites, the contradiction between things, refers to
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predicates with positive determinations which are mutually exclusive within a 
restricted context.
In the lectures on dialectical materialism, Mao confuses the subject with the 
predicate. That which is inherent becomes the subject of its own definition. 
Difference (and Mao uses difference and contradiction interchangeably) becomes 
Identity. A thing is no longer characterized as a unity of opposites, where negation 
exists in a reciprocal relation with affirmation; instead, contradictions come to exist 
on their own, in unity and in contradiction with other contradictions.
What this means is that when a contradiction, A, is negated through its 
interaction with another, contradiction B, the result is something higher and 
completely different: a new affirmation. This distinct identity is the product of the 
negation of the negation. "In the process of development of things and concepts," 
Mao says, "not only are their internal contradictory elements made manifest, but 
these contradictory elements can be removed, negated, and resolved to become a 
new and higher thing or concept, change to become a higher thing or concept. 
Correct thought should not exclude the negation of the negation."3
This concept of the negation of the negation denied the very premise of a 
sinification of Marxism. To argue that an affirmation assumes a complete negation 
made it clear that the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist stance demanded the negation 
of all preceding philosophies. This is why Mao called for the "liquidation of 
China's philosophical heritage."4 For this was a statement of precondition: a 
Marxist stance supposed the complete eradication of all those non-Marxist 
philosophies which constituted China's intellectual history. Hence, in this 
philosophy, antinomies were conceived as complete and self-contained; that which 
was positive negated its other.
This prohibitive aspect to categorical use makes it clear that Mao did not 
understand (nor does he seem ever to have understood)5 that the law of the negation 
of the negation proceeds from an initial affirmation, which is maintained throughout
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a discontinuous process, and is then restored at a higher level. This is the meaning 
of a determinate negation: that which is positive is preserved within the
discontinuity of qualitative transformation. Ascension contains regress within 
itself. There is always a sense in which that which is affirmed returns to its original 
point, but these points of return continue to be higher, since the whole process is 
assumed to be evolutionary.6
Ai Siqi had been quite clear on this. In an article concerning the relationship 
between formal and dialectical logic published in 1936, he had explained how the 
dialectic should be understood in terms of preservation and cancellation.
Ye Qing notes that sublation is not simply sublation; denial is not 
simply denial. And here he appears to be correct. Though sublation 
is in one respect the sublation or the negation of the negative thing, 
in addition there is also that aspect of the positive transformation and 
criticism of the thing which preserves it. This obviously is not 
simple sublation.7
The problem with Ye, however, is that he sees this relation mechanically; 
one area is preserved, while the other is negated. He separates and divides. 
Instead, Ai says, this relation should be seen dialectically, with respect to the mutual 
interpenetration of opposites. The idea that
'A is A' at the same time that 'A is not A' should not be treated as 
'one aspect and another aspect', rather they are interconnected.
These two propositions are a unified whole. Since they are not 
mechanically bound, therefore they cannot mechanically be broken.8
Ai's point is that since opposites are interrelated, then neither negation nor 
affirmation may ever be considered as complete acts in themselves. There are no 
pure states. Instead, the theory of the dialectic implies that as a positive contains 
within itself its own opposite, so is its higher re-affirmation dependent upon its own 
negation.
This is not how Mao understood the dialectic. He saw negation quite 
literally as the opposite of affirmation. In this context, a negative was a something
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which had to be negated. It was only with such a complete act that an identity could 
be affirmed. An identity therefore was a state; a realized moment which occurred in 
contrast to the conditions which preceded it: The 'C' which results from non-A, 
non-B. And here, it is important to make this distinction between state and 
condition clear, because it helps to explain Mao's reified concept of the dialectic.
To do so requires that Mao's marginal notes to his philosophical readings be 
taken into account.9 For it is in the reading notes to the Soviet textbooks, and to Ai 
Siqi's Philosophy and Life, that Mao elaborates on the argument that he makes in 
his public lectures. The use of these notes therefore is simply to help to clarify that 
which was openly expressed. There is no attempt here to try to find another 
philosophical system in what are soliloquitive writings.
The point to be noted then, is that Mao seems to separate the character of 
movement out of creation, so that flux becomes a permanent other to subjective 
moments of realization. Hence, there is a qualitative difference between the 
finalized state of a thing, and that which constitute the attributes of that thing in its 
transition from state to state. A state is something definite, a concretion; whereas its 
condition is that which identifies the content of a thing as it moves from one 
achieved state to another. "That which is considered as the basis of a developmental 
process," Mao says,
is namely a process of transformation from one kind of condition to 
another kind of condition. This is the development of a 
contradiction; that which is called a leap or sudden change. To 
consider this [process of transformation] as the basis, is to search 
for prerequisites, the condition and its realization for a new stage.10
This is the movement of the unity of opposites through a process of
affirmation, negation, and the negation of the negation. It is that which
characterizes aspects in transition. And though the content of a particular course is
specific to itself, the end is predetermined: that which negates the initial affirmation
will ultimately be negated. When this occurs, a new Identity is created. "All
phenomena" Mao writes," are [examples of] the law of Identity. Although there are
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various kinds of stages, they are still entirely a kind of particular secondary process. 
They still reside within the law of Identity."11
A thing which is in Identity is a realized affirmation. It is also the complete 
other of a negation. "Struggle," Mao says,
is where sides are in opposition. Identity is where both sides are 
peaceful. The state is where both sides are opposed, Identity is the 
liquidation of the state. Because mutual opposites exist as the 
condition of a process, to go through struggle is to overcome 
opposition, and thus to be able to evolve to an Identity.12
This Identity is to be seen as a Contradiction. This is how it is real. Thus, 
as a Contradiction it exists in unity with other Contradictions. But this unity is 
temporary, because the true state of a thing is to be in struggle with other 
Contradictions. "The unity of contradictions itself," Mao says in his lectures, "just 
makes manifest the straggle of contradictions; or just is an element in the straggle of 
contradictions."13
There are then two processes, two types of struggle. The first refers to the 
resolution of an internal negation which leads to an affirmation: a pure state. But 
since everything is assumed to be in a condition of flux, this affirmation cannot 
exist other than as a Contradiction. And here, it is important to remember that Mao 
insists that everything is in contradiction. Indeed, he criticizes Ai Siqi for failing to 
recognize that "all difference is contradiction."14 Therefore, a thing in Identity must 
be a Contradiction. The affirmation which results from the final negation takes its 
place as a positive antinomy, because this is the only way that an affirmation could 
be distinguished as the other of negation, within the permanent state of 
contradiction. In other words, the predicate could only be sustained as a subject, if 
the character of that predicate was also maintained. This is what Mao does with the 
idea of the unity of contradictions: he turns a copula into a subject, which is then 
defined in terms of the assumed philosophical condition of history.
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This logic denied any concept of a sinification of Marxism. Instead, the 
reception of Marxism was seen as dependent upon the negation of its ideological 
other: Chinese history. And on this point, Mao was quite clear.
If we wish to ensure that the current of dialectical materialist thought 
will penetrate deeply into China and continue to develop, and will, 
moreover, firmly direct the Chinese revolution along the road to 
complete victory, then we must struggle with the various decadent 
philosophies which currently exist. We must raise the flag of 
ideological criticism on the ideological front throughout the whole 
country, and thereby liquidate the philosophical heritage of ancient 
China. Only thus can we reach our goal.15
Since Mao's categories of value were based upon a principle of exclusion, 
there was no aspect of China's culture which could be integrated within another 
intellectual framework. And thus for Mao, the point of the whole movement toward 
enlightenment, toward the development of a national culture, was to prepare the 
ground for a proper negation. It was to guide change toward a real affirmation; the 
creation of a new Identity. "To raise the national culture," Mao says, "is to prepare 
the conditions for changing to an international culture. . . ,"16 "We make the 
declaration that we are internationalists, but at the same time, because we are a 
political party of a colony, we struggle for the protection of the motherland. Only 
when we have first escaped from imperialist oppression can we participate in a 
world communist society. . . ."17
The conception of negation as an evolution from the particular to the 
universal underscores the philosophical fact that in the interest of Marxist 
preservation, these lectures on dialectical materialism cancelled the idea of the 
dialectic. In turn, this discarding of the concept of synthesis makes these statements 
philosophically unique. Hence with regard to the writings of Mao, the lecture on 
contradiction is not philosophically comparable to the essay published on this theme 
in 1952. The similarity of reference: the name contradiction, must be distinguished 
from the contrasting sense in which this name was given meaning.18
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The importance of "On Contradiction" will be discussed at length in the 
second half of this work. It may simply be stated here, that "On Contradiction" 
provided the philosophical underpinning for the idea of sinification. Through the 
category of the "unity of opposites," "On Contradiction" transformed the conception 
of the relation between the universal and the particular, so that the universal came to 
be seen as the requisite of that particular. And while Mao made it clear that the 
correct ideas of Marxism were always to be rooted within the specificity of China’s 
ground, this idea was expressed through a principle of integration, an idea of the 
dialectic, which was foreclosed in 1937. In short, it was only with the publication 
of "On Contradiction" in 1952 that theorists were able to utilize Mao's Marxist 
philosophical perspective.
There are those, however, who have tried to read the theme of "On 
Contradiction" back on to the lectures of 1937, in order to establish a sense of 
continuity .19 But this effort at retrieval rests on a fundamental philosophic 
misunderstanding. The concept of a "unity of contradictions" is incoherent, and 
therefore it may not be discussed as the logic-equivalent of the concept of the "unity 
of opposites," which is the centerpiece of "On Contradiction."
The notion of contradictions existing in unity or in contradiction with other 
contradictions is meaningless; is self-contradictory. And statements on 
contradiction may not violate the rules of formal logic. As Stanley Rosen points 
out, "to assert, for example, that a concept corresponds to the predicate 'p and non- 
p’ makes it clear that contradictions are intelligible, not that we can construct 
arguments using contradictory statements."^ It is a serious mistake therefore to try 
to deconstruct the concept of the "unity of contradictions" to some verbal shell so 
that it might carry a (more desirable) content. Mao's explicit statements on the 
dialectic in 1937 had meaning; they led to a clear ideological position. And thus his 
argument concerning the roles of affirmation and negation, and their expression in 
the call for the 'liquidation of China's philosophical heritage', may neither be
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discarded nor side-stepped, because they otherwise are incomprehensible, or 
because the statements seem historically discordant. Mao meant what he said: the 
affirmation of Marxism supposed the evisceration of China's cultural heritage.
It should also be noted that Mao is not entirely consistent in his use of the 
notion of contradiction in the lectures of 1937. At times, he seems to suggest a 
different process to negation depending upon whether that which is negated is a 
contradiction or an opposite. This, of course, is in keeping with his basic 
distinction between the two. Thus, in his first lecture on dialectical materialism, he 
says, for example, that "a new form of motion occurs as the opposite of (or in 
antagonism to) an old form of motion . . .  at the same time the new form of motion 
necessarily preserves many essential elements of the old form of motion."21 
Moreover, in the margins of one of the translated Soviet textbooks, he does note 
that negation is not absolute. "Negation does not destroy everything; it does not 
divide the old and the new. It is not absolute, and that which moves forward 
contains that which came before. . . ,"22 But, he also asserts that, "all processes 
change from their contradictory opposites to an identity; change to a negation of the 
negation."23 This means that the rise of a new Affirmation (Contradiction) assumes 
a level conceptual ground unified beyond opposition. "New things," Mao says, 
"occur as the resolution of the original contradiction. At the same time that the 
original opposites and their unity are eliminated, new contradictions begin to 
develop."24 And this underlines the consistency of his overriding point: each new 
identity was subject only to itself.
It is important to recognize that Mao seems never to have grasped the 
concept of a determinate negation. It appears that he always believed that negation 
signified unwanted negativity. And this is brought out, emphatically, by the fact 
that when, in the late 1950s, he re-embraces that same philosophical structure of 
understanding which had informed the lectures on dialectical materialism, he simply 
tosses the category of the negation of the negation from the canon.
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Engels talks about the three categories, but as for me I don't believe 
in two of those categories. (The unity of opposites is the most basic 
law, the transformation of quality and quantity into one another is 
the unity of the opposites quality and quantity, and the negation of 
the negation does not exist at a ll.). . . There is no such thing as the 
negation of the negation. Affirmation, negation, affirmation, 
negation . . .  in the development of things, every link in the chain of 
events is both affirmation and negation. Slave-holding society 
negated primitive society, but with reference to feudal society it 
constituted, in turn, the affirmation. Feudal society constituted the 
negation in relation to slave-holding society but it was in turn the 
affirmation with reference to capitalist society. Capitalist society 
was the negation in relation to feudal society, but it is, in turn, the 
affirmation in relation to socialist society.25
This understanding that the purpose of movement was to be realized in 
completion, makes it clear that despite the debacle of the lectures on dialectical 
materialism, Mao retained his un-dialectical conception of the dialectic, whereby 
predicates were transformed into newly affirmed subjects. This suggests, in turn, 
that this particular logic was neither transformed, nor cancelled by the arguments of 
"On Contradiction." Instead, these earlier concepts were, in effect, pushed back to 
what might be called a second philosophical line, where they remained until Mao 
returned to his unguarded and unchecked philosophical musings. In other words, 
as opposed to the argument of "On Contradiction," where the understanding of the 
"unity of opposites" as a dynamic relation took fifteen years to develop, and had the 
benefit of critical commentary, Mao's later statements on philosophy mark a return 
to that same mode of thought which had discredited his lectures on dialectics. The 
only substantive difference is that in the late 1950s he was finally able to remove the 
idea of a dialectical process from the permanence of contradiction. This is the point 
of casting the negation of the negation aside. For only then could affirmation truly 
stand as a full subject in opposition to its constant other. The theory, 
unencumbered by the dialectic, is actually rather straight forward: there is only one 
affirmation at any time, which is eventually destroyed after an indeterminate period. 
And out of this void a new positive is created, which then repeats this whole 
process ("affirmation, negation, affirmation . . "One thing," Mao says,
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"destroys another, things emerge, develop, and are destroyed, everywhere is like 
th is ."26 This new positive which occurs after negation, Mao termed the 
"affirmation of negation."27 It was a concept of affirmation as identity; the rebuke 
of emptiness.
This philosophical understanding was at one time restated as Mao's "poor 
and blank" thesis: the idea that upon an empty mind the most beautiful characters 
could be written. But this was only one form of an idea which had first been 
expressed in the late 1930s. It would be a mistake therefore to see this theory of the 
"affirmation of the negation," and the denial of the negation of the negation, as 
signifying a decisive shift in Mao's philosophical thought.28 Though it might be 
argued that his approach moved in another, less Marxist, direction in his later years, 
this change may not be found in his discussion of the related ideas of negation and 
affirmation. On the contrary, these constructs simply reiterated, as a refined 
philosophy, the essential argument of Mao's earliest discourse on contradiction.
This aspect of continuity underscores the importance of the framework 
which guided the initial lectures on dialectics. And in this regard, the philosophical 
environment in which Mao's theories were formulated should be made somewhat 
more clear. For he was certainly not alone in his understanding of the dialectics of 
negation.
As has previously been discussed, Chen Boda also conceived of negation as 
a self-contained and completed act. But this argument, which Ai Siqi had rather 
pointedly criticized, led to a radically different conclusion from that offered by Mao. 
For Chen, the working out of the negation of the negation proved the need for a 
nationalized form of Marxism. His idea of the dialectic supported the idea of 
sinification, whereas Mao's concept denied it. Therefore, it would seem that Mao's 
final schema was basically self-formulated. And while this does appear to be the 
case, it should also be noted that at this time, Li Da was advancing a theory of 
negation which was not so far removed from the philosophy of Mao. In other
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words, during this period, there was a context, a representative attitude of thought, 
of which Mao's particular statements were a singular part.
Li Da argued that negation was a quality which permeated the entire process 
of contradiction. It was that which both initiated and resolved the course of the 
dialectic. Negation was the one constant. "Within each stage there are many 
negations . . . the law of the negation of the negation is not realized in the law of 
three stages; this is very clear."29 What he seems to have meant by this, was that 
negation was the force which operated through, and defined, those opposites united 
in contradiction. Thus, negation functioned as the cunning of the dialectic, as a 
moment between opposites. At the same time, since it was always there, negation 
both preceded and was the product of the final negation—the negation of the 
negation. "Within each thing itself, it is the stage before sublation. It is the 
relationship permeating the whole process of contradiction within each stage of the 
whole process."30 "Negation is the result of the course of the internal development 
of a contradiction."31
This idea of an affirmative negation is meaningless: a pure negation may not 
be the continuous product of development. Indeed, there would be no 
development. But the point to note here, is that Li's notion that negation is 
somehow the result of the negation of the negation shares the same theoretical basis 
as the argument of Mao. In other words, though they both characterize the result of 
the dialectical process differently, their terms refer to the same event: a state in 
which the dialectic is completed as a unique positive. Since Li understands negation 
as extinction, then it follows that, that which is truly affirmative has to be something 
entirely new. When Li Da separates negation from the category of the negation of 
the negation, so that the latter exists as a separate identifiable stage, while negation 
exists as the activity which both precedes and succeeds that stage, he makes it clear 
that the stage of the negation of the negation had itself to be negated. This means 
that each positive filled a void; provided an identity for that which otheiwise would
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remain blank. Accordingly, if anything was to exist, there had to be an affirmation 
of the negation.
Though this conclusion was dictated by reason, it was never stated. Li, that 
is, never moved beyond philosophical explanations of the negative. And therefore, 
the concept of the positive as recompense, was unique to Mao. This then suggests 
that Li had little influence on Mao's theoretical development.32 As philosophers of 
the dialectic they rambled separately. In fact, in 1938, commenting on Li's 
explanation concerning the negation of the negation, Mao writes to himself, "this is 
unclear," "this still is unclear," and "this is all unclear."33 The point therefore to 
recognize is that during this period, there was a common structure of reasoning 
which guided the distinctive arguments of Li, Chen, and Mao. They all shared a 
literal, undialectical, interpretation of the dialectic, which was the product of a 
specific political commitment to a nationalist Marxist stance.
Thus, the categories of the dialectic were never allowed any theoretical 
authority, but were defined instead in terms of concrete concerns. Principle was 
governed by attitude. And it is this refusal to try to understand meaning 
independent of the immediacy of political need, that ties Chen's simplistic reading 
of the negation of the negation, to Li's "floating negation"; and both of them to the 
ddbScle of Mao's lectures. Yet, at the same time, it is important to realize that 
Mao's philosophical failure was also the result of his rejection of a claim for a 
general status to Marxist political philosophy.
What governed the lectures on dialectical materialism was Mao's belief that 
theory is never neutral: it always acts as an ideology. This insight, which forced 
him to move beyond a mere demonstration of competence in his lectures, was of 
course shaped by the political history of the Comintern in China, and by the 
activities of the 'returned students' within the Communist Party. It is not necessary 
here to recount the long and complex dispute between Mao and the 'returned 
students1.34 But it is necessary to note that as these 'returned students' justified
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their factional position, in part, through their understanding of Soviet Marxism, so 
Mao came to identify the theoretical constructs of this Marxism with the imposition 
of policy. This means that he read Soviet philosophy within the subtext of 
domination and control. Truth expressed political interest; and all works were 
representations of particular relations of power. Instead of a generalized essence, 
an "orthodoxy", there were only collections of statements of instrumental value. 
This understanding of content as the completely internalized dictum of political 
authority, left meaning without an independent, substantive basis. And in turn, this 
foreclosed the possibility for theoretical speculation. "Seventeen and eighteen year 
old babies," Mao wrote, "are taught to nibble on Das Kapital and Anti-Duhring. 
Thus many students develop an abnormal outlook; they have no interest in Chinese 
problems, and pay no heed to Party instructions. Their inclination is to regard what 
they have learned from their teachers as dogma."35
With this statement, the idea of critical reasoning vanishes. Theory becomes 
objectified as an exhaustible determination. And where intention so governs, there 
is no theoretical point of resistance. This explains how texts could betray; for their 
intellectual expressions were merely the cover for that which had already been 
submerged. Mao's recognition of the ideological character of theory did carry with 
it a sense of endorsement; an accepted understanding of the foundations of control. 
But here, in this formative period, what it is critically important to note is that this 
extinguishing of content turned upon a logic which could only conceive of an other 
in absolute terms. This meant that Mao saw power simply as the negation of truth; 
its affirmation. And therefore as there was no truth content which was redeemable, 
so was there no inherent meaning which could survive the process of adaptation. 
"If," Mao says, "you speak of Marxism apart from the special characteristics of 
China, it is only abstract and empty."36 In other words, there were no universal 
truths; there was just a name to be taken on, and a separate ideology to be defined.
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The idea of synthesis was not therefore grounded in philosophical judgment; 
instead, it was based upon an attitude which saw antinomies as completed subjects. 
Thus, Mao's move back to the celebration of Chinese history, the reversal of 
contradiction which occurs as the result of the lectures, is accompanied by a denial 
of a substantive universal Marxism, just as the reception of that Marxism had been 
conditioned by the rejection of Chinese culture. In this context, exclusivity both 
reflected and reinforced prejudice. This ossified thought—the undivided one as the 
achievement of the negation of the negation—was the cause of misunderstanding, 
since it was the product of an ideological approach to theory. Thus Mao's political 
education, which led to an insight into the political culture of Soviet philosophy, 
prevented his philosophical understanding from moving beyond immediacy. In 
turn, this sealed off interpretation from a more general determination.
The reduction of meaning to a series of formal statements, meant that the 
translated Soviet materials basically provided a vocabulary for what was envisioned 
as an essentially different theoretical approach. At the same time, re-definition 
could only be offered through a vocabulary which both acted as a spur to creativity, 
and insured at least the aura of allegiance.
In this regard, it should be obvious that no competent Soviet theoiist would 
ever have agreed with Mao's argument concerning the unity of contradictions, and 
the role of negation in the dialectic. Mao’s incoherence was certainly not in keeping 
with the character of Soviet thought. It is not at all surprising therefore, that when 
Wang Ming returns to China a few months after Mao's lectures, he comes with the 
instruction from Moscow that Mao's theoretical level be ra is e d .T h o u g h  it is not 
absolutely clear that this dictum was in direct response to Mao's lectures, it does 
seem reasonable to assume that his major address would have been known in the 
Soviet Union soon after it was given. But even if the statement was not an 
immediate response, the judgment was correct: Mao's understanding of philosophy 
was insufficient.
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The idea of clarification, of acquiring knowledge through interchange, was 
therefore denied by an ideological mind set that remained quite rigid. And this 
attitude continued to define Mao's theoretical articulations. For what unites both the 
lectures on dialectical materialism with the subsequent speech on sinification, is the 
fact that both were governed by strands of belief which had no philosophical 
underpinning. And this point is the key to an understanding of the domain of 
theory throughout this period.
In order to make this clear, it must first be emphasized that the failure of the 
lectures on the dialectic did not lead Mao to any critical re-appraisal of his 
understanding of philosophy. On the contrary, he continued to adhere to a literal 
interpretation of the dialectic. As he wrote in 1938, in his notes to Ai's Philosophy 
and Existence, "occurrence, development, and extinction are part of the process of a 
thing; they are not three processes. No doubt occurrence also expresses that which 
is above the stage of liquidation, and liquidation again expresses the stage below the 
stage of formation, but these are not three processes."38 This, of course, is the 
same concept of the movement of the dialectic as the internal transition from one 
fully realized stage to another, which had shaped the lectures. And in this context, 
Mao holds to his characteristic description of negation as extinction, as liquidation.
Thus, in the late thirties, the structure of Mao's philosophical thought 
remained constant. The same form of reasoning which denied any real value to 
Chinese history, was the logic which denied any independent truth content to 
Marxism. It was only the variable which was to be negated or to be affirmed which 
changed. This persistent philosophical illiteracy meant that Mao's statements as to 
the meaning of the dialectic had to remain essentially private. And this is why, 
throughout the entire period of the thirties and forties, his philosophical remarks had 
no effect on the mode of theoretical analysis.
To understand this, it is important to distinguish between two intellectual 
relationships. The first is the relation between Mao's political thoughts as they
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helped to define a political culture, and the second, is the relation between these 
political thoughts and the specific theoretical constructs which were used to 
understand and to interpret a political culture. The difference here is between a 
philosophy of politics which provided an ideological setting, and those 
philosophical categories and concepts which were used to find meaning for that 
ideological setting.
This does assume that though Mao's political line was, at this time, the 
referential substrate of discourse, this did not, indeed could not, entirely determine 
the speech acts of theorists. Put another way, a period of flux such as that which 
characterized China's politics up to the seizure of power, allowed Party 
philosophers and theorists real freedom in their choice of conceptual language; in 
the words that they used. (Obviously, this is restricted to a Marxist vocabulary.) 
And therefore, though in 1938 Mao does give expression to the idea of sinification, 
and though he later defines the new ideological era of "New Democracy," there was 
never a concomitant transformation in the constructs of theory. Instead, speculative 
understanding remained structured within frameworks which had been previously 
worked out. As will be shown in the next chapter, and hereafter, in the discussion 
of the criticism of Mao's concept of sinification, the arguments of philosophers 
such as Ai Siqi and those of political economists such as Shen Ziyuan, were stated 
through a form which remained consistent, while content expressed change.
Thus, the importance of Mao's lectures on contradiction in 1937, and the 
subsequent re-drafts, have to be seen in terms of how they affected his philosophy 
of politics; how they helped to determine his attitude toward Marxism, and the 
meaning of sinification. At the same time it may be recognized that though these 
statements were reprinted, and circulated, they had no appreciable effect. Those 
themes in the lectures which emphasized the particular, the idea which was 
celebrated in "On Contradiction," were here sedimented within an incoherent notion 
of contradiction. And therefore in order to serve as the principle for method, this
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concept of specificity needed to be grounded within another basis. But it took 
almost fifteen years of fundamental excisions and additions for this to be realized. 
In turn, this not only explains why "On Contradiction" should never be read back 
on to Mao's earlier speech, but it also suggests that the importance of theories 
concerning the particular as the expression of synthesis, have to be found 
elsewhere; in those statements where he tried to define the political culture.
This is the significance of Mao's speech before the Sixth Plenum of the 
Central Committee in 1938. For it was here that he attempted to set out the ideology 
that was to govern reason, by explaining the meaning of sinification.
Today's China is an outgrowth of historic China. We are Marxist 
historicists; we must not mutilate history. From Confucius to Sun 
Yat-sen we must sum it up critically, and we must constitute 
ourselves the heirs of its precious legacy. Conversely, the 
assimilation of this legacy itself becomes a method that aids 
considerably in guiding the present great movement. A Communist 
is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national 
form before it can be of any practical effect. There is no such thing 
as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call 
concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that 
is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete 
conditions prevailing in China, and not Marxism abstractly used. If 
a Chinese Communist, who is part of the great Chinese people, 
bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism 
apart from Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is merely an empty 
abstraction. Consequently, the sinification of Marxism--that is to 
say, making certain that in all of its manifestations it is imbued with 
Chinese characteristics, using it according to Chinese peculiarities-- 
becomes a problem that must be understood and solved by the whole 
party without delay. We must put an end to writing eight-legged 
essays on foreign models; there must be less repeating of empty and 
abstract refrains; we must discard our dogmatism and replace it by a 
new and vital Chinese style and manner, pleasing to the eye and to 
the ear of the common Chinese people.^
This singular argument was clearly not based upon any idea of a dialectic. 
As was to be expected, there was here no conception of a creative adaptation of 
Marxism. Instead, the creation of a new identity, a Chinese Marxism, was to be the 
after-effect of the sublimation of all difference. Within this logic of cancellation, 
there was then no other content to be preserved save for a common vocabulary
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regarding course, where meaning was to be exhausted through an exclusive 
interpretation.
It was to prevent such a deconstruction of theory that Ai Siqi writes an essay 
in 1940, criticizing the Maoist notion of sinification. In this context, it should be 
recalled that as with Mao, Chen Boda also believed that China's past offered a 
methodology for the present and future. And therefore Ai's concern was to move 
beyond these statements that were politically eristic and nationally misconceived, in 
order to try to set out the underlying concept, the idea, which would both clarify 
and act as the imperative for the process of assimilation. And this is expressed most 
artfully in his essay, "What Is Philosophy;" where he asserts, quite strikingly, that 
the necessary condition for a dialectical adaptation of Marxism lies in the prior 
recognition of genealogy: of the historical presuppositions as to its intent. 
Marxism, that is, must be understood through its own origins, as having arisen 
within a particular context—one which shaped and determined its categories. "The 
special point concerning the creation of Chinese Marxism and dialectical materialism 
is that its establishment has certainly not developed out of the criticism of China's 
intellectual legacy."40 This is
because China's capitalist class, in its cultural revolution, did not 
achieve that level which would be sufficient to serve as the basis for 
the creation of Chinese Marxism and dialectical materialism. For 
Marxism, the product of the highest level of development, to come 
into being required such great capitalist philosophies as French 
socialism, Classical German Idealism, and Classical English 
Economy, to be the foundation of its growth. In China, however, 
there were no Chinese capitalists who, in their cultural revolution, 
seriously introduced these great philosophies, much less were there 
those who created these kinds of philosophies. . . . And therefore, 
China directly received Marxism and dialectical materialism from 
outside. . . . [As a consequence] it cannot be denied that Chinese 
Marxism and dialectical materialism were, in the beginning, 
extremely unsophisticated, for the proletariat did not completely 
develop its own revolutionary ideology in advance. Thus, when it 
was needed, they had to begin to study foreign things. And that 
which was studied inevitably was not at all well adapted, and 
inevitably was learnt somewhat superficially. This is what caused 
the many serious mistakes in the tactical leadership of the Chinese 
proletariat in the early stages of the revolution, and this is what 
caused Chinese Marxist theory, in all aspects of research, to have
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such a low level of scholarship. It is for these reasons that today we 
promote the sinification of Marxism, and the sinification of 
dialectical materialism.41
Mao had also noted, in his lectures, that Marxism-Leninism had not 
developed out of China's cultural legacy. But this point which was tied to the entire 
dismissal of China's cultural history, had been superseded by the speech on 
sinification. And thus, Ai's reiteration of this argument in 1940 makes it clear that 
his understanding of the process of adaptation differed quite significantly from that 
of either Mao or Chen Boda. In this regard, his thesis was of crucial importance. 
For in stressing that the axioms of social theory had to be grounded historically, that 
the method of dialectics was to be used to unfold that which gave rise to and 
allowed for the development of its own essential content, Ai not only offered an 
alternative concept to meaning, but in so doing he also revealed the contradictions 
inherent in Mao's particular understanding of synthesis. In effect, Ai was refuting 
one version of reconciliation, in order to prepare the idea of how to go about 
realizing another.
Ai's definition of Marxism as a method, was based upon the understanding 
that the purpose of dialectical and historical materialism lay in its ability to show 
how men produce, and can create, their own histoiy in circumstances not of their 
own choosing. As he maintained as early as 1935, its critical function was to 
analyze an historical moment, through, in part, the recognition that consciousness 
had a dual determination: that as it could purposefully alter its objective
environment, so was its activity ultimately linked to, a reflection of, a specific 
process of production. And this was true irrespective of the level of conceptual 
abstraction. Therefore, what he now argues, is that the effectiveness of Marxism, a 
theory which aims not only at analysis, but also at the supersession of an existing 
moment, necessarily depends upon a continuous reflection as to the origins of 
ground; the lineaments of genealogy. He makes it clear that the possibility of 
integrating the intention of Marxism within a specific practice, has as its condition
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that, that Marxism become the object of an historical and dialectical critique. Its 
realization and development, or, in its Chinese context, its sinification, supposes the 
critical analysis of its past formations (the various historical forms of its idea) as a 
determined determinant within a changing totality. And this of course is why he 
emphasizes that the poverty of Chinese Marxism must be understood in terms of its 
relation to the weakness of developing Chinese capitalism. Because in specifying 
one source, by bringing out contrast, he suggests--indeed demands—an 
understanding of that which identifies comparison, the genus of theory.
This is precisely what Mao does not imply in his conception of sinification. 
For, his notion that Chinese history constitutes a value in itself, a methodology to 
guide the revolution, divides the concept of the necessary historical concretion of 
Marxism from histoiy; they become two distinct values. And therefore, their logical 
connection only becomes realized in the re-appearance of the dialectic as an invariant 
process which is then either grafted on to Chinese history," . . .  to make certain that 
in all of its manifestations it is imbued with Chinese characteristics,"42 or, as in 
Chen's argument, is then re-derived as a methodological component of Chinese 
history. This reduces the concept of the dialectic to a mutable categorical 
instrument, whose purpose is defined by a given thesis—it becomes the corollary of 
a purely particularistic approach. Thus, from the standpoint of Marxist theory as Ai 
had defined it, Mao's reasoning on sinification exacerbated those problems which 
Ai had attempted to resolve. Instead of providing direction, by making clear the 
need for an increased critical awareness of the tenets of Western Marxism, Mao 
railed against the returned students, who though "ignorant of anything their own, 
yet hold on to Greek and foreign tales." And rather than recognize that the 
"responsibility to create something new," needed itself to be analyzed historically 
and dialectically, Mao saw Marxism holistically, and hence stressed the "precious 
qualities of Chinese history. "43 Thus, other than from his own knowledge and
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beliefs, Mao provided no clear or consistent basis for the Chinese Revolution. This 
gave a legitimacy to the ossification of political theory.
In this context, it is important here to look at Ai's writings throughout this 
period, and to see them as an alternative statement regarding the philosophy of 
Chinese Marxism. As such, his argument reveals itself both as theoretical 
consideration and as representative type: a substantive intellectual account, and, in 
this, a signifier of a method for adaptation. For, what is striking about Ai's essays 
at this time, is their integration of Marx's basic philosophical stance. And this is 
most evident in Ai's discussion of Marx's analysis of German Idealism. For, the 
point of "What Is Philosophy," which begins with an overview of Marx's own 
critical development, was not only to emphasize that Marxist dialectics begins in the 
supersession of all forms of idealism, but also to suggest (in a somewhat concealed 
fashion) that Marx's unveiling of the conception of history which underlined 
German Idealism, implied the necessity of a paralleled response by Chinese Marxist 
theorists to the idea of history underlining the notion of sinification. In other 
words, as Marx recognized that, "German Idealism was the ideal prolongation of 
German history,"44 that it was the abstraction of the state, the fiction which the state 
imagined itself to be, so Chinese Marxist philosophers needed to recognize that 
Mao's and Chen's notion of sinification idealized Chinese history, created out of it 
an historical myth of essence. And thus, what distinguished these conceptions from 
that of someone such as Ye Qing was primarily the use of source; the juxtaposition 
of folk and mandarin culture. Therefore, just as Marx analyzed the effect of the 
antinomous character of the Hegelian legacy upon the later development of German 
Idealism, by showing how, on the one side, the attempt by Left Hegelians to realize 
the positive premise of critique (which began in their criticism of religion) was 
limited by their failure to understand the materialist basis of their philosophical 
thought, and how, on the other side, it led to the effort to negate all philosophy,
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through "pragmatic" rejection 45 so Ai stresses that the critique of Confucianism, 
the positive postulate of sinification, could neither be actualized through the 
hypostatization of Chinese Marxism as a dual abstraction: that of an invariant 
dialectic and that of Chinese history (each abstract in itself); nor could Marxism 
simply be dismissed as ill-suited to the reality of China.
Most importantly, Ai's continuous emphasis upon the nature of critique, its 
historical and materialist presuppositions, suggests that he had grasped the 
implications of Marx’s insight into the relationship of theory to practice contained in 
the "Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right." For, it was there that Marx argued that philosophy could only become a 
material force to the degree that it expressed the real needs of the people. Its 
revolutionary character was determined, in part, by its ability both to create a desire 
for liberation, and to provide the conceptual understanding as to the basis and 
reason for that desire. And thus, Ai begins his article on sinification by quoting 
Marx's famous statement, "as philosophy finds its materialist weapons in the 
proletariat, so the proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy."46 
Moreover, it is in the "Contribution to the Critique" that Marx emphasizes that 
philosophical analysis can only be translated into revolutionary praxis, if there is a 
mutual correspondence between theory and practice. Theory, that is, must find its 
reflection in the material needs of man; it must find in its historical moment, the 
material conditions from which the possibility of its own supersession may be 
realized. "It is not enough," Marx says, "that thought should seek its own 
actualization; actuality must itself strive towards thought."47 Accordingly, Marx 
argues that if there is no congruence between material need and theoretical demand, 
then theory can only be expressed in revolutionary praxis as a negative political 
ought: as that which attempts to resolve the "universal" problem of emancipation 
from the partial standpoint of politics. This, however, inverts the relationship 
between state and society; for, without a sufficient material basis, the direction of a
revolution, and that of post-revolutionary construction becomes dependent upon the 
imposition of theory, as political thought, upon civil society. Theory, that is, must 
re-order civil society to fit the image and consequent requirements of its own 
political categories. Therefore, Marx makes it clear that the state cannot become 
abstracted from the dialectical concept of a social totality, to be re-designated the 
sole agent of supersession. "What is utopian," he says, is "the merely political 
revolution, the revolution which would leave the pillars of the edifice standing."48
Marx's discussion of the pre-conditions for revolution in Germany appeared 
to be directed toward developing in the consciousness of the proletariat a demand 
for basic democratic rights. As he assumed the existence of the materialist basis 
necessary for the actualization of philosophy, he therefore focused his analysis 
upon those elements within the superstructure which created a myth out of the state, 
and reified consciousness. His conception of that condition of economic 
development suitable for socialist revolution changed dramatically, once he had 
understood the process of capitalist production, and the manifold meaning of 
"surplus-value." While in his later works, the notion of that level of productive 
development necessary for socialism remained ambiguous, nevertheless it is clear 
that he had grounded his philosophical concerns within economic presuppositions 
by emphasizing the ultimate determination of the productive forces. Hence, Ai's 
writings may be seen, in part, as an attempt to define the philosophical standpoint of 
Capital, so as to create in China not only an understanding of the meaning and use 
of Marxist theory, but also to emphasize the distance between the demands of that 
theory and the reality of Chinese practice.
To Ai, the supersession of idealism in China merely signifies the beginning 
of the development of the dual materialist pre-conditions for socialist revolution: 
dialectical awareness, and economic productivity. Thus socialism becomes a distant 
premise; one in which the creation of 'true’ consciousness is postponed by the 
imposed reconciliation of state and society. In this, social and economic growth
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turn into the predicate of state construction. The subject of movement, the 
underpinnings of the transition to socialism, shift to another level of determinacy. 
And this causes an antinomy in the relationship of theory to practice. For here, 
theory must function both as political thought and as a process of enlightenment: 
the guide for the state, and that which mediates state and society. It must, that is, 
act as the agent of that which it must also oppose: the sublimation of all forms of 
social life within the political sphere. Thus, Ai's point of contrast, the emphasis in 
his writings on the methods and precepts of Marxism, on the dialectic between base 
and superstructure (specifically, his argument that there are times when the relations 
of production can truly hinder the development of the productive forces), and on the 
"organizing" role of ideology, was designed to derive, from an explanation of the 
fundamentals of Chinese and Western Marxism, the conscious recognition, in state 
and society, that in a transitional period, philosophy must exist both as a theory of 
praxis, and, as a theory in practice. As praxis, as a particularistic method, it turns 
the contingent into the immediately necessary by justifying the demand for the 
seizure of power. As a theory of praxis, however, it criticizes this very demand and 
its expression, by grounding this within a teleological projection of Marxist 
necessity; within, that is, a more universal and materialist conception of economic 
attainment. In this sense, the transition toward socialism in China becomes that 
stage when philosophy can be superseded; when, the ought of revolution becomes 
identical to the promise of emancipation.
Ai's use of Marxism as both the subject and object of critique, and inferred 
from this, his argument that theory must heuristically deny its own requisite 
concretion, reveals an asymptotic character to Chinese Marxism: the fact that its 
own definition could prevent its full integration within its contemporary practice. In 
this, idealism is superseded only in part; what remains is the veil, if not the essence, 
of metaphysics. Thus theory becomes its own abstraction, its strength and meaning
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determined by the extent to which its content is both preserved and cancelled 
through the progressive development of its political form.
The coherence of this theoretical definition should not, however, conceal the 
contradiction inherent in its dual determination. For, there is no necessary 
complement between the tasks of political and social enlightenment: the idea and 
working out of that which is believed to be "progressive", is merely relative to its 
source. The tension between the dichotomous position and function of theory (that 
which is self-advanced, and that which is advanced for it), and that between its 
form and content, demands a constant and creative resolution of a concept, which 
can, and almost inevitably does, conflict with the exigencies of politics. This is 
clearly illustrated in the dispute over the meaning of sinification. Ai's argument not 
only had as its presupposition that which it was required to struggle against—the 
recognition by the leadership that the application of Marxist categories implied only 
the possibility of their future realization—but, in turn, acceptance of this meant that 
philosophy could not legitimize Mao in his fight with the 'returned students'. It 
could not justify Mao's contention that his unique knowledge of China was the 
singular requisite for revolutionary leadership. Though Ai's thesis responded at 
many levels to those ideas underlying Soviet philosophy, and though he laid a basis 
for the conceptualization of a Chinese road to socialism, nevertheless, as a theory of 
praxis, his work contradicted in theory Maoist practice. Yet, at the same time, the 
role of theory as praxis was dependent upon the primacy of Mao. For if Mao 
exaggerated the importance of Chinese history in developing a course for the 
socialist revolution, the arguments of the 'returned students' were even more ill- 
suited to this task, as they were mere echoes of Soviet policy. Hence, to preserve 
its hermeneutic value, philosophy as political thought had to co-exist both as theory 
and as polemic. It had to encourage and steadfastly support the political principles 
of Mao Zedong. Here, the antinomic position of theory was reflected, and as such, 
was both nullified and heightened by the common acceptance of Leninism. The
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model of Leninist technique, that apparently most suited to developing the 
organization and consciousness of discipline, became the shared focus for Party 
intellectuals and the leadership. It was the Party, as the sole instrument of power, 
which, Ai explained, "grasped the correct scientific revolutionary theory of 
Marxism-Leninism," and which was thus, "able to give the proletarian struggle the 
correct direction."49
Hence, theory came to exist as a dual method, Marxist-Leninist, and it 
became characterized, from the standpoint of Ai's previous definition, by a praxis 
of contradiction. For, it celebrated principles of organization, the philosophy of 
which (Lenin's conception of epistemology and dialectics) it had denied it in its 
formation. In this sense, Ai's philosophy had gone full circle: his explanation as to 
the meaning of Marxist dialectics, in contra-distinction to that proposed by either 
Engels or Lenin, had begun in the analysis of the dialectical legacy of theory and 
method in Hegel, and in particular in the emphasis upon the impossibility of 
separating method from its conceptual precepts. Yet here, it was precisely this 
methodology of division which became the rationale for his interpretation of 
Chinese Marxism. Thus, at the beginning of the new period of "New Democracy" 
the meaning of dialectics, and the definition of Marxist categories, remained open- 
ended. Marxism was still a rubric for theoretical ambiguity and political opposition.
92
Notes
1 Joshua A. Fogel, Ai Ssu-chi's Contribution to the Development of Chinese 
M arxism, Harvard Contemporary China Series no. 4, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987, p. 61.
2 Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989, p. 62.
3 Nick Knight (ed.), Mao Zedong on Dialectical M aterialism. Armonk: M. E. 
Sharpe Inc., 1990, p. 161.
4 Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung. p. 68.
5 Ibid., p. 139.
6 For a discussion of the general concept of the negation of the negation see: 
Gustav A. Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, pp. 355-366, and the introduction to 
Theodor W. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
7 Ai Siqi, "Guanyu xingshi luoji yu bianzheng luoji" (Concerning the between 
formal and dialectical logic"), Ai Siqi Wenji. vol. 1, p. 302.
8 Ibid., p. 303.
9 I am grateful to Professor Stuart R. Schram who graciously provided me with 
this source material.
10 "Bianzhangfa weiwulun jiaocheng," in Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuii 
("Annotations on A Course on Dialectical Materialism." M. Shirokov and A. 
Aizenberg et al., trans. Li Da and Lei Zhongjian), Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian 
chubanshe, p. 88.
11 Ibid., p. 118.
12 Ibid., p. 79.
13 Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), Mao Zedong ji bu.iuan (Supplements to the Collected 
Writings of Mao Zedong). Tokyo: Sososha, 1983-1986, vol. 5, p. 275.
14 Mao Zedong, "Ai Zhu 'Zhexue he shenghuo' zhailu" ("Extracts from Ai's 
Philosophy and Existence") Zhongguo Zhexue, August 1979, vol. 1, p. 29.
In passing it is interesting to note that Ai's view that not all difference was 
contradiction was quite similar to Deborin's argument that contradiction was not 
necessarily present at the beginning of every process. By 1938, however, 
when Ai was writing, this was a discredited thesis in the Soviet Union. It had
93
been superseded by Mitin's insistence that contradiction was ever present, and 
all encompassing. Thus, it makes no sense for Joshua Fogel to assert that Ai 
simply patterned himself after Mitin, by adopting his arguments. On the critical 
questions as to the nature of the dialectic and the character of the Soviet 
economy, Ai clearly stood apart from the established position in the Soviet 
Union. Joshua Fogel, Ai Ssu-chi's Contribution to the Development of 
Chinese Marxism, pp. 86-87.
15 Quoted in Raymond F. Wylie, The Emergence of Maoism: Ch'en Po-ta and the 
Search for Chinese Theory 1935-1945. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1980, p. 80.
16 Knight (ed.), Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism, p. 191.
17 Ibid., p. 191.
18 The distinction between meaning and reference is drawn from Frege's seminal 
essay "On Sense and Reference," reprinted in A. W. Moore (ed.), Meaning and 
Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 23-43.
19 For the belief that the 'unity of contradictions’ and the ’unity of opposites’ are 
simply two forms of the same expression, see Knight's introduction to Mao 
Zedong on Dialectical Materialism. It is this neglect of categorical difference 
which allows Knight to create a thematic identity between "On Contradiction" 
and the lectures of 1937. In this regard, he follows the editors of Mao's 
Selected Works in creating a false history to Mao's political thought.
Raymond Wylie has also suggested that these lectures provided the 
philosophical outline for Mao's theory of sinification. To make this point, 
Wylie relies solely on the lecture concerned with the general criticism of 
idealism. It is in the principle of the unity of thought and existence that he finds 
the basis for Mao's insistence that Marxism be rooted in the reality of China's 
material circumstance. This is incorrect; Mao never expressed his ideas on 
sinification through the philosophical ciitique of idealism.
What Wylie does not understand is that Marxism is a social theory; it demands 
concretion. The requirement of location says nothing however about the 
character of the process of adaptation. The relationship between the general 
theory which has revealed the truth that all ideas must ultimately be linked to a 
given process of production, and the specific situation in which this truth is to 
be understood, is not defined through a denial of idealism. For by itself, the 
basic criticism of idealism simply introduces the subject of Marxist concern. 
Indeed, at this level any statement in China concerning identity was almost a 
tautology: to be a Marxist in China is to be a Chinese Marxist. And therefore, 
as there was here no principle of necessity other than that associated with a 
declaration of stance, all conclusions as to meaning were open. This explains 
why it is in this lecture on idealism that Mao first explains that the reception of 
Marxism required the denial of China's philosophical heritage. This was the
94
requirement of Marxist condition before the explanation of the condition of the 
categories for that condition could be made clear. Philosophically, sinification 
could therefore only be expressed through an interpretation of the dialectic. It 
was only through an understanding of contradiction that the activity of 
adaptation could be explained. And this is why Chinese philosophers spent so 
much time discussing the categories of the dialectic.
Wylie's mistake is to read back the later complaint against emptiness in Marxism 
onto the earlier criticism of idealist philosophy, in order to stress that Marxism 
had to be rooted. Had he understood the social context of Marxist theory, then 
he would have recognized that since Marxism has to be grounded, the criticism 
of idealist philosophies could not in itself lead to a statement on sinification.
20 Stanley Rosen, "Logic and Dialectic," in Stanley Rosen, The Ancients and the 
Moderns. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 142.
21 Knight (trans.L Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism, p. 109.
22 Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji. p. 124,
23 Ibid., p. 80.
24 Ibid., p. 175.
25 Stuart R. Schram (ed.), Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1974, p. 226.
26 Ibid., p. 227.
27 Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung. p. 138.
28 Ibid., pp. 138-143,
29 Li Da, Shehui dagang (Outline of Sociology). 1938 text reprinted in Mao 
Zedong zhexue pizhuji. p. 248.
30 Ibid., p. 246.
31 Ibid., p. 246.
32 For a discussion of the possible influence of Shehui dagang on Mao's 
understanding of the dialectic see Knight's introduction to Mao Zedong on 
Dialectical materialism, pp. 56-62.
33 Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji. pp. 247-249.
34 See, for example, Gregor Benton, "The Second Wang Ming Line (1939)," 
China Quarterly. 61 (March 1975), pp. 61-94, and Lyman Van Slyke, "The
95
Chinese Communist Movement 1937-1945," The Cambridge History of China, 
1986, vol. 13, Chapter 12, especially pp. 615-620.
35 Mao Zedong, "Second Preface to 'Village Investigations,"' in Boyd Compton 
(ed.), M ao’s China Party Reform Documents. Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1952, p. 52.
36 Ibid., p. 63.
37 Gregor Benton, "The Second Wang Ming Line," p. 77.
38 Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuii. pp. 383-384.
39 Quoted in Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung. p. 70.
40 Ai Siqi, "Zhexue shi shenma" ("What Is Philosophy"), Zhongguo wenhua. no. 
6, vol. 1, 1940, p. 32.
41 Ibid., p. 32.
42 Stuart R. Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung. p. 70.
43 Mao Zedong, "The Reconstruction of Our Studies," in Boyd Compton (ed.), 
Mao's China Party Reform Documents, p. 62.
44 Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: An 
Introduction," Joseph O'Malley (ed.), Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 135.
45 Ibid., p. 136.
46 Ibid., p. 142.
47 Ibid., p. 138.
48 Ibid., p. 139.
49 Ai Siqi, "Zhexue shi shenma," p. 27.
96
CHAPTER 3
THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTRUCTS OF
PRACTICE
The asymptotic character of theory was in a sense the predicate or the 
signification of a more radical problematic concerning the definition of revolutionary 
subject. For though it was clear to Mao, to Ai, and to Chen Boda, that the concept 
of a 'sinification' of Marxism was both logical and necessary, the precise meaning 
as to the nature of this concretion remained somewhat ambiguous. Ai, for example, 
had argued that the legitimation and content of Chinese Marxism presupposed a 
self-conscious acknowledgment as to its antinomic basis: there had to be a 
recognition of the identity of identity and difference. Yet this rather sophisticated 
idea that what remained in the dialectic of praxis was a referential aspect, and that in 
the interest of preservation, theory was dependent upon the arrestation and 
continuity of a specific moment, was not only perhaps an impossible formulation 
(both intellectually and politically) but also was not necessarily suited to or reflective 
of its circumstance. Put another way, did not the period require a novel 
understanding, a reinterpretation of analytic constructs: theories of a 'new' 
bourgeoisie, a 'new' form of capitalism, or the recognition of a working class 
dictatorship? Could the categories of Marxism not be exhausted through the 
mediation of particularity? But if they were, what would be left of their original 
intention, what would be (and here we come full circle) the basis for critique?
Then again the question might be ill-posed, for it assumes (or in terms of 
Chinese perception it follows Ai's suggestion) that there was or should be a 
conscious distinction between Marxism and Leninism. But if instead, Marxism was 
understood (with or without reflection) through its Leninist interpretation, if the 
operative equation—Marxism-Leninism—was truly unbalanced, then the analysis of 
Chinese discussions as to the substrate of their theory (as to what they believed)
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would relate far more to Lenin’s precepts and their influence, if any, upon later 
Soviet theory and practice; would, that is, relate to questions as to whether or not 
either or both were accepted as prescriptive in China, than it would be concerned 
with a tripartite constellation of intellectual sources.
It is clear that irrespective of Chinese arguments, an attempt to understand 
the dialectic between concepts and categories supposes a consideration of its 
referential aspects. But equally as important, it should be made clear that at this 
level, a study of the form and content of Chinese Marxism, of its theoretical center 
of gravity, must take into account the political mediation of this intellectual sphere. 
It must, that is, consider the extent to which the basis of theory lies segmented 
within a political hierarchy, and thus the degree to which it is affected as a 
determined determinant.
This is not meant merely in a broad sense, as the presumption that an 
historical moment assumes its own 'relevant' articulation; rather, more specifically, 
the idea here is that a philosophy of theory and practice is somehow (and this, of 
course, remains to be explored) predefined or structured by a given policy as to 
social and economic construction. In other words, despite the dialectic between 
theory and practice, a political line appears to possess an anterior sovereignty; one 
which imposes the parameters to the choice of discursive formulations. Once a line 
has been declared or altered, thought, as an ideological force, must incorporate or 
re-adapt itself to it. This is not to imply that there is no continuity within 
discontinuity, that there are either clear epistemological breaks within the constructs 
of thought, or that there is a correspondence 01* identity between theoretical and 
political change such that the former may simply be decoded from the later. What it 
does however suggest, is that these concepts do not necessarily anticipate within 
themselves political movement. There was little in the early writings of Ai or Chen, 
for example, which suggested Mao's "On New Democracy."
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This underscores the dilemma of location. For though it was neither Ai's 
nor the leadership's intention that theory 'in itself should not at the same time 
reveal a theory of and for praxis, the supersession of political philosophy's 
seemingly contingent nature was dependent upon a definition of content, and hence 
of role, that had yet to be made.
In 1940, the inchoate situation of theory mirrored the general character of its 
historical period. And, baldly put, the quality of inception distinguished the 
transitory years up to and including the attainment of power. Indeed, without 
minimizing the dramatic alterations which had occurred in the period between 1940 
to 1949, by 1949 the fundamental policies directing practice were still in large part 
those which Mao had set out, somewhat discretely, in 1940—China was in a "New 
Democratic" stage. Thus to take a small leap forward, and to resume with the 
beginning period of state control, is, perhaps, justified not only because the 
problematic of political philosophy had not as yet been resolved, but also because 
the focus of concern is rather better appreciated when the political axis was more 
firmly rooted. It also follows that an understanding of the condition of theory, of 
its position and function, requires a prior, but brief, discussion as to the primary 
aspects of its coordinating line: what Mao meant by "New Democracy."
1
"New Democracy" referred to what Mao saw as the first stage of a 
revolutionary process which was to prepare the material groundwork for the 
transition to socialism. Politically, this meant that while fundamental responsibility 
for state construction lay with the working class and its vanguard, the Chinese 
Communist Party, the direction of practice was to be shared through the exercise of 
a joint dictatorship of all progressive or revolutionary classes. This included, "the 
proletariat, the peasantry, the intellegensia, and the other sections of the petty-
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bourgeoisie," as well as those members of the bourgeoisie who were willing to
participate in a "national and democratic revolution."1 In turn, this movement was
to find its economic complement in a policy of a mixed economy, where private
property and capitalist production were allowed as long as neither dominated the
people's livelihood. At the same time, large estate capital was to be redistributed to
the peasants, who were thereby encouraged voluntarily to use this to form
agricultural co-operatives. Basically, the overall policy was that of 'regulation of
capital and the equalization of land ownership' under the guidance of a state
structure adapted to the needs of an underdeveloped country. It was a type of
organizational theory and practice which differed from that which had characterized
Soviet political practice in 1917; and was instead, as Mao argued, singular and
essential. "During this period, a third form of state must be adopted . . . this form
suits a certain historical period and is therefore transitional; nevertheless, it is a form
which is necessary and cannot be dispensed with."2
It should be noted that while the nomenclature "New Democracy" was
apparently original to Mao, almost all of its theses were not. The notions of a
'bourgeois-democratic state', of a 'united front', or a reliance upon the peasantry,
etc., were strategies which had earlier been articulated either in Soviet or in
Comintern pronouncements.3 Moreover, in regard to the program of redistribution
of land and the need for a sympathetic drive toward agricultural association, there
were aspects of Mao's argument which recalled some of Marx's formulations. As
Marx wrote in his "Conspectus on Bakunin's Statism and Anarchy,"
where he has not disappeared and been replaced by the agricultural 
wage-labourer . . . the proletariat . . . must as government take 
measures through which the peasant finds his condition immediately 
improved, so as to win him over to the revolution; measures which 
will at least provide the possibility of easing the transition from 
private ownership of land to collective ownership, so that the 
peasant arrives at this of his own accord, from economic reasons. It 
must not hit the peasant over the head.4
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The accent in "New Democracy1' was not, however, upon its cosmopolitan 
antecedents; rather, more parochially, it was upon providing a predicate to the 
concept of 'Sinification1. Mao's intention was to justify his claim to power by 
presenting his policies as uniquely appropriate to the situation in China. This was 
the significance of the 'third form1 and of the attitude toward the peasantry. For 
here, he not only established a content to the form of an idea, but also, in so doing, 
he drew the boundary, as it were, between his supporters and those who identified 
their interests with those of Moscow. The latter were, Mao said, Marxists who 
failed to recognize that "Chinese culture should have its own form, its national 
form."5 Men who 'made a fetish of formulas' through a neglect of the basic tenet 
of revolution, which was that the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism required its 
synthesis with Chinese practice, and therefore for whom there was "no room . . .  in 
the ranks of the Chinese revolution."6
This stress upon particularity of course did not imply a complete anti-Soviet 
orientation. Instead, the independence of Chinese theory and practice was to be 
understood within the broader context of international solidarity. In other words, a 
distinction was drawn between Soviet policy in general and its value for China. 
This is why Mao argued repeatedly for the necessity of an alliance with this 'home 
of socialism'.
Once the conflict between the socialist Soviet Union and the 
imperialist powers grows shaiper, China will have to take her stand, 
on one side or the other . . .  if alliance with Russia is sacrificed for 
the sake of imperialism, the word revolutionary will have to be 
expunged from the "Three People's Principles" which will then 
become reactionary.7
But if "New Democracy" was for Mao a felicitous expression uniting and 
balancing the interrelated concerns of theory and practical politics, what remained 
unresolved was the primary question of basis. Despite the use of a novel phrasing, 
the relationship between the general and the specific was still, at best, ambiguously 
defined. Mao's 'third form', for example, was advanced as archetypal for countries
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whose revolutions occurred in more backward economic conditions. "Each of these 
revolutions," he says, "will necessarily have specific characteristics of their own, 
but these will be minor variations on a general theme."8 This, however, merely 
begged the question as to the character of this theme: was this basic movement, this 
specific generality, to be understood dialectically, in terms of the mutual 
transformation of universal truths? Were the specific categories to be understood as 
the new orthodoxy of Marxism-Leninism? Or, was Chinese theory and practice, 
and that of the other underdeveloped nations, somehow to be seen as an intellectual 
fugue, as the flexible and independent middle within a complex of previously 
articulated precepts? And here, even in those situations where the emphasis upon 
particularity was seemingly predominant, the meaning of inheritance remained a 
problem. In "On Coalition Government," for example, Mao wrote, "Russian 
history has shaped the Russian system . . . similarly Chinese history will shape a 
Chinese system for the present stage; and for a long time to come there will exist in 
China a particular form of political and state power."9 But what was unclear was 
whether or not this sense of distinctiveness was to act as the conscious parameter to 
the process of integration, or whether it would be the inevitable characteristic of a 
superseding praxis.
The difficulty is that Mao's writings at this time lacked a sense of theoretical 
architecture. And the reason for this lies, perhaps, in the conceptual framework 
underlying Marxist commitment. For the formula of sinification, the statement that 
it was the synthesis of the universal and the particular, appears to have been the 
most suitable form of expression for what was substantively a rather different idea, 
one in which particular posited in and for itself its conscious object. In this, the 
notion of mediation, of synthesis, was translated as a concept of acquisition. It 
seems that in Mao's view Marxism-Leninism comprised a form of technical 
abstractions which provided the concretion for statements of content. "The arrow 
of Marxism-Leninism," he says, "must be used to hit the target of the Chinese
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revolution. If it were otherwise, why would we want to study Marxism-Leninism?
. . . Marxism-Leninism has no beauty, nor has it any mystical value. It is only 
extremely useful,"10 What is missing here is the recognition of the dialectic which 
occurs, irrespective of intention, between form and content. The understanding that 
concepts could not simply be imported 01* managed without a concomitant 
transformation in the mode of thought. Instead, Mao adheres to a belief in 
unaffected permanence, to a notion of an inviolate essence. And thus the real 
principle of ’Sinification of Marxism': "that is to say, making certain that in all of 
its manifestations it is imbued with Chinese characteristics using it according to 
these particularities"11 seemingly rested upon the mistaken notion, as Ai had 
pointed out, that it was comparatively easy to 'Sinify' the language and logic of 
another system (or other systems).
The distance between statement and desire did create, however, a space for 
theory. The possibilities for a definition as to the meaning and relationship between 
constructs received an implicit level of assurance in the imprecision of Mao's 
theses. There was, in other words, a legitimate scope for discourse. And in this 
intellectual haze nationalism was not imposed; rather it was a philosophic axiom. 
But to understand how Party intellectuals attempted to provide a structure for 
theoretical location, it is first necessary to discuss the other complex within their 
ideological constellation, the arguments of Soviet theorists concerning the meaning 
of a "New Democracy."
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, one of the immediate 
concerns among Soviet theoreticians was to provide an analysis of the countries of 
Eastern Europe. I11 this regard, the first notable contributions were those of the 
economist Eugene Varga, and the law academician I. P. Trainin.12
Varga's basic argument was that these countries were historically unique. 
They were neither dictatorships of the proletariat nor that of the bourgeoisie; rather
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they were orders of a 'third form', "New Democracies," led by the working class in 
alliance with progressive national elements. Arising out of liberation and resistance 
struggles, they were in the process of preparing the material and political 
groundwork for the transition to socialism through the requisite means: the 
eradication of feudal forms of ownership, the nationalization of banks and industry, 
and the encouragement of voluntary co-operativization. Though the economy was 
mixed, and private property guaranteed, Varga believed that since state power was 
controlled by the working class the eventual dominance of the state sector was 
assured. Here his concern was with the content of power and not its form; indeed, 
he declared that working class rule could be preserved even within the structures of 
a parliamentary democracy.13
There were two practical reasons for this assertion. The first was that he 
was attempting to find general principles which were applicable to a variety of 
constitutional forms. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia were, for example, 
parliamentary republics, whereas Yugoslavia was a federal republic. Second, 
Varga was intent upon emphasizing this aspect of particularity, since Soviet foreign 
policy was directed toward propagating ideas of national identities and specific 
paths to social and economic construction. It was in this spirit that the Czech 
President Eduard Bernes had said,
the Soviet Union and the Russian Communists themselves 
acknowledge . . .  that the transformation of a liberal democracy to its 
higher degree—to a socializing democracy should and can come 
about . . .  by means of reasonable evolution in accordance with the 
national economic, social geographic, ethical and juridical conditions 
of the national societies concerned.14
At the same time, implicit in Varga's thesis was the notion that in this kind 
of transitional economy there could not be a full or complete correspondence 
between the relations and forces of production. The different modes of production 
which characterized these economies—the co-existence of public and private sectors, 
the vestiges of feudalism etc.—meant that the crucial question was that of who
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controlled the means of production. And according to Varga it was the working 
class. Because of this he concluded that irrespective of the state of the productive 
forces, working class control assured the mitigation of antagonistic contradictions. 
Though class struggle continued, since the bourgeoisie and the large land-owning 
classes continued to exist, he assumed that due to the 'aid and advice of the Soviet 
Union', and to the fact that the means of production were 'in the hand of the 
people1, political strife would be resolved through economic progress.15
In this faith in state power, Varga was expressing an idea which some of his 
contemporaries (Marr, Notkin, and Yaroshenko) were also beginning to develop, 
and to which Stalin would later respond. But the most important point here, is that 
Varga was attempting to construct a Marxist theory of and for revolutionary 
societies where political change had preceded the development of indusuialization. 
And in so doing, his argument that the state could direct the economy to the extent 
that it could absorb contradictions, his denial of future violence resulting from the 
development of the productive forces, salvaged a justification for the theories of 
practice of these pre-socialist societies. And in this, Varga had articulated, to some 
degree, the unstated assumption guiding all these "New Democracies." Moreover, 
in his adoption of the 'third form', he had at least offered the possibility of a more 
complete analysis as to what was meant by the transition to socialism in what were 
unique circumstances.
Trainin's argument followed in most respects that of Varga. Where they 
disagreed was over the phrase "New Democracy." Trainin believed that this could 
only be applied to Soviet democracy—as a characteristic distinguishing it from 
bourgeois democracy—and that therefore these Eastern European countries were 
democracies of a 'special type'.16 Most importantly, as with Varga, Trainin felt that 
what distinguished these democracies was the predominance of working class 
leadership within the transitional form of National Front Coalitions. These broadly 
based movements of 'internal liberation', which were allied to the Soviet Union,
105
were seen, in turn, as possessing the sufficient conditions for a gradual transition to 
socialism. And this novel situation meant that it was unnecessary for these states 
either to adopt a Soviet type of political system or to have to engage in a Soviet type 
of violent revolution. This did not suggest the disappearance of class struggle, but 
it did imply, on Trainin’s part, a strong belief in the ability of the working class to 
manage economic construction; particularly in relation to the countryside. For along 
with Varga, Trainin stressed that since the peasantry basically supported the state, 
there would be no serious economic disruptions in the countryside. And it was on 
this issue that they were both criticized.
The economist Faberov, for example, charged that Trainin had "mistakenly 
portrayed that vicious and most numerous exploiting class, the kulaks, as having 
'dispersed among the people,' whereas in reality the kulak class was still an 
important force exerting fierce opposition to the people's authority." In addition, 
because Trainin had not emphasized an attack on die capitalist elements in the cities 
and the villages, his ideas "weakened the class militancy of the working people."!7
Faberov's critique was part of a shift in interpretation by Soviet theorists, 
which followed a new fine of emphasis on the similarity between these new or 
special democracies—now referred to as People's Democracies—and the Soviet 
Union. As the Doctor of Law Mankovsky put it,
the Soviet state and the People's Democratic state are variations 
within the confines of the single socialist type of state. The Soviet 
state is carrying out the transition from socialism to communism; the 
People's Democracies are carrying out the transition from capitalism 
to socialism."18
Indeed, as he said elsewhere,
views which repudiate the proletarian character of a People's 
Democracy, and regard it as a middle path between capitalism and 
socialism, as a special type of state as opposed to a socialist state, 
are completely alien to Marxism-Leninism.
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Thus it was argued that what distinguished these regimes was that power was solely 
in the hands of the working class; that they had achieved this position through the 
aid and collaboration of the Soviet Union; and that further, the continued and correct 
exercise of this power was dependent upon a recognition both of this and of the 
overriding principle that a successful transition to socialism meant adherence to a 
Soviet model. To oppose this was deviationist, nationalistic, and could only, as 
was tirelessly pointed out, aid imperialism. "The very assertion," Faberov says,
of the possibility of building socialism exclusively by a country's 
own forces and in its own special way . . .  while a bitter struggle is 
taking place between the two fundamental groups in the 
contemporary world is a sure incarnation of nationalism, which was 
and remains the mortal enemy of socialism.20
Though the political form of these People's Democracies differed from that 
of the Soviet Union, the character of their state power was now to be understood in 
terms of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Accordingly, as their primary task was 
to build a socialist economy through the liquidation of capitalism, the principle of 
virulent class struggle was reintroduced. And here Stalin's earlier prescription that 
as socialism drew near class antagonisms intensified, became the leitmotif for a new 
critical understanding. "A pattern of development in the transitional period," 
Faberov asserted,
is the uninterrupted sharpening, not fading, of the class struggle.
The more socialist construction develops in the People's Republics, 
the fiercer becomes the opposition of the exploiting classes, and 
consequently, the sharper becomes the class struggle.21
It is important, however, not to over-exaggerate the role and function of this 
idea of antagonism in these revised Soviet interpretations. For though it was basic 
to the justification for and definition of a dictatorship of the proletariat in Soviet 
orthodoxy, this thesis of class struggle was, at the same time, balanced by a notion 
of gradualness within the category of transition. The movement to stress identity, 
made manifest in the argument that People's Democracies were fulfilling the
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function of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and were not as Varga had claimed, 
unique political forms, required a predication in the principle of continued class 
antagonism. Yet, without contradiction, this idea was also paired with other 
normative concepts, so that Party intellectuals were consciously able to 
reincorporate the statements of Varga and Trainin regarding the suppositions for a 
relatively peaceful transformation of agriculture, and for the possibility of avoiding 
bloodshed in general thanks to Soviet support. Thus, economists such as 
Kazantsev and Pukhlov argued that collectivization could only be accomplished in a 
slow and voluntary fashion:]
it is necessary that the peasantry, through is own experience, 
become convinced of the advantages of large-scale collective farming 
. . . and that a broad movement arise . . . among the masses of the 
peasantry for voluntary entry into collective farms,22
it must be borne in mind that the collective farms cannot be forcibly imposed 
on the peasants;23
while the Hungarian leader Jozef Revai noted, that "thanks to the fact that we can 
rely on the Soviet Union, and so can be spared from civil war, the foremost 
function of our dictatorship of the proletariat is a task of economic and cultural 
construction."24
It is rather misleading therefore to suggest that an analysis of interpretations 
concerning the political nature of People's Democracies should center upon attitudes 
toward class struggle.25 For the restoration of this concept was, in the end, more 
the result of an overriding policy directed at rigidifying alignments within the 
Eastern European bloc than it was the cause. Obviously, this kind of demarcation is 
never that clear, and it would be incorrect either to deny the argument that the theory 
of struggle was crucial to the alliance, or to ignore the fact that action was taken 
against the rich peasantry. Nevertheless, its meaning was fundamental only in 
terms of its formal representation, as a constitutive part of a vocabulary defined by 
the immediacy of pressing issues. In this context, Soviet theorists saw the problem
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of nationalism and of specific paths to social construction as the real threat. "It 
should be noted," Faberov says,
th a t. . . the principal error committed in Bulgaria during the period 
before the Fifth Congress of the Party (December 1948) was . . . 
that [the] dictatorship of the proletariat had not been considered 
absolutely indispensable . . .  in some cases principles other than 
those established by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin were 
recognized, as were other ways of transition from capitalism to 
communism. This led to exaggeration of the special features of the 
Bulgarian path to socialism.26
The revised emphasis in Soviet ideology was, to some degree, reflected in 
Mao's statement in 1949 that China was a People's Democratic Dictatorship, in the 
stage of "New Democracy."27 In effect, the declaration was a studied compromise; 
by considering China to be a type of People's Democracy, he kept alive a sense of 
general identity, while, at the same time, through the option of "New Democracy" 
he underlined the precept of particularity. As has already been noted, however, the 
idea of distinctiveness, and with it, the primary question as to the substantive 
content of the political philosophy of Chinese Marxism, presupposed a clearer 
articulation than that offered by Mao. It is in the writings of Ai Siqi, that a creative 
attempt was made both to legitimize China's "New Democracy" through the theory 
that the dialectic between concepts and categories was itself a specific phenomenon.
Ai's method was based upon the concept that difference presumes a 
framework of identity. Thus to explain China's specificity, he first sets out to 
establish those aspects of orthodox uniformity. And here he starts with a 
comparison of the fundamental reasons for the successful seizure of power in both 
the Bolshevik and Chinese revolutions. And he argues that this was possible 
because of governmental loss of the monopoly of force. "A ruling class," he says,
which wants to preserve its ruling position must rely upon the armed 
strength of the army, police, etc. The collapse of the crack troops of 
the Czar's army thus certainly weakened ruling power, which is just 
to say that the rulers were in danger of being toppled.
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Somehow this conditional tense is reinterpreted as a causative principle, for, he 
continues, this situation is "just like in China, our people's liberation army defeated 
the several million reactionary troops of Jiang Kaishek's KMT, and hence his 
government was subsequently forced to collapse."28 Later in his radio lectures, he 
reiterates this point, emphasizing that,
if these numerous reactionary troops had not been annihilated, if this 
crucial state instrument of the KMT had not been smashed, then the 
demand to overcome reactionary rule, the demand to construct 
people's political power would have ben unimaginable.29
It is, of course, clear that the analogy between the loss of armed control and 
the attainment of power in the two revolutions is not exact. For in China, as 
opposed to the Soviet Union, the telos of revolutionary change was assumed in the 
course of military action. Yet this imprecision is purposive, in that it allows Ai to 
sublimate economic considerations to political exigencies. In other words, by 
concentrating upon the decline of effective ruling force, and by creating from this a 
conceptual requisite for revolutionary success, he is able to shift determinacy to the 
level of the superstructure. Thus he begins to resolve the problem of legitimizing a 
Marxist revolution in an underdeveloped country.
The fundamental stress is upon controlling state power . . .  if the old 
ruling group is weak and isolated, and if the revolutionary force is 
strong and is able to expand its alliances, then it is possible to seize 
power even though the economy may be relatively backward . . .  to 
deny this, even though the economy may develop to a higher stage, 
means that the revolutionary victory will still not be realized. This is 
one of the manifestations of the political superstructure vis & vis the 
economy.30
This theoretical justification for political activity in turn presupposed correct 
leadership and organization. And it is upon this basis that Ai explains the 
importance of Lenin and Mao. The genius of Lenin was that he "used the general 
theory of Marxism and each country's revolutionary experience to resolve at that
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time the specific practical revolutionary problems in the world, and in the Soviet 
Union."31 It was this, Ai says, which "created the ideology of Leninism":32 a 
system that provided both the rationale for the seizure of power, and the 
organizational means for its attainment. "The Russian working class at that time also 
had the Bolshevik Party, which was a true revolutionary, working class party, 
established according to the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism."33 
Because of all this, Ai argues that "at that time in the world, Lenin's thought was 
the highest point in the development of Marxism-Leninism."34
This separation of Lenin from Leninism is a poor formulation. But it does 
indicate the problem of hierarchy, of the tension between concepts and categories, 
that Ai was attempting to confront. To make this clear, it is important to remember 
that Ai's purpose was not only to provide a Marxist framework which justified both 
the Chinese revolution as a socialist revolution, and the independence of the form of 
"New Democracy," but to do so in such a way that theory as legitimation did not 
become subordinated to the pressing notions of immediacy. This concern, which 
underlined his writings from the 1930s onward, was, however, restricted by self­
defined and imposed requirements. For the dialectic between general continuities 
and specific discontinuities needed to be developed through and within the added 
parameters of Leninism. This of course facilitated his effort, but it also limited his 
conceptual freedom. Because to be consistent, to protect the sovereignty of theory, 
he now had to ground the subject of revolutionary truth within an idea of 
interpretation such that the specific could on one level be defined as a universal, 
while on another level it could be defined as the predicate of this universal. Put 
another way, there had to be a distinction between thought or principles which were 
prescriptive, which allowed for or presumed particular realizations, and thought 
which in its actualization was conditional, which reflected a concrete practice. To 
obviate this bifurcation, to deduce in each circumstance the general from the 
particular, would be to permit the accession of each unique theory to the status of an
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'ism'; it would, in its deconstruction and reformation of Marxism, threaten the 
stability of a set framework for critique. And thus what Ai is groping for in his 
confused discussion of Lenin and Leninism, is that which will allow him to turn 
concepts, in this case Lenin's ideas, into categories: Leninism, so as to establish 
the a priori principles to justify the originality of a revolutionary approach. While, 
at the same time, through the somewhat mystical inclusion of Lenin's thought 
within the pre-existing continuum of Marxism-Leninism, he is trying to deny to that 
individual thought a necessary claim to universality.
The point then would be that here Chinese Marxist theory could be nothing 
more than a second-order mediation. The argument explaining Mao's contribution, 
from which all else in ideology was to be deduced-that,
because the Chinese working class had Mao Zedong's thought, had 
the thought which was the synthesis of the universal truth of 
Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese 
revolution . .  . our Chinese working class thus also came to have 
the highest class consciousness3^
—becomes, in effect, a specific type of conceptualization, distinct from, the 
reflection of, a higher constellation of categories. This is true not only for Chinese 
praxis, but for Soviet and Eastern European post-revolutionary construction as 
well. Each, that is, becomes typified as the working-out of what are now 
hypostatized principles. And it is here, within this idealist framework, that Ai 
locates the identity and difference between China's "New Democratic" form and that 
of the Eastern European states. They are dictatorships of the proletariat, actively 
suppressing capitalism in the transition to socialism. "Soviet society is already 
without any exploiting classes," and though,
the People's Democratic states of Eastern Europe are now in reality 
socialist revolutions, are now conducting policies completely to 
eradicate the exploiting capitalist class . . . because of China's 
particular conditions, it still is not at the present stage conducting 
policies completely to eradicate capitalism . . .  to describe the 
Chinese revolution at the present stage: it still is not a socialist 
revolution, it still is just a "New Democratic" revolution.36
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Hence,
may or may it not be said that China is also a kind of form of a 
working class dictatorship, or in essence is a state of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat? We reply no. New China, the Soviet Union, and 
the Eastern European People's Democratic states are all People's 
Democratic states; on this point there is identity. In speaking of 
New China's present stage, however, it still is not a dictatorship of 
the proletariat, but is a state of a People's Democratic Dictatorship, 
led by the working class, with the workers' and peasants' alliance as 
its basis.37
National identity was thus defined by moments, by a relation to a formal set 
of requirements concerning both the dissolution of capitalist elements, and the idea 
and process of economic growth. "The stage of eradicating the vestiges of 
capitalism," Ai says,
ought to have a long time-span. This is an inviolate standard, the 
resolution of which must be seen in the circumstances of each 
country. It may be generally said that whenever a country's 
industrial productive development is relatively high, comparatively 
centralized, it is possible that this stage will be somewhat short; and 
that whenever a country's industrial productive development is 
relatively backward, that this stage will be relatively long.3**
Similarly, in discussing the transformation of agriculture, he notes that the pattern 
must be that of "first moving toward co-operatives, and afterwards advancing to 
collective production; through, for example, the organization of collective farms 
etc."3  ^ Co-operativization, collectivization, industrialization, etc., were here 
categorical imperatives, they were the pre-established signposts directing the road­
work to socialism (and obviously, since China was at this time, an underdeveloped, 
predominantly agricultural nation—as was the Soviet Union before it—there was 
more specification in terms of the process of the socialization of agriculture, than 
there was to the process of industrialization). Consequently, they were to be 
distinguished from the developmental strategies offered by other socialist states. 
For the mediation of situation—the belief that the actualization of principle must be
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seen "in the circumstances of each country"—meant not only that a country such as 
China must inevitably follow its own path, but, as a corollary, that whether or not it 
chose to emulate in its practice the constructive method of another, at this level 
concepts were not insuperable.
The hierarchy of dialectical processes, where Marxist-Leninist norms 
informed and persuaded Chinese theory and practice, providing the conditions for 
methodological choice, was Ai's attempt to position or fix concepts so that 
legitimation could be recognized and understood in terms of superstructural 
determination. The argument, though merely an outline of what in theory the 
definition of substrate should be, proceeded as it were, from top downwards. 
Because of this, as a counteipoint, it is useful here to note the approach of a political 
economist, such as Shen Zhiyuan, whose analytic constructs were derived primarily 
from the base, from the system itself rather than from the idea of it.
Shen's thesis is somewhat complex in that in order to explain and justify 
China's "New Democracy," he integrates and develops the discredited thesis of 
Trainin and Varga, within a framework which is as much determined by his respect 
for the Soviet economic achievement, and by his acceptance of more fundamental 
Soviet inspired economic theory, as it is by his sense of nationalism and Marxist 
'orthodoxy1. What appears to be the paradox of his approach is that he resists 
classifications from the stance of Soviet theory that he has already accepted. Or, put 
another way, though he rejects certain interpretations, in relation to the Soviet 
definition as to the general road to socialism, he was, at this time, a Chinese fellow- 
traveler.
This is set out in his book An Outline of Economics in New Democracy, 
published in 1950, which begins with the striking assertion that both the countries
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of Eastern Europe and China should be considered as "New Democracies." They 
are, he says,
democratic revolutions of a capitalist class character in the period of 
imperialism and the general crisis of capitalism; that is to say, they 
are democratic revolutions of a capitalist class character in the period 
of socialist revolution.40
Belonging neither to the economic realm of capitalism nor that of socialism, these 
distinctive forms were characterized instead by a dual mode of production; one 
which
'is' capitalism and at the same time it 'is' not capitalism; it 'is' 
socialism and at the same time it also 'is' not socialism. We say it 
'is' capitalism, because it allows capitalism the opportunity to attain 
development within a relatively long time-span; or at least during the 
period of New Democratic construction, it permits capitalism to exist 
. . . it 'is' socialism because the state economy has a socialist 
essence, grasping the whole country's economic life-line.4!
This definition of a hybrid economy owed much to Varga. And therefore, 
diplomatically, as a way of balancing conflicting claims, Shen endorsed the more 
contemporary view that these New or People's Democracies (the names were for 
him interchangeable) did not possess a complete sovereignty over all indigenous 
practice. Their social and economic construction needed to be seen instead within 
the context of general direction; indeed, their particularity was both subsumed and 
explained under the catch-all phrase: 'transitional'. "Although 'New Democracy,’" 
he writes,
becomes for the People's Democratic States (China, for example) a 
necessary economic stage within the historical developmental 
process, it absolutely is not an independent historical stage, but is 
only a period with a transitory character.42
Novelty was thus to be understood as something more commonly recognizable; for 
Shen's idea that "they were not socialist revolutions with the object of eradicating 
capitalism ,"43 was in its immediacy, immanently bound to the concept of a
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demarcated future. The formulation of process, the vocabulary of tasks, was 
already known and, in a sense, quite traditional: "to eradicate imperialism, feudalist 
power and the monopolizing capitalist class,"44 and concomitantly, to encourage 
and control the accumulation of capital. This was his commitment to a basic 
orthodoxy. It was, in Chinese form, the Leninist political rephrasing (beginning 
with the NEP) of Marxist economic necessity.
In turn, circumstance mediated the form of revolutionary expression. The 
economic determination of a regime, which, in Shen's words was a "special form 
of Soviet [council] democracy"4  ^presumed an encouragement, a political toleration 
for all who engaged in the creation of capital for the benefit of the state. These 
requisites, made manifest in the somewhat relaxed attitude toward the private sector, 
meant that the dictatorship over need could not as yet be realized as a dictatorship of 
the proletariat. The administrative structure was thus in a pre-position, based upon 
an "alliance of each revolutionary class: workers, peasants, farmers, the market 
petty bourgeoisie (including revolutionary intellectuals), under the leadership of the 
proletariat," and "its vanguard, the Communist P a r t y , s t i l l  to be consolidated.
This arrangement underscored the dialectic of discontinuity within 
continuity; the vicissitudinous character of socialist revolutions. And it is to reassert 
this point, to stress that there was an inherent dynamic to the activity of synthesis, 
that Shen draws a distinction between the October Revolution and these "New 
Democratic" revolutions.
The victory of the "New Democracies" of China and Eastern Europe 
is that which has opened up the peaceful transformation towards the 
promise of socialism . . .  it is the oppressed labouring people's 
completely new form of moving towards socialism, and shares no 
identity with the form of the October Revolution 47
Shen was not the only Chinese theorist to dislocate this aspect of the 
Russian Revolution from, in particular, the schema of China's forward course. Ai, 
for example, had made a similar point in his radio lectures, arguing that in respect
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"of the effort to make a steady change towards this transition to socialism under the 
leadership of the working class, we have the possibility of avoiding that kind of 
armed revolution such as in the Soviet Union."4**
This might seem somewhat confusing, especially in the light of Ai's earlier 
remarks. And thus, to make their intention clear, it should first be noted that Shen's 
and Ai's contrastive point was grounded in the prior acceptance of the authorized 
Soviet thesis concerning the October Revolution—it was a proletarian revolution 
which inaugurated the transition to socialism. Though at different times during the 
early years of power, Lenin reformulated the chronology of accomplishment, and 
though the reappropriation of this idea within the principle of 'socialism in one 
country' was a later development, the fundamental tenet that the seizure of power in 
1917 realized a socialist beginning, was here reaffirmed by Shen and Ai.
In China, however, revolutionary success could not be immediately 
identified with the transitional process; it was still the period of "New Democracy." 
Shen's and Ai's historical comparison, their juxtaposition of these respective 
revolutionary movements, was designed therefore to reassure their domestic 
audience that the transitional stage, once reached, did not presuppose even more 
violence. Their purpose was to deny the notion that armed conflict was a requisite 
characteristic of all transitions to socialism. (This is why Ai sees no contradiction in 
comparing these revolutions in relation to the activity of gaining state control, while 
contrasting their situations following this achievement. In the former, it was 
practice which revealed principle; whereas in the latter, it was the working out of 
principle which revealed the specitivity of practice.) Violence had, after all, been 
evident in the effort to seize power, and during the period when Shen and Ai were 
writing, there were serious problems regarding the use of force by peasants in the 
movement for land reform. Hence the need not only to impose order and stability, 
but also to assuage fears that armed conflict would be a continuous phenomenon led 
these theorists to insist upon a contrasting historical uniqueness.
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This promise of a peaceful horizon did not, however, signify the diremption 
in Chinese ideology of the importance of class struggle, as one commentator 
suggests.49 On the contrary, amongst others, both Shen and Ai warned of the 
persistence of class antagonisms. Shen states, for example, that since there are
those who believe that since state power is controlled by the working 
class, then, within a New Democratic society, though class struggle 
has not been completely eradicated, it should at least be alleviated in 
the great part of the country. This kind of method, though it appears 
reasonable, is completely wrong. Lenin, first, and Stalin 
afterwards, emphasized that under a dictatorship of the proletariat in 
the rebuilding period of the New Economic Policy and socialism, 
class struggle did not abate, rather it became extremely intense. The 
reason for this is very simple. The overthrown capitalist class, 
anticipating the final days before their ultimate extinction necessarily 
struggles with exceptional fierceness and violence. It still is like this 
in the period of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, and as for 
the period of "New Democracy," it naturally goes without saying.511
At the same time, Ai repeatedly called for ideological re-education in the effort to 
"suppress the remnants of those internal reactionary forces who would overthrow 
the country."51 These statements were part of a general policy of "democracy for 
the people, dictatorship over the reactionaries,"52 where the people were considered 
as those who aided national construction. In this, the Chinese argument concerning 
the possibility of state control over capitalist elements, Mao's contention that as "the 
people have a powerful state apparatus in their hands—there is no need to fear 
rebellion by the national bourgeoisie,"53 was more sanguine, and in terms of 
discourse, less emotive than Soviet rhetoric. But this must not be seen in terms of 
an ideological break, as the advancement in China of heteronomous concepts. On 
the contrary, with respect to the fundamental tenets of process: the importance of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, the continuance of class struggle, etc., and with 
respect to the importance of Soviet support for domestic achievement, there was not 
in these early years a split with the Soviet Union over fundamentals.
It was in terms of the stages of transition that theorists in China understood 
difference. The nomenclature of a "New Democracy," the correspondence of this
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name to an economic reality of underdevelopment, and as a consequence, to a 
political structure committed to a common program, meant that productivity had yet 
to achieve that level necessary for a transition to socialism. And this contention was 
in turn willingly accepted in the Soviet Union, where analysts were undoubtedly 
pleased to be able to postpone the whole question as to the nature of China's social 
construction. Thus, in September 1950 the editorial of the Comintern journal, "For 
a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy" read
at present the working people of China are not confronted directly 
with the task of building socialism, the instrument of which is the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. As Mao Zedong has said: " . . .w hen  
the conditions are ripe, and when this will be approved by the whole 
country, we, in our steady advance shall enter the new era of 
socialism."54
It is important here to recognize that in China the theoretical discourse which 
sought to set out the particular ideological dimensions to "New Democracy" was 
itself informed by a received language regarding process. This is evident for 
example in the conscious assumption of a terminology of periods and in all that as 
presumed by them. The specific debates surrounding the method of transition were 
thus shaped by a more cosmopolitan character. And in this, in terms of making the 
dialectic of adaptation more clear, it is appropriate to consider Shen's argument 
somewhat further.
As was stated, he contradicts the Soviet view concerning these 
'democracies' by grouping them together. At the same time he draws a distinction 
between them: though they all belong to the same camp, China is in the rearguard.
The point at which they differ fundamentally, and most importantly, 
still consists in the level of the development of the economy (the 
productive forces) . . .  if it is said that China is a typical example of 
a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country with extreme backwardness in 
capitalist industry, then, on the other hand, it may be said that 
though all the countries of Eastern Europe bear semi-colonial, semi- 
feudal characteristics, they are typical examples of countries with 
relatively developed capitalism.55
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This disparity he says is due to the positive effect of pre-war capital upon the course 
of economic development in Eastern Europe. By contrast, in China it has been the 
weakness of national capital that has stunted growth.
Put another way . . .  the two aspects of the historical developmental 
stages have a difference of before and after. The countries of 
Eastern Europe have been relatively advanced, and in comparison, 
China is quite backward . . .  in Eastern Europe therefore, the 
historical conditions of each country's "New Democracy" and that of 
China's "New Democracy," the location of the two, possess a 
difference as well.56
This dichotomy affected possibility. And the capability to direct change was 
defined by Shen in relation to two major phases.
Taking into account the capitalist class character of the democracy 
which is the product of "New Democracy," in the entire transitional 
period from capitalism to socialism, this democracy must pass 
through two developmental stages. One is the stage of preparing the 
material prerequisites in place of the transition to socialism, the other 
is the stage of direct transition to socialism.57
Each period was in turn identified by criteria of tasks: the more primary level 
involved completing the political democratization of this new revolutionary form 
through the development of production, with a foundation in heavy industry. The 
point of transition would occur when there was a sufficient material base to 
eradicate private capitalism and other non-socialist modes of production. 
Accordingly, Shen considered that "due to China's present economic 
backwardness, China's New Democratic construction arises from the former 
state";58 while the 'relatively more advanced' countries of Eastern Europe were at 
the point of transition. Nonetheless, as they were all part of the transitional 
process, they were all still "New Democracies."
The assumption that revolutionary countries which were not yet socialist 
were "New Democratic," clearly was designed to give a sense of place and 
equivalence to Chinese construction. It was also a more suitable assessment than 
that which was being offered by Soviet theorists. For it took into account the
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underdeveloped nature of these political economies, and thus underlined the 
problems connected with the accumulation of capital. In this, Shen's perspective 
was informed not only by nationalist considerations, but also by his understanding 
of Soviet tenets regarding the suppositions of socialism. This is seen for example 
in his argument that in terms of state production the law of value had ceased to 
function, and that its role was simply that of regulating price.
Concerning state enterprises in the national economy, since their 
character is socialist, then their undertakings are precisely not for 
profit but for production, and has as its goal the construction of a 
New Democratic state. Therefore the problem of higher profits, the 
problem of average profit within the national economy does not 
exist. Within state enterprises, manufacturing commodity pricing 
receives either the determination or regulation of production price.
Thus it does not receive either the determination or regulation of a 
blind labor theory of value.59
This assertive proof, and its corollary, that the continued existence of the labor 
theory of value in the private economy forced state effort to be focused upon the 
complete control of the market; the idea that through the development of the plan 
and the socialization of industry the theory of value was transformed-"already we 
can say that in the New Democratic economy, the capitalist law of value is losing its 
original function"6*!—and that therefore its elimination was dependent upon a dual 
pricing policy, was based almost entirely upon previous Soviet material regarding 
the 'laws of entry1 into socialism. In this, the official 1943 Soviet textbook on 
political economy was of particular importance. For here it was stated that though 
in socialist production the law of value was subordinate to the plan, in circulation 
there were in fact two kinds of markets, two kinds of prices. Thus "the struggle is 
between the organized market, which is in the hand of the Soviet state, and market 
elementally."6!
Shen's reiteration of this point, which presumed a rather sanguine view of 
the Chinese economy, also revealed a prior acceptance of the crucial precept that 
economic control translates as socialist productive relations. This theoretical fiat,
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which ignored the rather glaring question as to how socialist relations could come 
about without a real economic basis, was for him critically important not only 
because it was obviously necessary for the legitimation of state action as socialist, 
but also because it allowed him to re-emphasize the very problem of the base. By 
dispensing with certain categorical concerns, he could, that is, recast basic 
ideological questions in terms of the more fundamental requisites of economic need. 
And thus he sees the primary contradiction within these 'democracies' as that of 
"backward productive forces which cannot catch up with the kind of progressive 
productive relations. It is not the latter's restriction of the former."62
If this is so, then clearly the whole accent of policy toward manufacturing 
has to shift, because the task of maximizing productivity becomes sufficient in and 
of itself to ensure a peaceful evolution. Political antagonisms do not disappear; they 
are instead absorbed within the search for economic solutions. Thus in the struggle 
with capitalism Shen says that
the most important measures which the state grasps are not political 
(prohibiting, taking disciplinary action, or imposing fines) but are 
economic. This kind of struggle is first and foremost a struggle for 
the market.63
The situation is reversed however as regards agriculture. For in agriculture it is the 
foundation of organizational means and relations that are missing.
Within the small agricultural itself, on the other hand, there also 
exists the contradiction of the relations of production limiting the 
development of the productive forces. This is because the basis of 
scattered, small scale production cannot make use of the 
contemporary technical conditions.64
Yet, Shen does not doubt that this can be resolved; that the state can reorder 
agricultural organization through the movement toward co-operatives and 
collectivization. Indeed, his belief in the efficacy of state power, and his desire, 
though never emphatically stated but threaded throughout, that political activity 
should not interfere with the business of construction, was basic to his
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conceptualization of process. Thus he contrasts the manner of reconciling the 
antinomic relationship between the forces and relations of production in these "New 
Democracies," with that which characterized other social systems.
Following New Democracy's daily drawing nearer to socialism, this 
contradiction necessarily will gradually be moderated, will gradually 
be lessened. It is not as in past society, that kind which develops to 
revolution from the rebellion of the 'productive forces vis a vis the 
productive relations'. When these New Democracies have achieved 
the transition to socialism, the mutual relation will be just as Stalin 
indicated: the condition will be that of complete harmony.65
Shen's argument makes it clear that the location of the idea of China's 
uniqueness was still dependent upon a more general categorical imperative. 
Difference still supposed unity. And thus Shen's creative use of sanctioned and 
discredited Marxist theses ultimately did little more than refine a set of terms—laws 
of entry—which had been adapted to a particular situation. The idea of uniqueness 
related far less to questions concerning a particular path, than it did to the potential 
for a more general realization: the state of socialist economic achievement. In this, 
Shen's stress upon the distance between China's circumstance and the fixed criteria 
of Marxism was appropriate and purposive. It read out of this condition an axiom 
of gradual economic development through the mitigation of political conflict. Of 
course moderation and tolerance constituted the basic idea of this "New 
Democracy": this is what it was about. But here what is critical is that in his 
statements reflecting a present, Shen also gave expression to the logic underlying 
discourse. A process of reasoning which identified thought with power.
For, ultimately, all committed reason fell back upon the presumption that the 
state could manage and control; that it could guide development in an absolutely 
appropriate way, dispensing with the undesirable effects of class conflict. Indeed, 
this principle that power somehow guaranteed the achievement of intention, was the 
a priori of Chinese ideology.
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But this categorical imperative threatened to turn that which was immanent 
into a supposition of immediacy. For, it is clear that the legitimation of a specific 
line did not of necessity require a dialectical reflection as to the meaning of that line. 
Indeed, the activity of creative interpretation opened up the real possibility that in the 
assertion of adherence to Marxism, the transformation of traditional precepts would 
exhaust or attempt to exhaust the dialectic of content. Therefore, if theory were to 
be critical, political theorists needed to emphasize, as Ai had, the limited truth to the 
particular aspect of universal affirmation. The identification of the state with control 
could not rest as an inviolate condition, translated as a practical absolute. It was 
instead contradiction, the dialectic of mediation, that had to be kept alive, if only as 
an idea.
In 1949, however, this motive for preservation was redirected to the more 
pressing need of providing a justification and explanation for the central concern of 
raising productivity. The question as to how far a critical understand could go; 
whether it had the right to question the effectiveness of power, the state of the state 
as it were, did not disappear, it was simply shelved. And thus, theorists such as 
Ai, whose work a few years later would in fact come to typify the problems 
inherent within an attempt to give an account of power, saw their present with 
respect to the fundamental task of setting out the basis for that power. And thus, 
for example, he reworks the orthodox Marxist canon of the requirement for 
economic development so that it becomes the ontic of state policy. There are those 
in China he says who
do not understand that the goal of the revolution is to liberate the 
productive forces. Therefore, to want to destroy a certain kind of 
productive relation, to desire the liquidation of the power of a certain 
class over the means of production, is because this kind of old 
productive relation obstructs the development of the productive 
forces. The reason is not because of a certain class's relatively good 
standard of living.66
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In one respect, this may be read as a rather frustrated response to those in 
the countryside who were complaining that the people in the cities seemed better 
off. There are some, he says, who "see in the city a lot of people who are dressed 
in relatively good clothing, even to the point that the clothing of the workers is not 
comparatively different from that of the rural landowners."67 And therefore, they 
"feel that the objective of struggle is completely inside the cities."68 To Ai, these 
are people who do not understand the goal of the revolution; who selfishly and 
superficially recall neither the suffering of the working class, nor recognize the 
pressing need to develop the productive forces.69 Yet, Ai's argument was more 
than merely a rejoinder. For though it is clear that given China's economic 
situation, some kind of theorizing along these lines was required, the criterion of 
acceptability: the focus upon raising productivity, was in its simplicity reflective of 
the poverty of circumstance.
The supposition of national construction thus led him to suggest a 
subordination of the individual to the collective, which narrowed the very territory 
of meaning that he had seemingly sought to create. The fixation with the 
development of the productive forces, the endorsement of this as the telos of the 
revolution, meant, or rather strongly implied, that praxis was to be conceived 
instrumentally, purely in terms of the productive relations. There was here 
apparently no other sphere to individual activity or fulfillment, aside from that of 
producing or helping to produce for the collective. "In the end," Ai says, 
"revolutionary policy comes to be determined according to the people as a 
whole."70 This gainsays the distinction between man and citizen in favor of the 
redefined role of citizen as national laborer.
It must be made clear that to assume that an increase in productivity would at 
some stage be all that was necessary for the creation of a free and vibrant society, 
requires either that freedom be redefined in terms of a collective, or it supposes a 
metaphysical leap of faith. There could be no source or definition to a goal aside
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from that which could be derived from this ideology of state management that saw 
reason as simply another productive force.
There was of course an idea that some different promise to socialism could 
be found in the writings of Marx. Ai had certainly argued that the principles of 
Marxism had to be understood in terms of its historical formation, in relation to the 
great ethical works of German Idealism. But though original and brilliant, this was 
a formal statement. It merely set out the framework for a critical reflection which 
could be something other than a strategy for development. And this is how it 
remained, an abstraction, a speculative premise. There was no attempt to try to 
work out what might be the postulates to this theoretic of judgment. Instead, the 
interest of reason stayed tied, seemingly absorbed by the material concerns of its 
moment. And therefore principle lacked a standard for critique aside from that 
which could be represented or deduced as the method of the dialectic. But in this 
the dialectic appeared almost as an aesthetic, as the ideal principles for appearance.
And it is important to recognize that this tying of the object of theory to the 
objectives of production was the desire of philosophers and political economists. 
During this period of "New Democracy" there was an agreement that reason should 
be bound, should correspond to the needs of the state. It was in this spirit, with 
this sense of Marxist nationalism, that Shen and Ai had defined a space for a 
distinctive praxis. This was the point of drawing a careful line between the situation 
in China and that of the states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. And this 
apparently had effect, for in the end socialist unity was preserved through normative 
acceptance and the diplomacy of denial: as opposed to its counterparts, China was 
not yet at the stage of the transition to socialism.
Distance in turn demanded specificity. Therefore it makes sense here to 
analyze the discussions as to the character of this novel praxis.
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2One of the most important problems facing the new regime was how to alter 
the social, political and economic organization within the countryside, so as to be 
able to move toward collectivization. And thus an early decision of the CCP was to 
extend the process of land-reform begun during the civil war to the mainland as a 
whole. Basically this involved the abolition of the landlord's rural ownership, and 
the redistribution of this land to poor peasants and tenant farmers. At first rich 
peasants also had to relinquish that land which was tilled neither by themselves nor 
by hired labor, but this was soon changed. Moreover, in keeping with the overall 
strategy of "New Democracy," landlords and rich peasants were allowed to protect 
that property and investment which could be connected to industry and commerce.
As with the other constructive tasks of this novel historical period, land 
reform was understood as a temporary measure. Having given land to the peasants, 
they were in turn encouraged by the Party to form mutual-aid labor and exchange 
teams, and to unite in peasant associations to begin to produce in a co-operative 
manner. The aim was to increase much needed production through a socializing 
experience.
Now, in part, the successful application of this line was dependent upon the 
ideological consciousness of the cadres who were to lead and educate the peasants. 
But many of these cadres, who had been recruited locally, did not seem to 
understand the general policy that they were supposed to apply. As a result they 
relied on the opinions of the masses who themselves were ill-informed as to the 
higher purpose and meaning of the revolution.71 This at least was the charge of the 
Party. Formally this was known as the failing of subjectivism, or here specifically, 
as the false outlook of empiricism. Thus Ai, for example, pointed out that
empiricism appears to be relatively universal within the work method
of many of our cadres . . . they are satisfied merely with the
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parochial experience of a narrow working environment, and they are 
not willing to be open-minded to study each aspect of a new 
experience; for instance . . . within the villages there is also an 
absolute equilitarian divisive ideology. This kind of absolute 
equalitarianism not only wants . . .  to destroy the land and 
proprietorial relationships of the middle, and the new form of rich 
peasants; in addition they want to use this equilitarian method to 
destroy city capitalist industry. This is a kind of peasant socialist 
ideology, is a kind of backward opposition ideology, and is one 
which we must necessarily oppose . . .  an empiricist substitutes 
tailism for the guidance of the mass line, and considers that the 
opinion of the masses is entirely correct. The source for this kind of 
method is the absence of the method of class-analysis.72
At the same time, as if this were not enough, cadres were also said to be 
guilty of the converse sin of dogmatism: not listening to the people at all. "In 
carrying out Party policy," Ai says,
many cadres do not understand how to coordinate and resolve 
applying the general call with the specific. They still do not pay 
attention to moving to an understanding of the concrete conditions 
and situation of their time and place. They still do not understand 
that these policies come to be realized in different conditions by 
relying upon different kinds of measures.73
To appreciate the underlying substance to this criticism, it is necessary to 
understand the balancing concerns which informed the ideological framework of 
Chinese Marxism during this time. For the need to emphasize particularity, in the 
dual sense of stressing the specificity of Chinese Marxism and that of each locale 
within China, was leveraged by a parallel need to emphasize generality. This, with 
respect both to the universality of Marxism, and to the overall coherence of the 
general line. And thus in relation to the suppositions of the former, theoretical 
argument tended to highlight practice, direct involvement and an inductive 
methodology, while with respect to the latter requirements of uniformity, 
philosophic statements seemed to insist upon a set of maxims which were in fact to 
govern that practice. In this regard, Ai's work on epistemology stands as the 
archetypal expression for the inherent tensions and latent idealism which
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characterized the philosophic-ideological corpus of Chinese Marxism. And 
therefore his understanding deserves some further discussion.
In accord with established philosophy in both the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, Ai believed that matter or objective reality (and here the two were assumed 
to be synonymous) existed independently and prior to human consciousness. 
Hence thought reflected existence. "Human knowledge," Ai says, " . . .  is a 
reflection of the external world; whatever exists in the external world just is what 
we are able to know."74 Now in Marxist orthodoxy the development of the 
materialist concept of reflection is usually credited to Engels. As was noted 
previously, he argued that perception and thought were caused by the activity of the 
external world upon our sense organs.
We simply cannot get away from the fact everything that sets man 
acting must first find its way through their brains . . .  the influences 
of the external world express themselves in his brain, are reflected 
therein as feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions.75
This causal theory supposedly showed the error of the idealist assumption 
that the subject creates his world conceptually. Instead, concepts were the 
'conscious reflex' of the dialectic. "The dialectic of the mind," Engels says, "is 
only the reflection of the forms of motion of the real world, both of nature and of 
history."76 Accordingly, Hegel's three laws defining development need to be 
reinterpreted so that they are seen as laws of thought derived from nature. These 
laws are of course the mutual transformation of quantity into quality, the law of the 
mutual transformation of opposites, and the law of the negation of the negation. 
And it is due to discoveries in the positive sciences and human capability in general, 
that humans are able to make use of these laws
Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of 
motion, both of the external world and of human thought—two sets 
of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in so far as the 
human mind can apply them consciously. . . .77
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It is through practice that we come to know the correctness or adequacy of 
our perceptions and understanding. Moreover, he says that practice demonstrates 
that the Kantian 'thing-in-itself is an idealist myth. For once we have created 
something, we know both it and the conditions for its production. Indeed, given 
the physiological limitations of perceptual ability, and the state of scientific 
knowledge at a particular moment, nothing in principle is beyond understanding. 
There are philosophers, Engels says
who question the possibility of any cognition or at least any 
exhaustive cognition, of this world . . .  the most telling refutation 
of this, as of all philosophical crotchets, is practice, namely 
experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of 
our conceptions of a natural process, bring it into being out of its 
conditions and make it serve our own purposes in the bargain, then 
there is an end to the Kantian ungrasp able 'thing-in-itself. The 
chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals 
remained such 'things-in-themselves' until organic chemistry began 
to produce them one after another, whereupon 'thing-in-itself 
became a thing for us.78
Practice so defined does not refute the Kantian dualism. Indeed, in relation 
to cognitive capability a sense of confidence is reached once it is recognized that 
Kant's structuring a priori's. and his notion of a numenological content were 
designed to reveal the potential of knowledge with respect to phenomenon. The 
limitations imposed on knowledge were to show just how much men could grasp. 
And thus as long as one accepted the restrictions of appearance, everything was 
open to investigation. Further, Engels' somewhat confused idea as to the meaning 
of the categories 'in-itself and 'for-itself, his view that they were conceptual 
opposites, meant that he appeared to imply that everything which remained 
unknown was a 'thing-in-itself.79
The problems resulting from all this led Lenin to assert that Engels' intention 
was not to respond to Kant, but was to show that in principle things were as they 
seemed.8^ This argument, based in turn upon earlier statements of Engels, became
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the foundation for Lenin's 'copy theory' of perception.81 In this he states that 
reflection is to be understood as a mirror which depicts objective reality. "Matter is 
a philosophical category designating the objective reality which is given to man by 
his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations 
while existing independently of them."82
As might be expected, this thesis also aroused a great deal of controversy, 
particularly over the seemingly static or passive role which Lenin assigned to the 
mind. And it does seem that later, in his Philosophical Notebooks, he corrects any 
misconceptions—or as some would have it, rectifies his mistake8^—by insisting that 
since knowledge mirrors contradiction, knowledge itself must be understood 
dialectically: "as an eternal process of movement, in which contradictions are 
forever emerging and being resolved."84 This contradiction emerges in part from 
the antinomy between what is known at any given time and all that is to be known. 
But what was not clear in all of this was how literally Lenin meant his theory to be 
taken. Was the concept of a mirror-like reflection to be understood as a metaphor, 
as itself an image, or was it somehow to be understood as substantially true?
On this point, Ai interprets Lenin figuratively, arguing that "we may 
possibly use the metaphor of a photograph in discussing perceptual knowledge."85 
Primarily, Ai follows Leninist tradition in assuming that the world may be 
completely known, and that rational knowledge is achieved through perception. 
"Between objects and our reasoning," Ai says,
it is necessary to have a bridge . . .  the bridge which is at the source 
of reaching rational knowledge from the nature of objects is 
perceptual knowledge. Put another way, without perceptual 
knowledge, rational knowledge is not possible.86
Experience therefore is a condition of reason. Abstract thought is initially 
dependent upon sensory activity, and ultimately is revivified through practice. 
Quoting Lenin, Ai notes that "practice is the criterion of truth."87 From this it
131
would seem to follow, as a corollary, that knowledge develops from the recognition 
of that which is new. "The theoretical knowledge of books," Ai says,
cannot touch ready-made upon every kind of specific condition that 
we encounter . . .  therefore, when we use the theoretical knowledge 
of scientific works to come to resolve the problems within our work, 
our correct attitude should be to take the already fixed laws as a 
general guide, while we ourselves, still necessarily under this 
general guidance, turn towards independent research work, turn 
towards those specific circumstances, increasingly to analyze the 
perceptual material of these new conditions to find a number of new 
laws.88
This was the existential principle of Sinification, the concept which justified 
the policies of a "New Democracy." And at the same time it was the flexible aspect 
to the overall injunction to the cadres. Paying attention to one's area through, in 
part, the process of first accumulating and collating data (from matter through 
perception to abstraction) and thereafter testing specific formulations, was basically 
the 'mass-line' principle of theory and practice. "The correct knowledge of things 
and the guiding method of work," Ai says, "is what Mao has called 'to come to 
concentrate, to persist in return,' is 'from the masses, to the masses'."89
But here, the empiricist strain to this methodology (the concept of 'learning 
from facts') must be placed within its determining Marxist context. For it must be 
understood that as the line was organized from the top, as cadres were ultimately to 
be creative in application rather than in initiation, and as Chinese Marxism had its 
more universal allegiance, so was there a substratum governing cognition. In other 
words, what might recall the ideas of Bacon or Hume, should not obfuscate the 
deep divisions between, on the one hand Marxism and Chinese Marxism, and on 
the other, the philosophic tradition of empiricism.
And here, to stay with Ai's understanding as a model, it must first be 
pointed out that he does not argue that rational knowledge is simply based upon the 
impressions received from objective phenomena. Instead, knowledge was to be 
understood as mediated, as that which was determined by a given class position.
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The form of economic activity, one's relation to the economic sphere, was 
incorporated, inseparable from a conceptual structure. "The realm of things that 
man is able to come into contact with," he argues, "is dependent upon his material 
life conditions and his class status. Differing social-material life conditions and 
differing class positions make the objects of contact different, and thus knowledge 
is also different."90 This is of course a fundamental principle of Marxism and is 
completely at variance with the concepts of empiricism. What Ai is basically 
explaining is the axiom of praxis: the concept that the forms of consciousness— 
ideologies—may only be analyzed in terms of their social, political and economic 
circumstances. The activity of perception, and the content of abstraction integrate 
and reflect their prevailing economic relations.91
Similar things, under different conditions just have different 
characters and laws; just have different meanings. Humans, for 
example . . .  if we come to see them from the dialectical method, 
we are then able to understand that though they are alike as humans, 
as a result of their dependence upon different material conditions, 
they have a different class differentiation . . .  one who invests in 
the operation of a factory exploiting workers is known as a 
capitalist. One who is without a bit of capital aside from his labor 
power and thus can do nothing but sell his labor power is known as 
a proletarian 92
Furthermore, the mind is not only supposed to interpret phenomena through 
a particular dialectical determination, the synthesis of sense data was (had to be) 
unified or formed by the essential laws of the dialectic. These laws which governed 
and organized empirical activity, which provided the substratum of consciousness, 
were broadly defined as the basic tenets of scientific socialism. And for Chinese 
Marxism, Ai sets them out as first, that everything exists in organic relation to 
everything else.93 Second, that all things may be located as in the process of 
occurring, developing, or dying.94 And third, that this process itself could be 
specified in terms of the three basic principles of transformation which Engels had 
announced 95
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Perception was therefore limited; as with a photograph its information was 
fragmentary. For the character of historical and natural phenomena was that they 
were governed by invariant laws; by principles found in knowledge and used in 
judgment. In this, the ideological determination of all social thought was truly 
understood only by that consciousness which was able to grasp the fundamental 
mechanisms operating within that society. This was the dynamic of the concept of 
reflection: as material circumstance gave rise to thought so in turn did that thought 
posit the meaning and manner through which need was to be satisfied. As a 
revolutionary process in China, Ai says that this initially occurred as a movement 
from the top downward. It was through the activity of revolutionaries who 
researched into their past and present, who compared and contrasted the theoretical 
systems of other countries, that the most suitable ideology, Marxism, was found:
although revolutionary consciousness is a reflection of the 
revolutionary classes' life, it certainly is not that this consciousness 
arose directly and naturally from this classes' life. This 
revolutionary consciousness is to be sought in the arduous efforts of 
the progressive representatives of the revolutionary class. And, after 
the propagation of education and practice by them, mutually uniting 
theoretical principles with the masses' practical struggle to live, 
thereafter, it became the face of the revolutionary struggle.96
This hierarchical framework of ideological awareness suited and
correspondingly formed an epistemology which presumed all that it should have
proved. For what the vanguard passed on was the necessary condition that thought
had to adopt the standpoint of the dialectic in order to be able to analyze the
manifestations of invariant materialist relations. And this makes it clear that the
concept of praxis had another referential basis, a metaphysic, higher than that of the
mode of production. For in relation both to the normative tenets of scientific
socialism and to those of the line, judgment already presumed a correctly informed
political stance. "Standpoint, viewpoint, and method," Ai says, are three things
which cannot be separated."97
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These thoughts correctly correspond to the truth; these thoughts run 
counter to truth; these are ultimately determined by a definite class 
position. To break from the masses' revolutionary struggle, or 
those petty bourgeois elements who vigorously harm the class 
struggle; their eyes do not dare to turn towards objective reality, their 
thoughts just cannot reflect objective things. They continuously 
have incorrect thoughts.98
Here, what was meant by objective reality was of course politically defined. 
But then if praxis was to some degree preconceived, a question arises as to the 
relationship between class and class position. The kind of interpretation which sees 
knowledge in terms of class status, makes it difficult to advance an argument that 
village cadres, and the differing strata of the people, could truly inculcate an 
ideology of the working class. If, on the other hand, 'reflection' was to be 
understood as a stage or process governed by preformative or transcendent maxims, 
and if it could be said that the understanding of them was primarily dependent upon 
attitude, then the idea of thought-reform became a meaningful possibility. For then, 
a change in thought or the adoption of a new mode of thinking could precede a 
change in class position. This would follow from the theory that political change 
could be in advance of a stage of economic development.
This inherent tension between the suppositions of a received mode of reason 
and China's specific economic circumstance, was partially resolved in theory by Ai 
through his insistence that the role of a class and the character of its thought, needed 
to be understood in respect to the changing definition of material requirements. His 
argument was that since the ideology of a class was ultimately linked to a process of 
production, then in a situation where there was no dominant mode of production, 
the thought of a class would reflect the contradictory aspects of that economic 
whole. Each ideology would contain within itself a unity of opposites. And 
therefore, all thought had something positive to contribute. "To be able fully to 
resolve the problem of the ideological transformation of each class," he writes, "it is 
necessary correctly to analyze the particularities of each class. This will explain 
what is progressive, of value to expand within the thought of all these classes, and
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what is backward, regressive, and should be o v e r c o m e ." ^  And Ai states that if 
national capital opposes, for example, the economic invasion of imperialism, makes 
an effort to establish the people's own industry, takes the general welfare into 
consideration, etc., then "we may say that this capitalist kind of ideology of 
exploitation and profit in the present stage is reasonable, has a positive function, 
and we should not hinder its expansion."100
This confident encouragement of capitalist activity, the belief that the 
positive side of its ideology could be integrated within the theory of practice, was, 
in its expression of the period's transitional character, a reaffirmation of the guiding 
principle that organization, and the ideology of that organization, could contain and 
direct the dynamic of political and economic development. To argue that there were 
constructive aspects to each class' system of consciousness which could correspond 
to the requirements of a teleologically defined process, clearly assumed a principle 
of control, and here, an assurance of capability. This conviction of administrative 
capacity, an axiom which of course informed the reception of Marxism in China, in 
turn implied that the focus of concern had to be with the establishment of socialist or 
socialist type of productive relations. As with the preformative nexus to praxis, or 
precisely because there had to be some sort of pre-structure to it, so was there the 
supposition as to the setting up of a particular political-economic framework. It is 
necessary, Shen wrote, to
prepare a definite social condition—to establish a definite relation for 
people within the productive process. It is just under this kind of 
relation that the instruments of labor, labor power and the laboring 
object, that these material requisites for production are able to come 
together. In capitalist society . . .  it was still necessary beforehand 
to establish a mutual relationship between the one who had the 
factory (the capitalist) and the one who had the labor power (the 
worker); without this kind of relationship, the machines would not 
have moved.101
To make the point as to the social determination of technique through the 
example of the initial situation of the wage-laborer, is to discuss the requisites of
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capitalist production in terms of a previous process of development. Shen, Ai, and 
the leadership in general, however, were talking of a future pattern of growth, of 
imposed political and economic stages which could be anticipated and continuously 
managed. The underlying assumption here was apparently that the material 
instruments of production would be, or would be perceived to be in correspondence 
with suitable productive relations. In this, the question as to whether or not 
contradictions would not of necessity arise as the requirements of industry came 
into conflict with the narrow basis of industry and agriculture, was deflected or 
absorbed within the tenet that as these suppositions changed, so the next level of 
productive organization would be introduced. With a socialist superstructure, 
qualitative changes in the base would not therefore demand or necessitate an 
equivalent change in the nature of the political system. The political economy 
would instead remain socialist. And therefore economic development would be the 
fullest expression, the final realization of its own basic character.
Stance therefore insured, or was to insure the correctness of course. 
Thought-reform was both crucial and permanent since ideology could hinder as well 
as promote. Misinformed, the activity of labor could give rise to all sorts of 
politically diremptive theories: peasant socialism, petty bourgeois notions of 
individualism, etc. This Party conceptualization of thought, however, obfuscated, 
redirected the idea of interaction away from its dialectical basis. For to insist upon 
the adoption of a particular standpoint, and to assume that through it consequence 
could always be essentially determined, located the dialectic, fixed its role in 
practice. And this neither admitted nor implied a sense of mutual transformation, 
nor did it recognize that movement could be manifest in unintended result.
The source of deviation, of that which arose irrespective of original 
purpose, could always be explained in terms of incorrect stance. But in this, the 
specification of thought through a formalized discourse set what in principle could 
not be so stated. For as a concept the dialectic described a manner of thinking; it
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was not a method of analysis. Indeed, to express it in such a way revealed the 
distance between what it signified as speculative thought, and what politically it had 
become. To explain the dialectic in systematic terms meant having to adopt a 
traditional sentence structure and a form of logic which in itself denied inherent 
negation, in favor of a positive understanding. The idea of the dialectic gainsaid its 
expression through the form of a statement.102 Instead, the constructs of thought 
were to be seen as the unity of antagonisms, as that which was to be pushed in 
regai'd to their non-identity.
But this, the meaning of the dialectic, conflicted with the aim and phrasing 
of the rectification movements. For here the emphasis was on supersession in 
terms of unity and resolution. Non-identity was a fetter, in that true consciousness 
was that which had overcome the disenchantment of previous influences and was 
now in, or was to be in, normative correspondence with the laws of development. 
The restriction of thought through a language which concealed principle through 
proclamation was thus not surprising; it was critical for the implementation of 
praxis. And this meant that, though logically categorical assertion could not deny in 
principle the operation of a dialectic, it could deny the means through which the 
character and complexities of antinomies could be recognized.
The problem was that consciousness was apparently so tied to the needs of 
production, that thought was in danger of seeing these objective requirements as the 
sole motive for awareness. And as was already suggested, this would define 
thought instrumentally, as another productive force. Indeed, Shen argues that 
thought would act as a material force precisely when the people saw themselves 
precisely as they were seen: as the true aspect of production.
The workers and peasant masses are the most important element 
within the production process. The contradiction in old China 
between the forces and the relations of production thus appeared as 
the class struggle of the Chinese people, with the workers and 
peasant masses as the main element, in relation to the imperialists, 
feudalists, and the bureaucratic capitalist class.103
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This perhaps went some way toward justifying the organization of 
productive relations, toward resolving Marxist contradictions, but it did not answer, 
or attempt to suggest that the people were to be conceived as anything other than the 
main force for production. To celebrate capabilities, as Mao did in the "Foolish Old 
Man Who Moved the Mountains,"10^  insist, as Ai and Shen did repeatedly, that 
"history was in the first instance the history of producers,"105 restored pride; broke 
through the fetters of other ideologies by establishing humans as the moving spirit 
of history. But to translate this into a conception of praxis which emphasized the 
ability of self in terms of the good of the nation-state, of serving the people through 
the adoption of a "style of plain living and hard struggle,"106 while certainly 
understandable in terms of the requirements of circumstance, nevertheless 
suggested a vision of a rather bleak state. And even Marx, who adored work, 
would have found this unsettling. For as he said,
Communists . . .  do not put to people the demand: love one 
another, do not be egoists; on the contrary, they are very well aware 
that egoism, just as much as self-sacrifice, is in definite 
circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals.
Hence, communists by no means want . . .  to do away with the 
"private individual" for the sake of the "general," "self-sacrificing 
man."107
By the middle of 1952, the problems connected with cadre activity and the 
need to increase production intensified. In addition to the drain upon resources 
caused by China's involvement in the Korean War, there was great concern over 
organizational deficiencies: ’waste, commandism and violations of laws and 
discipline’, and over the activities of the private sector. Thus, as the first efforts to 
establish mutual-aid teams and cooperatives got under way, they did so within the 
setting of two movements: the Three and Five Anti campaigns, which were 
designed both to clean up the bureaucracy and to suppress the dealings of counter­
revolutionaries.
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It is in the midst of all this that Ai publishes a rather severe self-critique, in 
which he repudiates his previous argument that capitalist thought has some role to 
play in state construction. Concerning the idea that there were positive aspects to 
the ideology of national capital, he now says, "although the logical premise was 
correct, the conclusion was completely wrong. It is the conclusion of pure 
formalism lacking a direct involvement in real circum stances."10** This 
involvement, which he traces back to the May 4th Movement, has shown that the 
capitalist class has always essentially obstructed progress. "We may easily see that 
since the May 4th movement, China's capitalist class ideology has gone in a 
counter-revolutionary direction."109 And though members of this class have joined 
the revolution, this has been purely out of a (destructive) self-interest; "in reality this 
proves that throughout, its ideology has not been able correctly to reflect the 
objective existence of Chinese society; it has not been able to reflect China's 
material developmental needs."110 But though its ideology is "bankrupt," 
capitalism cannot as yet be fully liquidated, and thus the suffering will continue. 
"Since capitalism has not been eradicated, the working class and other laboring 
people will have to endure a certain stage of capitalist exploitation."111 Harmony 
was now to be replaced by the virulence of class struggle.
It must have been particularly difficult for such a celebrated philosopher as 
Ai, the intellectual confidant of Mao, to have to recognize that he had so completely 
misunderstood the working out of the dialectic. And certainly the tenor of his 
argument a few years later bears the mark of this self-confession. But what is 
important to note here is that the force of the present, "the direct involvement in real 
circumstances," simply locked insight back on to a correspondence with what was 
now a changed line. (It was this development which had caused Ai to realize his 
mistake.) And therefore, neither Ai nor any other theorist could anticipate the 
direction of movement. For "New Democracy" as a period was coming to an end,
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and a new stage, a new declaration of achievement and supposition was about to be 
declared. But of course such a pronouncement, that China was now at the stage for 
the transition to socialism, could only come from the top. And in turn, a statement 
of such decisiveness demanded a theoretical account of this location. A philosophic 
provision for a territory and its categorical structures.
This explains the critical importance of "On Contradiction" and "On 
Practice." For as landmarks, they re-established reason within a specific form for 
passage. Thus an analysis as to the meaning of this transition supposes an 
understanding as to the way in which this inwardness was posited.
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PART II
THE DESIGNATION OF THE DIALECTIC
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The effect of making men think in accordance with dogmas, perhaps 
in the form of certain graphic propositions, will be very peculiar: I 
am not thinking of these dogmas as determining men's opinions but 
rather as completely controlling the expression of all opinions. 
People will live under an absolute, palpable tyranny, though without 
being able to say they are not free. . . . For dogma is expressed in 
the form of an assertion, and it is unshakable, but at the same time 
any practical opinion can be made to harmonize with it; admittedly 
more easily in some cases than in others. It is not a wall setting 
limits to what can be believed, but more like a brake which, 
however, practically serves the same puipose; it's almost as though 
someone attached a weight to your foot to restrict your freedom of 
movement. This is how dogma becomes irrefutable and beyond the 
reach of attack.
(Wittgenstein, Culture and Value)
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Though the idea of synthesis had, to some degree at least, been clarified, 
realized in the declarations of state puipose, the concepts and categories attendant on 
this ideological imperative remained, throughout the period of "New Democracy," 
ill-defined. Sinification was still more a philosophical attitude than a concept of 
reason. What was needed therefore was a statement or a restatement of thought, an 
ordering which could provide the canons for the representation of a Chinese 
essence. The ground of Marxism had to be grounded.
The setting out of the epistemes of reason demanded of course some sort of 
elite finalization. But this in turn ran the risk of an affirmative foreclosure, since 
state intention would be to legitimate rather than deny (this irrespective of the ad 
hominem of the 'withering away of the state1). And thus the need for preservation 
might easily result in a kind of cancelled thought, where constructs simply 
accounted for power.
But here, this suggests a course, a stripping of the concept of the dialectic 
which had yet to be determined. Moreover, the anticipation of such an outcome 
was seemingly gainsaid by the very work which established the new theoretical 
condition for ground through the celebration of discord: "On Contradiction." For, 
it was in "On Contradiction" and its companion piece "On Practice" that Mao 
disclosed the principles for what was to be a very particular form of enlightenment.
And thus an understanding of the disposition of the dialectic, its practical 
intent, becomes inseparable from an analysis of these two works. It is only after 
the basis of judgment is made clear, that the function and character of interpretation 
may be explained.
The following chapters are concerned with the arrangement of a claim for 
reason; and the activity of this thought.
151
CHAPTER 4
THE EXPLANATION OF GROUND: MAO'S 
PHILOSOPHICAL 
STATEMENT ON THE CONDITION OF CONDITION
"On Practice" and "On Contradiction" are the two most significant 
philosophical works by Mao. They differ from some of his other works which 
might also be said to reveal philosophical concerns, in that here Mao defines the 
theoretical basis to the idea of synthesis. In the sense of philosophy, they represent 
a categorical answer to the fundamental epistemological questions of what and how 
a Chinese Marxist can know. Or, as Qian Jiazhu puts it:
with "On Practice" that which is resolved is the problem of thought 
and action, the problem of the relationship between knowledge and 
practice. Within "On Contradiction" that which is resolved is the 
problem of how to analyse objective concrete things; the problem 
from coming to find to coming to resolve the contradictions of 
concrete things.1
Officially, these works are said to have been the lectures on philosophy that 
Mao delivered in Yan'an in 1937, though neither was published until the early 
1950s. "On Practice" appeared in October 1951 as part of the first volume of Mao's 
Selected Works, and "On Contradiction" was initially published in March 1952, 
after Mao had made some substantial "additions, deletions, and revisions."2 This 
statement on editing was intended to disguise the originality of the argument 
published in 1952. And this means that the political and ideological significance of 
back-dating is thus derivative from its more contemporary political situation. For it 
is only within the context of the period in which they were published, that the 
meaning and importance of these works is made clear.
"On Contradiction," which is clearly the more important of the two, as it 
sets the conceptual bounds to practice, is the categorical announcement of the
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necessity of a Chinese road to socialism. It is the ideological underpinning, the 
theoretical prelude to the formal adoption of a new line. Here, it must first be noted 
that in 1951 the drafting of the First Five Year plan had already begun. In the fall of 
1952 the Party had declared that the period of rehabilitation (which is how "New 
Democracy" came to be designated) would be over by the end of the year; and in 
June of 1952 Mao had stated that the landlord class had been vanquished, and that 
the principal contradiction in China was now between the working class and the 
bourgeoisie.3 It is evident then that the leadership was looking ahead, laying the 
foundation for a new historical stage. And indeed this was proclaimed in the fall of 
1953, in the General Line of Transition.4 What "On Contradiction" did was to 
herald this by arguing that this was not merely politically justified, but was an 
ideological imperative.
In this, the concept of necessity was based upon the identification of essence 
with contradiction. Mao's starting point was the incorporation of the idea of the 
dialectic into a new universal category—the law of contradiction—whose definition 
supposed a specific realization. The premise of Marxist stance: "the law of 
contradiction in things, that is the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist 
dialectics"5 and its corollary, "that it is precisely in the particularity of contradiction 
that the universality resides"6 were meant to show that whatever the negation, that 
which would fall and that which would ascend would do so on Chinese ground.
Previously the concept of Sinification had been expressed through a general 
formula emphasizing the integration of Marxist truth with a specific practice; this is 
now both preserved and cancelled. The idea of synthesis is retained, but within this 
the notion of practice is lifted up so that it becomes the embodiment of that Marxist 
truth. In its general specificity practice now acquires the status of praxis, because 
the uniqueness of any situation is now to be understood as the requisite expression 
of universality.
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To deny contradiction is to deny everything. That is the universal 
truth for all times and all countries, which admits no exception.
Hence the general character, the absoluteness of contradiction. But 
this character is contained in every individual character, without 
individual character there can be no general character. If all 
individual character were removed what general character would 
remain?7
Thus the particular embodies that which was supposed in adaptation. 
Marxism is not merely an 'arrow hitting a target', the Chinese revolution is not the 
predicate of an external subject, rather the revolution is the subject because this is 
the meaning of Marxism. As Mao wrote in 1952,
Marx and Engels applied the law of contradiction in things to the 
study of the socio-historical process . . .  they discovered how these 
contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds of social revolutions 
in different kinds of class society.^
This notion of a universal which revealed itself in a diversity of antinomies— 
for as Mao argued, difference was contradiction—sustained the principle of identity 
as it affirmed antithesis. The absorption of the axioms of the dialectic into the 
category of contradiction preserved the appellation of viewpoint as Marxist, as this 
overarching unity, while it asserted the necessity of opposition within a particular 
approach. The character of that which was enjoined as contrary was variable: it 
could either be antagonistic 01* not, but here, this requisite of another kind of 
political determination was really a modifier for the principle of a declaration of 
independence.
For the concept of embodiment truly to be grounded however, cause had to 
be internal. The intended stress on the maxim's other side, that as the particular 
revealed itself so it also made manifest the universal, required that the origin and 
effect of movement be located indigenously. Otherwise praxis could be understood 
as a recipient, as merely the distillation of external tenets. Hence Mao's statement 
that, "contradictoriness within a thing is the fundamental cause of its development, 
while its inter-relations and interaction with other things are secondary causes."9
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The October Socialist Revolution ushered in a new epoch in world 
history as well as in Russian history. It exerted influence on internal 
changes in other countries in the world, and similarly in a profound 
way on the internal changes in China. These changes, however, 
were effected through the inner laws of development of these 
countries, China included.10
Others, Ai Siqi, for example, put this point more forcibly,11 but this 
followed from what was as a thesis a landmark in Chinese political theory: the 
principle of internal causality as the logos of development established the postulate 
of the necessity for a specific praxis. The pragmatic element to political strategy— 
that success was dependent upon a particularistic understanding—was now 
subsumed under a categorical imperative so that each path to socialism was 
universally true.
This is not to suggest that suddenly there was no longer any architecture to 
the Chinese conception of Marxist theory. On the contrary, the fundamental laws 
governing process and standpoint: the mutual transformation of quality and 
quantity, the dependency of thought upon matter, etc., and the primary categorical 
terms of Marxist political economy: the base and the superstructure, the relations 
and the forces of production, all remained inviolable. What had changed with "On 
Contradiction" was their meaning within the designated dialectic of adaptation. For 
what could or had been seen as theoretical opposition was now superseded by a 
new logic of definition. Descriptive principles and rubrics still shaped the form of 
analytical content, but as the content was specifically determined so it in turn shaped 
the function of form. "The productive forces, practice, and the economic base 
generally play the principal and decisive role; whoever denies this," Mao says,
is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain 
conditions, such aspects as the relations of production and the 
superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principle and 
decisive role . . . this does not go against materialism; on the 
contrary, it avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds 
dialectical materialism.12
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At another level, this constructed dance could not resolve the tension 
between form and content, since the scope of mutual interaction remained restricted. 
Whatever the variation in terms of political or positional significance, principles 
were a priori's which regulated practice. Concepts or hypotheses might alter, might 
be transformed through the activity of labor, but the rules systematizing the 
manifold representations of phenomena were permanently placed. This was of 
course the presupposition of this philosophy of synthesis; the affirmation of identity 
and authority could only be expressed through an immovable categorical 
praesidium. Hence, everything was to be viewed as in a state of process save for 
those transcendental dictums which asserted and anticipated all eventuality. This is 
why diversity could be nothing other than contradiction, for in this context other 
logical possibilities implied a dialectic between concepts and categories, which of its 
own necessity negated the assumption that intention could always be realized.
As was previously noted, Mao, in a commentary on Ai's Philosophy and 
Existence in 1938, had argued that there was no distinction between difference and 
contradiction. Whereas Ai had said that contradiction was a contingent relation, 
"when, for example, it happens that two certain things at the same time, in the same 
place together develop mutually exclusive functions, this constitutes a 
contradiction";^ Mao stresses that,
the reasoning that difference is not contradiction is incorrect. All the 
things and events of the world are different; under definite 
conditions all are contradictory, this causes difference to be 
contradiction. This then is that which is called a concrete 
contradiction.14
This point is specifically repeated in "On Contradiction," though in a less muddled 
form,15 so that from the beginning all phenomena are subsumed under a restrictive 
and overriding axiom. Once established, however, the analytic structure is then 
opened up through an elaborate classification system, which as it orders, extols the 
idea of internal complexity. The different states of an antinomy: the fundamental
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contradiction, the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of contradiction, 
and its various combinable types, antagonistic and non-antagonistic, moved 
theoretical constructs ever inward. And this located cognition precisely where Mao 
wanted it, oriented toward the particular and upon those elements which comprised 
it or defined the character of any stage. The idea was to fix analysis within a 
definite territory, so that as the originality of labor could be reaffirmed, so its 
frontiers could also be bound.
The celebration of practice and its systematization in "On Practice" was not 
therefore a reception for empiricism, or for a philosophy of pragmatism, as one 
critic has argued.16 Indeed it does seem slightly extravagant to suggest that in 
allowing two major philosophical works to be published in the wake of an anti­
empiricist campaign, Mao was either so divorced from his own political reality that 
he was unaware of the movements' tenets, or that he sought to repudiate it by 
embracing a conceptual mode completely at variance with Marxism. Though this is 
logically possible, a glance at "On Practice" and its thematic continuity within "On 
Contradiction" shows that this is not the case. First, as opposed to what is 
fundamental to an empiricist epistemology, Mao emphasizes that the constructs of 
thought are inextricably tied to a subject's social, political and economic 
circumstances; how one thinks is historically mediated. This, as was noted 
previously, is the basis of the Marxist concept of praxis.17 "In class society," Mao 
says, "everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking 
without exception is stamped with the brand of a class."18 Further, whatever the 
synthetic activity of labor, consciousness assumes or is directed to accept the 
essential nature of that which it will discover. "The real task of knowing," Mao 
argues, "is to arrive step by step at the internal contradictions of objective things, of 
their laws and of the internal relations between one process and another."19
Here, the guidebook providing the order for these laws and relations was of 
course "On Contradiction." Practice was crucial, as an idea it was the center-piece,
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but this was true as praxis, as ideologically oriented action. The interest of reason 
in labor could not be separated from political intention. The injunction to learn from 
facts supposed a fixed referential context of a logic of political categories, which 
themselves were conceptualized as the line. Novel hypotheses did not, indeed 
could not, lead to a fundamental philosophical breakthrough since the situation of 
theory prevented its own reflection as to the applicability of its basic constructs. 
Therefore, to get around this tension, to preserve this political philosophy while 
encouraging a flexibility to approach, Mao distends the table of contradictions. 
Through division and subdivision, he widens the concept of totality so that each 
stage or moment is to be seen in terms of multifarious and interrelated complexes.
We who are engaged in the Chinese revolution should not 
only understand the particularity of these contradictions in their 
totality, that is, in their interconnections, but should also study the 
two aspects of each contradiction as the only means of 
understanding the totality. When we speak of understanding each 
aspect of a contradiction, we mean understanding what specific 
position each aspect occupies, what concrete forms it assumes in its 
interdependence and in its contradiction with its opposite, and what 
concrete methods are employed in the struggle with its opposite, 
when the two are both interdependent and in contradiction, and also 
after the interdependence breaks down.20
This certainty was quite a task, but it did underline the idea of the originality 
of praxis; for the variety of antinomies required a reciprocal diversity in respect to 
the specific forms of resolution. As Mao stresses, "the principle of using different 
methods to resolve different contradictions is one which Marxist-Leninists must 
strictly observe."21
In setting out the matrix and components of contradiction—which was what 
Mao had spent the years refining—thereby focusing attention on internal 
development, he reaffirmed the principle of sovereignty. This is why "On 
Contradiction" is back-dated; it is a statement that the synthesis between Marxism 
and nationalism had been realized in praxis as early as 1937. In respect to the
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political conditions at the time of publication, Mao looked back to revivify the 
Chinese people, as the leadership looked ahead.
To theorists, "On Contradiction" was a "revelation," as Qian Jiazhu kept 
reiterating,22 for it provided the basis through which analysis, in ordering its own 
phenomena, could also compare and contrast differing notions of process. Thus, as 
the work lifted Chinese practice to a higher level, so the theory itself was seen as a 
development of Marxism. Here, Ai's comments set the standard; and primarily 
what he argues is that whereas Lenin understood the fundamentals of the dialectic, 
Mao recognized their interior dynamic and relations of complexity. Lenin, Ai says, 
pointed out that all antithetical tendencies of a thing reside within, and that there are 
numerous kinds of connections between one thing and another. "Mao correctly 
brings these thoughts of Lenin into play; moreover Mao advances a step, stipulating 
the correct relationship between the internal contradiction and the external cause 
within the development of a thing."23 Further, though "Lenin 'concisely defined 
dialectics as the theory of the unity of opposites,"' it was Mao who saw that "the 
contradictions of a thing are certainly not that of a simple concrete thing" since "all 
things possess relatively complex contradictions and relations."24 This, Ai 
emphasizes, is why,
Comrade Mao’s "On Contradiction" opens up the many principles of 
materialist dialectics, raising to the level of genius that which Mao 
has written concerning the use of dialectics. It all progresses a step 
in having developed Lenin's fundamental thoughts.25
It is important to note the continuity of Marxist orthodoxy in Mao's theory. 
At the level of universal determinations his dictums were inherited from Lenin's 
assertions as to the meaning of the dialectic. In turn, Lenin's statements were 
drawn from an understanding of Hegel's Logic, and in particular, from an 
interpretation of the notions of Identity, Difference and Opposition in the book on
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Essence. In this regard, what Mao takes over is Lenin's arrestation of the 
ascending dialectic at the category of polar opposition; at that point where Hegel had 
shown that a term could only be defined in respect to that to which it was 
contrasted. Briefly put, Hegel's argument was that for a thing to exist means that as 
it exists for itself it must of necessity be in a simultaneous state of interaction. No 
thing is a finite collection of internal properties contingently related to another, 
rather a something maintains itself in a causal context, is to be seen in relation to its 
other. This other is its negation, is that which would suppress it; and since this 
aspect is inseparable from a thing's own existence, each something has within in its 
own contradiction. This insight leads to the category of Ground, where Hegel 
attempts to show that the essence of the real is that it is the requisite embodiment of 
the logical Idea.26
Now if this cannot be proved, or if the supposition that reality manifests a 
pure conceptual structure is denied, then, of course, the basis for the idea of 
universal contradiction is called into question. For there is apparently no 
philosophical necessity to see all contrastive relations as the embodiment of a deeper 
structure. This is after all what Ai had pointed out, and Mao had rejected. At the 
same time, neither Mao nor Lenin accepted Hegel's Logic as a successful proof, nor 
did they attempt one of their own, and, therefore, the rationale of contradiction 
dissolves into subjective intention. The idea that all phenomenal relations are 
dialectical is simply a political pronouncement. And here, the form of statement 
reified the idea of movement. A distinguishing characteristic of "On Contradiction 
-indeed of contemporary Chinese political philosophy in general—is that the mode of 
presentation denied the tenets of method.
To make this clear it is necessary to recognize that it is virtually impossible 
to express a dialectical thought through a conceptual pattern where the subject is 
fixed in relation to its predicate. This is because the kind of understanding where
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the content of information relates back and assumes—if only immediately—a firm 
foundation, is not truly adequate for an approach which insists that judgment be 
continuously pushed beyond itself, from an awareness of the antinomy inherent in 
any positive statement. In this, the effect of cause is mutual; that which is 
established gives way to a breakthrough, where ideas are turned against themselves, 
and thereby taken to their own limits.2? In "On Contradiction," however, the 
axioms of process absorb the notion of conflict through declaration, so that in any 
period an idea is provided which explains and incorporates the course of 
contradiction within itself. The categorical subject never alters. What could be 
transformed was the definition of content, if, that is, an antinomy was announced as 
having been resolved, or a stage proclaimed as having been reached. Then the 
properties constituting a particular axiom might be judged to be substantively 
different. The precise meaning as to what was a principal contradiction clearly 
would change over time. Yet there always had to be this specific type of 
contradiction—"there is no doubt that at every stage in the developmental process, 
there is only one principal contradiction, which plays the leading role"28—which 
was never revealed as incoherent nor was it ever superseded. New categories might 
be added, others temporarily dropped (the negation of the negation has a somewhat 
chequered history) but there was no spontaneous generation arising out of 
productive interaction. Save for the subjective decision of replacement, this 
discursive form lacked any other sense of implicit negation. Thus these categories 
could not inform a dialectical approach, since at the level of theory in itself they 
were, as ossified assertions, the predicate of puipose. This is the other reason why 
there could not be a dialectic between concepts and categories, because these 
principles were undialectically conceived.
Therefore, this political philosophy contradicted its own procedural 
assumptions, or that which it ought to have had, if it were dialectical. And in so 
doing, it left itself unaware of the radical alteration of the relationship between
161
subject and object. For it is clear that in this Marxist theory change was not mutual, 
rather it was restricted to phenomena, and as long as consciousness was correctly 
guided, it remained secure. And therefore the idea of a plan in its formation did not 
recognize mediate relations; on the contrary, matter was seen simply as the passive 
object of labor. The concept of objectification was thus confused and assimilated 
into the notion of productive goals. Two antinomic meanings came to be defined as 
synonymous. This meant that a theory which attempted to administer and to absorb 
diversity necessarily rigidified a leadership belief in complete domination. 
Voluntarism was inbuilt, and here it found itself in unintended consequence. For a 
logic which sought to capture the dialectic in a classification system could not but 
continuously surrender to its real manifestations arising out of synthesis. In its own 
terms—excluding that is the panoply of symbols and devices used to initiate and 
maintain a mobilization—the poverty of this philosophy was that as it denied its own 
governing propositions, it deceived itself into assuming that intention was sufficient 
to control result. Though this was a political requisite, at the very minimum this 
kind of assurance supposed another type of conceptual system or metaphysic. As it 
stood, this philosophy was without a reflexive basis from which it was possible to 
grasp the dynamic in praxis. And it is a striking point that the political histoiy of the 
Chinese Communist Party from the seizure of power until the death of Mao, is one 
of miscarried and dislocated movements. A heritage, where each demanded process 
revealed a conflicting and unanticipated complexity, such that ambitious 
pronouncements soon gave way to reactive declarations which either revised, 
redirected, or abandoned a campaign. The Hundred Flowers, the Great Leap, the 
Socialist Education Movement, the Cultural Revolution, and the Criticism of 
Confucius, all testify to this. Not once does a plan or an operation succeed in the 
time and manner allotted to it. Instead, as the realization of failed effect, the 
dialectic occurred behind the leadership's back. Thus the constant demand 
throughout this period for a rectifying and instrumentally responsible theory was
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bound to be repeatedly disappointed by a somewhat inarticulate response, since the 
rationale of this revolutionary philosophy-in all respects--did not permit its critical 
trespass across a formed political line. The chasm between is and ought could not 
be bridged purely by an announced desire.
In all of this there was of course a strong suggestion of a principle of 
identity. Clearly, in one sense it was always there: as it was necessary to explain 
and justify how the idea of socialism could continuously be realized in a praxis 
which antedated its stated material requisites, so the tenets of "On Contradiction 
and those of Chinese political philosophy in general—had to be understood as the 
embodiment of the telos of history. But then what was consciousness aware of, 
what was it supposed to be aware of, other than the working out of these Marxist 
determinations? That which was objective, the ground for existence, seemed 
simply to be the substance for active proof, and hence the material for self- 
affirmation. Given the real assumption of method as preconceived knowledge of 
essence, it appeared that there was little that was left of the object which could 
restrict or alter the subject, aside from what remained in the aftermath of 
misconception. And here this problem concerning the intended nature of reflection 
was compounded by Mao's very adoption of the law of identity to categorize one 
aspect of the relation between opposites. In turn, this maxim was based on Lenin's 
confused identification of unity with identity. "All contradictory things," Mao 
writes,
are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given 
conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform 
themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity 
of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed how 
they happen to be (how they become) identical—under what 
conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one 
another.29
As examples, Mao gives: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, ruler and ruled, life 
and death, and war and peace.
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The concept of identity as a realized state of contradiction was, of course, a 
familiar argument. What was relatively new, however, was the belief that change 
was cyclical: the theory of the dialectic as continuous substitution. This meant that 
while contradictions were still understood as their own subjects, their resolution 
was to be seen as occurring through a functional exchange, rather than through a 
simple negation. The negative, therefore, in its movement from affirmation to 
negation back to affirmation (peace, war, peace . . .) thus retained a sense of 
complete identity, whereas later, in the theory of the "affirmation of the negation," it 
was transformed into a void to be conquered.
At the same time, it should be pointed out that Mao's theory of identity was 
here marginal to the central thesis of "On Contradiction." This is becuase 
contradictions were basically defined in terms of their internal constituents, as the 
"unity of opposites." It was with respect to this condition and not as a statement 
concerning an achieved moment that Mao set out his notions on identity. The 
problem was that rather than explain his theory of identity with respect to this 
internal condition, he turned his analysis into a discussion of a series of states. But 
this was far from clear. And it is because this theory was so ambiguously defined 
as both state and condition, that China's theorists were able to avoid the whole issue 
of what Mao meant. In other words, Mao's argument was accepted, and it was 
pushed aside. When, for example, Ai was asked to clarify the role of struggle 
within identity, his response was merely to reiterate the gallimaurfy of Mao's 
explanation; there was no attempt either to refine or to bring out, however subtlely, 
some of the difficulties and consequences inherent in this interpretation.30 This is 
not to suggest that Mao's readership remained unaware of an alternative and equally 
orthodox approach to this question. For in 1955, Yang Junrui pointed out in 
Philosophical Research that the Soviet editors of A Concise Philosophical 
Dictionary (Jianming Zhexue Cidian), one of whom was Malenkov, had rejected
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most of Mao's argument, particularly his illustrations—though without of course 
reference to him. "Some people," they say,
mistakenly apply Marxism's principle of identity to some 
phenomena which are in fundamental opposition. For exam ple- 
some say that war and peace are in identity. Others say that under 
the capitalist system, the capitalist class and the proletariat are in 
identity, etc., . . . phenomena such as war and peace, the capitalist 
class and the proletariat, life and death, etc., are not able to be in 
identity, because they are in fundamental opposition and are 
mutually exclusive.^1
This recognition of a critical difference over interpretation did not lead to any 
substantive comment. Instead, and in reply to Yang's query: 'why the Soviet 
denial', the editors of Philosophical Research merely stated that the problem 
deserved further study.32
What is important to note here is that though perhaps expected, Yang's 
assumption that Mao was correct underlined a confidence in Chinese political theory 
which had been missing before "On Contradiction." The former, somewhat 
ambiguous position of theory, the lack of a clear referential basis, caused primarily 
by the acceptance of a seemingly negative definition of national course, where 
uniqueness, or "New Democracy," was the necessary expression of extreme 
underdevelopment, had now been superseded by an ideology which could celebrate 
and justify its own Marxist standards. In this, the center-piece was, of course, the 
'unity of opposites'; the essence of the dialectic as Mao had put it. For, above all 
else this meant that within the shared identity of socialism, paths could—indeed had 
to—diverge, could seemingly be in opposition to or contradict certain kinds of 
expectations. And as this emblem of indigenous Marxism laid the basis for Chinese 
construction, so did it also crystallize the more immediate domestic policy of a 
'united front’ under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, irrespective of the 
imprecision and philosophical incoherence which truly characterize "On 
Contradiction," it fulfilled the declared function of representing or 'reflecting' its
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historical moment. It provided both the theoretical architecture for development in 
general, and the structure for die consciousness of each specific practice.
The idea of unity was of course immanently tied to a principle of 
contradiction. And it was the working out of the nature of the antinomies both 
within the economy and the polity, which dominated the writings and controversies 
in the initial period of transition. In effect, Chinese Marxist theory was asked to 
begin again (only now, perhaps, at a higher level) with the basic question as to the 
character of this new present. Mao had declared a discursive independence through 
"On Contradiction" and "On Practice," which had been concretized and endorsed in 
the "General Line of Transition to Socialism." But the meaning of the relationship 
between stage and telos, the clarification of phenomena within the discontinuity 
caused by development-itself understood as part of an historical continuum--was 
far from clear. What, for example, was the character of the base and of the 
superstructure in this period? How was capitalism to be understood: could it be 
seen as offering some positive contribution or not? What was the basis of the 
agricultural sector: was it basically comprised of individual peasants, or was it 
primarily small commodity-producing? In short, how was all this to be seen, and 
what was to be done?
There were of course historical antecedents, past experiences, to draw from 
in terms of paradigms or models for approach. The whole period of the NEP, and 
the era of War Communism, provided an archive for reference, recommendation, 
and intellectual support. But in this new moment, theoretical reception presupposed 
a logic for specificity, a substantive interpretation and reinterpretation of all existing 
and inherited concepts. This is what "On Contradiction" set out: the categorical 
field for the particular form of reason.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INTERESTS OF REASON: THEORETICAL 
DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE NATURE 
OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
The dominant theoretical question in the first period of transition was, in fact, the 
most fundamental: how was this transition to be understood? Having arrived at a 
new and higher stage, the concern of Party intellectuals was to explore its meaning; 
to define the character of this, their, political economy. And though the issue was 
basic, thereby inviting, almost demanding a variety of response; in the end, it was 
the two primary and contesting paradigms that were offered by the philosophers Ai 
Siqi and Yang Xianchen that both summarized and incorporated the diverse and 
contending views as to where China was, and how it could and should achieve 
socialism. Thus an account of the codification of particularism, the grounding of 
condition, quite properly begins here with an analysis of the arguments of Ai and 
Yang.
1
Yang saw the base as a unity; as a whole constructed from the sum of its 
parts—its productive relations. "The theory of the sum total of the relations of 
production is that there are all kinds of productive relations, and these co-exist at the 
same time."1 In turn each productive relation was composed of three aspects: the 
form of ownership over the means of production, and the method of exchange and 
of distribution. But in themselves these did not constitute a separate or quasi­
independent system; irrespective of difference or complexity, each productive sector 
was simply an element within the general order. "Within a society," he writes,
where the exploiters have not yet vanished, the "base" itself just has 
the character of synthesis. To deny the character of synthesis to the
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transitional period is without basis, because Marx was very clear that 
the base was the social economic form. And the social economic 
form is the sum total of the productive relations. And is not the sum 
total synthesis?2
If Marx is supposed to be the arbiter, the answer is no. Marx was writing 
from the stance of capitalism, analyzing its dialectical underpinnings. In this he 
makes it clear that in its beginning phase capitalism contained pre-capitalist 
economic formations. But as there had been a qualitative change in the dominant 
mode of production, these 'unsurmounted remains' only survived in a transfigured 
way.
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex 
historic organization of production. The categories which express 
its relations, the comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows 
insights into the structure and the relations of production of all the 
vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built 
itself up, whose partly still unconquered remnants are carried along 
within . . .  since bourgeois society is itself only a contradictory foim 
of development, relations derived from early forms will often be 
found within it only in an entirely stunted form, or even travestied. 
For example, communal property.3
In other words, Marx's emphasis on the dynamic of continuity and discontinuity, 
his promised dictum of ineluctable economic change and conflict, had little in 
common with Yang's view of a static, integrated economy of equal parts.
As China's economy had been officially characterized in terms of five 
productive relations, it was these foims which Yang understood to be the base. "In 
the end," he says, "the social economic formation of our transitional economy is 
constituted from five kinds of economic sectors."4 And quoting from the Seventh 
Plenum of the Seventh Party Congress he lists them as: (1) the socialist system of 
the state owned economy, (2) the co-operative or semi-socialist system of 
ownership, (3) the capitalist system of private ownership, (4) the system of 
individual ownership, (5) state capitalism.
This is where he sees China to be at present. Concerning the achievement 
of socialism, Yang thinks that the key lies in the extraordinary potential of the
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peasantry; particularly in their ability to forge a creative alliance with state industry. 
Indeed he goes so far as to see this sector—which he also refers to as the individual 
peasant economy—as the 'basis for socialist construction'. "In the practice of the 
transitional period, small agriculture must be the foundation of the socialist state."5 
"Lenin and Stalin," he says,
were veiy clear on this point. That in the transitional period, before 
collectivization, to build a socialist economic basis meant uniting 
agriculture and industry into one integrated economy; subordinating 
agriculture to the leadership of socialist industry or using the 
products of large-scale industry to exchange for the products of the 
peasants. This agriculture referred to is individual agriculture; and 
the peasants referred to naturally are individual peasants, not a 
collectivized peasantry.6
This celebration of the pre-collectivized peasantry is somewhat odd in light 
of what followed in the Soviet Union. And of course regardless of historical 
circumstance, it is strange to find a Marxist panegyrise the peasantry. But it is 
perhaps less mystifying when it is made clear that for Yang existence implies 
acceptance. Thus, the peasantry, the largest sector in the economy ("quite clearly," 
he writes, "straight through till today, within our agriculture, individual agriculture 
still occupies the tendential force")7 had to be the foundation of what he considered 
an integrated economy. The predominant part of the whole had to be understood as 
the basis of that whole. To suggest otherwise would be to move from appearance 
to essence, to move, in a Marxist sense, toward an emphasis upon antagonism and 
contradiction. But in turn, this would undermine Yang's principle of synthesis 
where things were as they were supposed to be.
It helps to understand that Yang's world-view is rooted in the fundamental 
axioms of materialism. He believes that matter is both prior to and independent of 
human awareness, and that the laws of nature are completely distinct from the laws 
of history.
"Matter" or objectively existing reality is separate and independent 
from human consciousness. It does not change according to human
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will. The law is that which affirms a thing in itself [is that which 
makes a thing what it is]. Hence the law also is objective, is 
independent of human consciousness, and does not change 
according to human will.8
For Yang, this premise of the sovereignty of nature is a unique truth. It 
divides materialism from all other philosophical systems, and, indeed, stands as 
their repudiation. Thus metaphysics (taken as plural singular) is to be seen as 
inverting the real; substituting subject for object. "Idealists," he says,
consider thought and existence to be an identical thing. Matter is 
only an "assembled concept," or a "complex sensation"; the world is 
only what I make manifest. Consequently outside of myself, it's not 
possible for other people to exist.9
This is of course nonsense. And to reduce the varied and, at times, brilliant 
forms of idealism to aspects of Berkeleian philosophy simply eclipses reason. But 
the point here is that stripped of exaggeration, Yang is restating a basic tenet of 
materialist orthodoxy: the idea that in attributing a telos or subjective intention to 
nature, metaphysical thought necessarily denies objectivity to the real world. In 
this, the principles of materialism, grounded, as it is declared, in the real become for 
Yang nothing more than the rational expression of immediately recognizable truth.
That is to say, we must honestly recognize the world as it is, by its 
true colors: is thus is, not thus is not; the earth just is the earth, to 
have just is to have, to be without just is to be without. Idealism, on 
the other contrary, does not firmly recognize a thing; that which is 
without, it fabricates to bring about. It reverses is and not, confuses 
black and white, makes something out of nothing, and creates 
fictions: calling a horse a deer, this sort of thing.*0
This is embarrassing. And as a concept it fits, if anywhere, within the 
rubric of naive materialism; having, that is, little in common with the professions 
for the dialectic of materialism. Yang's understanding of the subject-object relation 
suggests two removed and self-contained spheres; where nature is not only 
independent but somehow stands apart. What is missing is that sense of interaction 
and mutual change which is the essence of the dialectic. In other words, in the
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language of Marxism, Yang lacks a concept of praxis. It is one thing to emphasize 
endlessly the priority of matter, and the inviolate character of natural laws; and 
another to explore the possibility that through labor men may change both nature 
and themselves.
He does, on occasion, allude to this. In his book, The Struggle Between 
the Communist World-View and the World View of Subjective Idealism, he 
discusses the notion of labor dynamically, as that which distinguishes human 
beings.
Humans are a particular type of living animal within the natural 
world. This is because humans have the ability to labor, the ability 
to create instruments, the ability to be engaged in productive activity 
. . .  that is to say humans have the use of subjective capability.11
But in terms of his political and philosophical analysis this concept had no 
meaning. It simply remained a statement of accepted principle. Thus, almost by 
default, his epistemological stance turned into a 'mirror theory' of reflection, where 
things were as they seemed. Since appearance was equivalent to essence, the task 
for consciousness became that of creating a correspondence between itself and its 
objects. The point, Yang says, is "definitely to make our subjective world capable 
of reflecting the objective world, to be able to achieve a unity between subject and 
object."12
In this, accord is more than validation of the real in the face of Berkeleian 
objections, it is the valorization of that real, as it exists. Knowledge is the 
representation in reason of empirical data interpreted within a specific vocabulary. 
This ocularcentric theory did presuppose the ideological setting of Marxism- 
Leninism, but this did nothing more than guarantee true vision. Thus when Yang 
insists that "subjective dialectics are a reflection of objective dialectics,"13 it is not 
simply that this is completely meaningless; it is also that he turns a respect for 
objectivity into reverence, thereby reducing consciousness to a gaze. Thought
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adapts through the subservient vindication of that which it observes. "For 
example," he says,
in newswork, facts are primary, the report is secondary. In medical 
work, sickness is primary, the prescription is secondary. In artistic 
work, life is primary, and creation is secondary . . .  in economic 
work, factory conditions (including equipment, machines) are 
primary the plan secondary.14
This does rather dispense with the idea that men create their own instruments of
production, but the point here is that Yang assumes that his analogies may be drawn
for every sphere since the principle is ineluctable: the intellect literally reflects.
The theory of the synthetic base was then the almost 'inevitable' result of
collation; the sum pieced together from observation. But though this notion was the
product of a peculiar philosophical reasoning, with respect to political analysis,
Yang was not—or most certainly did not feel himself to be—alone. As was noted
earlier, he found a comrade in Lenin; particularly the Lenin of the early stages of the
NEP; the one who wrote "On Co-Operation." And this perceived commonality
created a point upon which Yang was quite insistent: that there was a strong parallel
between China's contemporary moment and that of the Soviet Union in the early
twenties; and that therefore Lenin's theories and policies remained appropriate for
China.
In "On Co-Operation" Lenin argued that since the working class firmly 
controlled the means of production and monopolized political power, the basis of 
agricultural production should be peasant co-operatives. These voluntary 
institutions, which he had previously labeled as 'petty-bourgeois', but had now 
been raised to: 'a third type of commercial enterprise', were seen as the foundation 
for socialism.
The power of the state over all large-scale means of production; 
political power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this 
proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, 
the assured proletarian leadership of the peasantry, etc.—is this not 
all that is necessary to build a completely socialist society out of co­
operatives; out of co-operatives alone which we formerly ridiculed
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as huckstering . . .  it is still not the building of socialist society, but 
it is all that is necessary and sufficient for it.16
It is not clear how serious Lenin was about this. As Moshe Lewin notes, 
Lenin had a tendency to connect the idea of socialism to any pressing task, in order 
to motivate the populace.16 For example, when electrification was the target, 
socialism was defined as 'Soviet power plus electrification'. And so it is possible 
to see the identification of socialism with co-operatives as an exaggerated attempt to 
mobilize the peasantry.
Yang of course saw this rather differently; he took Lenin's words as a 
cardinal offering for the transitional strategy.
Lenin's theory of co-operativization was the guiding principle for the 
movement of the laboring peasants towards socialism. It was the 
most important ideological weapon of the Party and the government 
in the work of advancing the socialist transformation of the small 
peasant economy. It was the basis of the Party's policy towards the 
peasants.17
Critically, Yang argues that underlying Lenin's conceptualization is the 
affirmed tenet of synthesis, the belief in the seemingly inviolate link between 
sectors. It is this which permits a somewhat blithe attitude toward these non- 
compulsory peasant organizations. Otherwise, in the sense of real class struggle, 
they would have to be seen as potentially counter-revolutionary, demanding 
supersession through, for example, collectivization. "Lenin," Yang writes, 
"recognized that within the enterprise of socialist construction, the principle of the 
socialist transformation is that the organizational parts cannot be split."18
Since Yang also assumed the axiom of state cohesion, it appeared obvious 
that China's peasantry should equally serve as the rallying point for the transition. 
With power secure this now non-threatening class could be trusted to support all 
state efforts. Moreover for Yang, Lenin's tolerance of self-interest among the 
peasantry seemingly endorsed a somewhat static view of them. Co-operatives 
offered a gradual controlled process, in which personal gain could be combined
176
with the overall good of the collective. Their value was that they were not an 
imperative for quick change. "Lenin," Yang writes,
considered that in the transition to socialism, all co-operative 
systems, especially the agriculture system, were the easiest form for 
the individual peasant to receive and understand. This is because it 
is the situation under which personal advantage follows the 
collective benefit. It is the best form to unite private interest with 
that of the whole. ^
This theme of social assembly, of state control which mitigates conflict, was 
in turn extended by Yang to the private and semi-private capitalist sector. As with 
peasant co-operatives, so the policy toward industry was to be characterized by a 
mixed form—a state capitalism—where ultimately profit and activity would be a state 
determination.
Under China's specific conditions, to go through the various forms 
of state capitalism to transform capitalist industry, the first step is 
gradually to turn capitalist industries into state capitalist enterprises. 
Second, it is gradually to turn state capitalist enterprises into socialist 
enterprises . . . our present policy towards capitalist industry of 
'utilize, restrict and transform' . . .  is the concrete utilization in 
China of the policy which Lenin pointed out concerning state 
capitalism.20
In arguing that rural policy should be seen in terms of the requirements of 
the peasantry; in particular, the individual peasant, and that industry should adopt a 
state capitalist form, Yang felt that he had captured the essence of Lenin's 
transitional program. Conceptually, and without explicit recognition, he was also 
following the line of Bukharin. Though Yang did not talk of 'ultimately riding into 
socialism on the backs of the rich peasantry'; and though he did not discuss 
Bukharin's theory of 'proportional development1, the emphasis upon the principle 
of equilibrium, the down-grading of class-struggle, and the idea of a 'third form' of 
production, placed Yang broadly within the Bukharinist approach. And, in this, in 
historically parallel fashion, Yang shares in an interpretation which separates Lenin 
from the later history of collectivization.21
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This, in turn, suggests an evolution in Chinese political discourse; where the 
former understanding of Soviet history as a paradigm is now superseded by a view 
which sees this past somewhat more discretely; as relatively independent moments, 
each providing a direct source for recommendation. Whatever Yang's intellectual 
limitations (and they are serious), he could not possibly have been unaware of the 
Stalinist collectivization campaign. Yet he simply ignores it, since it does not suit 
his argument. That he does so might strain reason (though this is not necessary), 
but it also indicates the lifting of any sense of prohibition to do otherwise. The 
logic which salvages Lenin by divorcing him from later practice—irrespective of 
primary intention—is here founded upon an analysis which defines all of the Soviet 
past as so much data for conceptual support. It is a reason which has with 
confidence moved beyond one particular foim of categorical imperative. Therefore, 
though Yang's analysis was clearly out of the mainstream in respect to Soviet 
orthodoxy, this created no political problem for him in China. The discursive 
territory had shifted.
To make this more clear, it is helpful and important to move, as it were, to 
the other side of the controversy over the nature of the base and the superstructure; 
that is, to the contentions of Ai Siqi.
Yang legitimized his reality through circular reasoning: what is, should be; 
and it should be, because it is. Thus, the present floated as a sort of permanent 
tense. For Ai, all moments were historically conditional; factors within an ongoing 
process. Within this flux, there was, nevertheless, a center of gravity, an 
epistemological standard which created order, and indeed gave meaning to 
existence. This was the transcendent idea of socialist construction; the first 
principle of theory and practice, which in turn provided the a priori of discourse. 
The premise of the socialist transformation was then the ground for his Marxist 
reasoning, the grid for classification.
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Thus all events could be broken up, decoded in terms of a contingent 
relation, as to whether or not a given phenomenon aided or obstructed the transition 
to socialism. Value was specifically defined in respect to what aided the future. 
This meant that to Ai questions concerning the character of the base could neither be 
general nor all inclusive. Analysis would not attempt to sum up a moment through 
the synthesis of the various aspects of an economy; instead, stance, expressing the 
presumptions of socialism, would reflect upon itself and dictate exclusion. When 
Ai asks,
what does our State have as its own economic base? Is it formed 
simultaneously of the four different systems of ownership, or is it 
formed only of the productive relations of the system of whole 
people ownership, and the system of collective ownership that are 
being established?;
his question is not what exists; rather, what exists for the possibility of socialism 
("Who are our friends and who are our enemies?").22
This temporal dualism as to what should and should not be, meant that 
while capitalism and the individual peasant economy were part of the transitional 
period, for Ai, they were not part of the base. "In order to demonstrate the thesis 
that the individual peasant economy and the capitalist system also form the base of 
our regime," Ai writes,
Yang places the emphasis of his argument on our regime's 
considerate care and arrangement for these economic factors at the 
present stage, instead of emphasizing the point that the main task of 
our lines and policies is to reform and destroy these economic 
factors.2^
In order to utilize the productive forces of capitalism, it was 
necessary, as a matter of policy, to make adequate arrangements and 
show adequate concern for its productive relations, but it would be a 
mistake to think that this amounts to regarding capitalist relations as 
our own economic base.24
To Yang, of course, this is simply inexplicable; for it seems as if Ai, from 
the start, excludes the obvious: that which is out there. This is why Yang asks the
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rhetorical question, ’how do socialists eat1; do they not depend upon the very 
produce of the peasants whom they are attempting to ignore?25 But for Ai this is an 
equally fatuous question, because it is empirical; whereas his concern is with the 
realization of an idea. "In order to have food," Ai says,
we must, at the beginning, rely mainly on the support of the 
individual peasants; and in order to win the support of the individual 
peasants, it was necessary to encourage their enthusiasm for 
production, and to give them all kinds of aid, including loans . . . 
does this amount to making the individual the socialist economic 
base? No. They are completely different things. We help the 
individual peasants mainly for the purpose of obtaining temporarily 
material supplies from their productivity, and not because we want 
to consolidate and develop their productive relations. The economic 
base means productive relations [emphasis added].26
This restriction of the concept of the base to the relations of production was
critical; it provided the theoretical justification for the idea of China's socialist
transition. In tying the definition of the economy to a political or administrative
situation; that is, to the state of the productive relations, Ai removed the axiomatic
fetter which bound the concept of a socialist or non-capitalist base to an achieved
level of productivity. In effect, he reversed the hierarchy of determinants by
shifting the emphasis to the top, to the polity. This means that ultimately economic
development would, of necessity, be guided or conditioned by the political
structure. In short, by offering an interpretation of the base which excepted the
forces of production and technique, Ai was attempting to explain how socialist
relations could precede economic underdevelopment, and how these relations could
continue to direct the course of the economy.
Intellectually, there was little that was new here. Ai had offered the same
definition of the base in his 1935 criticism of the Bukharinist inspired Soviet
textbook on political economy. But, in response to Yang, he now turns to the later
writings of Stalin, in particular Marxism and Linguistics and Economic Problems in
the Soviet Union, for further support. It is in these works that Stalin provides the
ideological justification for the Bolshevik Revolution (and for subsequent policies)
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as well as for those other Marxist revolutions which might occur in conditions of 
economic deprivation.
Stalin's presumption—which Ai shares—is that the base includes nothing 
more than the relations of production; it mediates the effect of the forces of 
production.27 In terms of Marxist canon, this principle is original to Stalin; and it 
clearly differs from the more expansive view of Engels, for example, where the 
economy meant everything associated with production, including geography. As 
Engels wrote, "by economic relations, which we regard as the determining basis of 
the history of society, we understand the entire technique of production and 
transport. .  . also the geographical basis on which they operate.. . ."28
This is not to suggest that Stalin dispensed with the critical role of the 
productive forces. He did pay homage to their creative and revolutionary 
significance. But in this, the force of determinism was tempered by that of 
possibility. It was no longer the case that revolutions or revolutionary events- 
collectivization, for example—occurred as the result of an achieved level of 
productivity; they now occurred when the Party recognized a moment in terms of its 
potential. This, according to Stalin, made manifest the law whereby the relations of 
production needed to conform to the character of the productive forces. Since 
'character' was determined subjectively, by the leadership, or leader, this was not, 
of course, a nonnative law at all; it was simply a slogan which could justify any 
action or assertion.
"Relying on the economic law that the relations of production must 
necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces," Stalin wrote,
the Soviet government socialized the means of production, made 
them the property of the whole people, and thereby abolished the 
exploiting system and created socialist forms of economy. Had it 
not been for this law, and had the Soviet government not relied on it, 
it could not have accomplished its mission.29
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Stalin's narrow definition of the base, and his revivification of the 
superstructure was precisely what Ai needed to hear. It provided orthodox support 
for what became a fortress-like conception of the socialist base in the time of 
transition. The reduction of the economy to its productive relations meant that Ai 
could, in effect, regroup the various forms of ownership into the two competing 
fiefdoms of socialism and capitalism. "The economy of the transition period," he 
writes,
is transitional. . .  because the socialist base is only in the course of 
formation. In its midst there still exists the capitalist economic base, 
though this base is steadily declining and dying. Therefore it should 
be said that during transition periods there exist in fact two 
antagonistic bases: the socialist and the capitalist base.30
In this, non-socialist economies, or non-socialist forms of ownership, stood 
in relation to the socialist economies as productive forces, as instruments of 
production. The practical reasoning of Ai's political economy meant that these anti­
socialist economies were defined in terms of their use-value. The socialist base 
drew and would continue to draw from them upon the criterion of need.
Before the capitalist system of ownership, and the system of 
individual ownership are destroyed we, on the one hand, must 
reform "by all possible means" their productive relations; while, on 
the other, we must also utilize their productive relations wherever 
possible . . . not everything which we can and must manage is the 
economic base of our state regime, and only that which we have to 
form and to consolidate can be our own economic base.31
This was a neat, though somewhat one-sided formulation. The designation 
of non-socialist economies as, at best, technical forces, clearly did not imply a 
dialectic between these two bases. There was no idea here of mutual change as a 
consequence of mutual interaction. The question for Ai was instead how best to 
contain, administer, and transform.
In this instrumental definition of value, Ai's argument brought out an 
important point concerning the mode of China's theoretical discourse. This was
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that analysis tended to conceptualize in the same way as it had been conceived. It 
viewed as it was viewed. Consciousness stated more than its understanding of an 
external real, it also made manifest the conditions for the expression of that real. In 
the act of enunciation, every declaration of reason acknowledged the ground of 
political necessity which had been incorporated from the beginning; from, that is, 
the genesis of its ideas.
Amongst other mental and natural phenomena, political philosophy had a 
place; only here location was a state prerogative. Authoritarian pronouncements: 
the line, statements by Mao or by someone else in the elite, provided the field for 
knowledge and for the articulation of experience. As it shaped, so it clearly 
restrained reason. The acceptable bounds of criticism was not a socially determined 
convention, it was a formal political fact. Thus, every statement, irrespective of its 
specific intent—whatever the claim, for example, concerning the nature of the 
superstructure—reinforced a hierarchy of order, a vertical sedimentation of power. 
In this, philosophical notions always mirrored themselves in their own reflections.
Grounded, this meant that unless there was a faction within the leadership 
which declared the superstructure to be in present danger (the need for constant 
vigilance against capitalist restoration was given as a permanent aspect) Party 
political theorists were not sufficiently independent to be able to question the 
stability of the regime.
And this puts Ai in a bind; it forces him into holding two contradictory 
positions. On the one side, he argues that, relatively speaking, the superstructure is 
basically solid, and that the state is in control of non-socialist activity. On the other 
side, he argues that class struggle is rife, and that a capitalist revival is a distinct 
possibility.
Thus in support of the latter position, for example, he writes: "the socialist 
superstructure does not exist alone, and its building is not all plain sailing; but goes 
on amidst a life and death struggle against factors of the capitalist superstructure."32
183
This means that it is critically important to be vigilant in the fight against "those 
capitalist class elements who firmly oppose the socialist transformation; who still 
promote all kinds of destructive schemes to the point that they vainly dream of 
conspiracies to destroy the Party."33 At the same time, he argues that "our state 
regime is essentially a socialist superstructure,"34 and, that this "political 
superstructure, i.e., our state regime, is more or less consolidated at present."35 
This, of course, explains the success of the state's policy of 'restrict, utilize, and 
transform'.
Can we say that we have achieved consolidation because, while 
relying on our socialist economy, we also rely on the capitalist 
system? I do not think we can. True, in the present transition 
period we have also utilized capitalism and it has done us good. But 
does utilization amount to dependence? Of course it does n o t . . . 
our proletarian regime is increasingly consolidated . . .  through the 
development of the socialist economy and the fulfillment of the 
socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, and 
agriculture and handicrafts.36
Here, it must be made clear, that above the antinomy between conflict and 
order was the overarching imperative, the transcendent need for Ai to insist that the 
superstructure was both socialist and whole. It was this point which gave meaning 
to the state’s existence in the transition period. As a Party theorist then, Ai had to 
link socialist essence with state achievement, since this legitimized all administrative 
policy throughout this transformational moment. The entire edifice of justifying the 
present through a future oriented idea-m ade manifest in the vocabulary of 
construction—required die nomenclature of socialism. Without this, the category of 
transition was meaningless; and in terms of stages this would still be the period of 
"New Democracy."
In addition, the idea of a socialist superstructure did help to establish the 
concept of a real socialist base. Since the logic of Marxist terminology dictated that 
a socialist superstructure arose from a socialist base, the existence of the former 
implied (theoretically, at least) some form of the latter.
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Yet, emotionally and intellectually, Ai does seem somewhat uncomfortable 
with a sanguine approach toward contradiction, and instead, appears in 
philosophical stride when he is able to portray the superstructure in bleak and bitter 
terms, under siege from within and without. And the reason for this was in part 
personal; what might be seen as the after-effect of rectification.
In the early 1950s, Ai had been criticized by Chen Boda, amongst others, 
for arguing that capitalist elements could play a positive role in the superstructure.37 
This contention, which was made during the period of "New Democracy," did little 
more than echo the Common Program. As the economy was seen officially in 
terms of a complex set of interactive productive relations under the direction of a 
proletarian dictatorship, it seemed logical to assume that capitalist logic could 
contribute to the developmental process. To Chen (whose own philosophical 
shortcomings Ai had pointed out in the late 1930s), this was a dangerous 
vacillation; it kept, he said, a 'foot in both doors'.38
By the mid-1950s, the period of the controversy with Yang, Ai has recanted 
his previous position. He now says that he had underestimated the capitalist threat.
With regard to the question of the superstructure, there existed in the 
past an erroneous and confused view, which said that the 
progressive side of the bourgeois ideology should be regarded as 
part of the guiding thought of the superstructure of the state; and that 
it was an indispensable though not a decisive part, under the 
guidance of Marxist-Leninist thought. Such an erroneous idea has 
been refuted after discussion. I now agree with the view that 
Marxist-Leninist thought is the sole guiding thought of our state 
regime, that our political system should conform to the Marxist- 
Leninist thought and viewpoint, and not conform to the bourgeois 
viewpoint.3^
From this time on, Ai will see the state's relation with all non-socialist elements 
primarily in terms of struggle. Never again will he be accused of tolerating 
capitalism or any other sector conceptually opposed to socialism.
The question as to whether this represents an intellectual sacrifice to get 
along politically, or whether it was the result of an honest self-appraisal in the light
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of criticism and self-criticism is not easily answered. His philosophical work in the 
1930s, his original and forceful arguments concerning the political and 
epistemological problems connected with ideological consolidation, and his 
understanding of the meaning and function of the dialectic, suggest that during the 
period of "New Democracy," his judgment of capitalism was too affirmative. Put 
another way, his desire (and duty) to education, explain and justify official policy, 
caused a preoccupation with what was, instead of what could be. This changes 
after the declaration of the General Line, and the publication of "On Contradiction."
The adoption of a new stage transformed his sense of time. The present 
was now teleologically defined; immediacy became an aspect of a dialectically 
unfolding immanency. Philosophically, this meant that constructs had to 
incorporate the complexity of their moment within a stance that concomitantly 
divided them along the suppositions of a socialist path. This Mao provides, and Ai 
finds, in the principle of the "unity of opposites." This axiom allows Ai to group 
the disparate elements which characterize the economy into two conflicting groups. 
It affirms his stance of exclusivity. "The economic base in the transition period," he 
writes,
is not monistic, but is a ’unity of opposites'-two antagonistic bases.
Nor is the superstructure monistic. It is also a 'unity of opposites'— 
the socialist superstructure which occupies the ruling position, and 
the factors of the capitalist superstructure which are hostile to it.40
This dichotomy, in turn, presupposed new types of agricultural and 
industrial signposts; contemporary non-socialist productive relations simply could 
not be tolerated. And here, to back his sense of the imperative, Ai again looks to 
Stalin. For it was Stalin, Ai says, who saw that the achievement of socialism 
requires the simultaneous alteration of individual and handicraft modes of 
production. Stalin's idea was that of "a course of reform of the individual peasant 
economy which was also a course for the building of the socialist economic 
base."41
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Compared to the view of Yang, this pushes Soviet history forward, and it 
suggests that Stalin did not laud the individual peasant in either policy or 
declaration. And it is in Stalin, particularly the Stalin who ends the NEP, that Ai 
finds his Virgil. For Ai understands China's contemporary moment as analogous to 
that of the Soviet Union in the late twenties; when, as he sees it, both established 
state structures were under threat.42 Consequently, Stalin's words retain a 
significance higher than mere sentiment.
It must be recalled that in China at this time there were a number of ongoing 
campaigns to eradicate 'counter-revolutionaries' and 'class collaborationists'. The 
Sufan movement to purge anti-Party elements, the excoriation of Hu Feng and the 
idea of 'bourgeois humanism', and the start up of the criticism of Liang Shuming 
and the philosophy of pragmatism, made it clear that this was a period of serious 
class-struggle. Indeed, by 1954, when Ai quotes Stalin on the peasantry, the Gao 
Gang affair had only recently been resolved. And as Mao noted, "the emergence of 
the anti-Party alliance of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi was by no means accidental, 
but was the acute manifestation of the intense class struggle at the present stage."43 
In this, Ai was quite in line in offering a bleak assessment of China's polity.
And here, the regulatory prescription as to how to overcome class conflict 
seemed to him pre-established in the given of collectivization, and a concentration 
upon heavy industry. This he sees as Stalin's solution, or the way in which Stalin 
"defended and developed Lenin's thoughts on socialist industrialization,"44 This 
policy continues to be appropriate, Ai argues, because in China heavy industry is 
the "pivot capable of driving all of socialist industrialization forward."45 
Collectivization, in turn, is the foundation of socialist industrialization. "If," Ai 
says, "a socialist basis is not constructed in the villages, then socialist 
industrialization cannot be firm."46 Though, as he notes, collectivization was 
originally Stalin's specific response to the grain crisis, it still has a more general 
application. "Stalin pointed out that in developing the construction of socialist
187
industry, it's necessary to guide the individual peasant in an orderly fashion 
towards the road of collectivization; to construct a socialist basis in the villages."47
Unless "orderly" is to be decoded as coercion, this is utterly disingenuous. 
It also does not accord with Ai's earlier statements, in his radio lectures, where he 
discussed the more forceful aspects of the Soviet transition.48 Nevertheless, the 
issue here is not that of deceit; instead, it is to note that aside from what are deemed 
general laws of entry into socialism-collectivization and industrialization-Ai offers 
little in the way of political or economic strategy. His discussion of the base and 
superstructure rests more upon the idea of the base and its future than upon any 
detailed discussion as to its character. Ultimately, the analysis of the political 
economy is expressed in relatively traditional fashion, through philosophical 
constructs. And as such, Ai's concern centers upon the critical function of 
consciousness in shaping the material base.
The pivotal role of consciousness in either aiding or hindering the 
development of the economy was of course a hallmark of Ai's conceptual 
understanding. He had always held a dynamic view of the subject-object relation, 
where understanding integrated the discovered antinomies—the ever-present 
contradictions—into its reflective activity. Thought was active, not reactive; and 
thus could not be compared to a mirror or a photograph. As he said,
to discover the contradiction which exists within a thing, just is to 
discover the problem, just is to indicate the problem. Only, 
tediously, to want 'to respect reality', 'respect proof, is certainly 
not inclusive of the scientific method. Because reality and proof 
(without necessarily going through the distortion of pragmatism) just 
serves as the starting point for the scientific method. The critical key 
for the scientific method is towards reality—and it's necessary to treat 
this as objectively existing practical matter—to increase analytical 
research, to discover within the objective laws [emphasis added].49
The point was not, as Yang would have it, to accept or to legitimize a given 
circumstance; it was to specify, and sublimate a revealed contradiction.
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It is clear how this kind of approach, one which ties method to the 
epistemologic a priori's of a system of antinomies, may lead to a picture of the 
superstructure as mired in conflict. Left alone, an understanding which is unified 
by contradiction will not in itself necessarily seek to reaffirm or resolve its reality. 
But, of course, philosophic argument was not a singular concern; or it was so only 
with respect to dissidence. Ultimately, philosophy was the predicate of state 
determination; consciousness the refinement of images where neither logic nor 
historical evidence was always readily apparent.
Thus, in July 1955, for example, Mao found the social situation in China 
had been suddenly transformed; and that the time was right for a 'high tide of 
socialization'. "Nineteen fifty-five," he declared, was
a decisive year for the struggle between socialism and capitalism in 
C hina. . .  in the first half of 1955 the atmosphere was dark and dark 
clouds threatened. But in the second half of the year there has been 
a complete change and the climate is entirely different.50
By the end of the year the victory of socialism will be largely assured.51
The point here is not whether Mao really believed that circumstances had 
been so transformed that the time was ripe for a leap forward; or whether he was 
trying to force a transformation which had few social roots; where his rhetoric was 
simply another device to mobilize the peasantry. What is important is that once 
announced his statement became dictum. And this meant that Ai and his bleak logic 
of division were pushed aside in favor of Yang, and his more elementary, but 
comforting, notion of secure control. Yang, that is, told the leadership what they 
wanted to hear. And thus in 1955 he became Director of the Marxist-Leninist 
Institute.
In terms of theory, the contrasting arguments of Ai and Yang made manifest 
the possibilities open to expression. In this, the allowance for a consideration of the 
character of the polity was to be found in the essential idea of uniqueness. An idea
189
which in turn gave meaning to knowledge. This is made clear in the novel approach 
toward Soviet history. For in their effort to adapt certain aspects of the Soviet 
experience to China's situation, Ai and Yang assumed the new categorical ground 
of China's specificity. With the vantage point of "On Contradiction," with, that is, 
the established grid of particularity, they (as well as all Party theorists) were now 
able to select those aspects from previous socialist experience which could either aid 
or inform current analysis. The Soviet past did not provide a paradigm to be 
imitated, rather it offered data for interpretive choice. The statements of Lenin and 
Stalin were less invariant rules for conduct than they were citations: references for 
policy recommendations. Indeed, the principle of difference was so rooted in 
China's political discourse, that Ai had to reassure his audience that this did not 
imply the abandonment of socialism. "Our present line for the transition period," he 
wrote (before the 'high tide'),
has its own particularity, and is distinct from the general line for the 
transition period in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless both are [or 
were] for the transition to socialism. Therefore it may not be said 
that because China's general line for the transition is possessed of its 
particularity, and is dissimilar to that of the Soviet Union, it is not a 
general line for the transition towards socialist society.^2
At the categorical level of political philosophy there was no Soviet model. 
Whatever this might have implied in the past with respect to the idea of mimesis, 
had been gainsaid by Maoist practice. The stance of particularism had created its 
own equivalent truths within the world view of Marxism-Leninism. This was the 
new charter for ideas.
At the conceptual level, in the arena of explanation, analysis, and 
suggestion, where controversies attempted to endorse or to anticipate the 'correct 
line' Soviet experience had a definite place. It offered evidence for dictums, and 
proof for contentions. This is why Soviet history could be broken up so easily into 
a series of periods, each almost a clear and discontinuous moment, for their value 
was determined by China's theorists. Ai and Yang could each have their Lenin and
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their Stalin. In this, the metaphor of a 'high tide' was not inappropriate, it did 
denote a swell in the substantive content of China's political theory.
Political philosophy was more then than simply the after effect of image; it 
defined (or attempted to define) promise, by making clear that which was both 
stated and implied. In this, philosophy assumed prerogative, as it led its collegiate 
disciplines, and, of course, the arts, through the constructs and political meaning of 
discourse. It was the privilege of political theory to regulate, formally, at least, 
conceptual performance upon the grid.
For this to become evident, however, it is necessary here to move to a 
discussion of the analysis of some of China's leading political economists 
concerning the character of the polity. It is only then that the ground for the 
constructs of theory becomes truly clear.
2
The dispute between Ai and Yang centered primarily on concepts; on 
conflicting ideas as to the nature of the base and the superstructure. In this, there 
was little in terms of concrete analysis of the economy. Theories were instead 
supported by rival citations from the Soviet past.
This was to be expected given the conditional aspect to philosophic 
discourse. The fact that the line between the real and the possible was blurred 
means that argument was, out of necessity, thrown back into a sort of 'meta-air'. 
The apodictic of future orientation, of a present understood as being in permanent 
transition, locked thought into a fixed space of anticipation. Thus philosophic 
consciousness was fundamentally reflexive, concerned with how each moment 
fitted into a set of categorical presumptions.
While some political theorists were issuing judgments, there was also a 
group of political economists who were offering critical interpretations of the base. 
Their concern was less with the superstructure than it was with the complexity of
191
economic definition. But in order to develop their points these economists had to 
adopt the basic discursive formation of political theory. Method presupposed the 
ideological framework which political theory had helped to set out. Hence the 
analysis of political economy entered the matrix of inviolate categories, sanctified 
leadership pronouncements, and restricted conceptual movement.
To make this clear, and to give an indication as to how the base was 
understood-the other side of the problem—it is important to note, however briefly, 
the arguments of some of the leading economic theorists, who were on the editorial 
board of the journal New Construction.
There were two structural keys to the analysis of these political economists: 
"On Contradiction" and the designation of the economy as state capitalist.
"On Contradiction" provided the ground for the development of theory. Its 
underlying idea, the distillation of the general into the particular, was the 
presupposition of reason; the platform for conceptual argument. In turn, the 
characterization of the economy as state capitalist allowed political economists to 
read into a somewhat ambiguous phrase a more substantive definition of 
independence. "The fundamental nature of our country's political power and that of 
the Soviet Union is identical," Shen Zhiyuan, one of the three editors of New 
C onstruction , writes. "However," he continues, "our country's historical 
conditions, and those of the Soviet Union are not the same. Thus the form and 
function of state capitalism in our transitional period and that which occurred in the 
Soviet Union are also different."^3
Here, the working out of the principle that one divides into two, the unity of 
opposites, is apparent. The use or celebration of state capitalism is perhaps not.
State capitalism was one of those terms that had a relatively brief run and 
then disappeared; much as it had in the Soviet Union. As policy it could be traced 
both to the Common Program and to the Draft Constitution, where it signified the 
process of transforming capitalism into socialism. It actually expressed the form of
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capitalism in China. "The present day capitalist economy in China," Mao wrote,
. . is not an ordinary but a particular kind of capitalist economy, namely a state 
capitalist economy."54 But though Mao talked of the "various" forms of state 
capitalism, and though others discussed the complexity of its stages, it was unclear 
as to what this truly meant. There was no concrete definition of this idea as a 
specific course. It seemed more a nationalist expression than anything else. Still, 
cloudy as it was, state capitalism was a politically legitimate notion, open to 
interpretation. And as the New Constructionists were intent upon limiting the pace 
of economic reform, they read into this phrase a statement of complexity; a 
recognition of a lengthy process.
Almost inevitably, this was brought out through contrast, through the 
particularization of the universal. State capitalism became raised, that is, to a sort of 
abstract noun, an historic stage which all transitions were required to pass through; 
in their specifically determined manner. The overriding subject became the 
predicate of a patavinous realization.
In this, uniqueness was underlined through role. Shen, for example, 
argued that whereas state capitalism was an external economic relation in the Soviet 
Union, in China the relationship was internal; the state participated directly in the 
management of private enterprises.
The principal form of state capitalism which the Soviet Union 
adopted at that time [1921] was to follow a system of leasing and 
hiring. But today the principal form which our country adopts is 
one of public and private partnership; we still do not lease or rent.55
At the same time, Qian Jiazhu stressed that while state capitalism in the Soviet 
Union acted as the mediation between small production and socialism, in China, it 
served as the link between capitalism and socialism.
Can we compare our economy today [1954] with that of the Soviet 
Union in 1921? Without a doubt we consider we cannot. Although 
we are also a country where small production is supreme, we 
already have today a strong state economy, and a rapidly developing
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co-operative economy. And from our state industrial enterprises and 
the co-operative enterprises we have already established a link with 
the agricultural economy. Therefore our state capitalism is a 
transition from capitalist industry towards socialism, and is not a 
transition from small production (agriculture and handicraft industry) 
towards socialism.56
In turn, particularity affirmed complexity. Understanding that China's 
economy was basically primitive—"at present," Qian writes, "our economy is 
relatively backward"57—both Qian and Shen read out of the concept of state 
capitalism a somewhat epochal process, consisting of three lengthy stages. With 
respect to industry and capital accumulation, China was to move gradually from a 
situation where private capitalists were beginning to depend upon the state to that of 
an external alliance between state and private capital until, as a result of transformed 
productive relations, the state participated directly and controlled all industry.58 
Concomitant with the development of the productive forces there would be an 
evolution in the thinking guiding production; consciousness as well as technique 
would be raised.
It should be pointed out that in going through the practice of state 
capitalism to transform private industry, this involves the 
transformation of private industry and the transformation of the 
private industrialist. These two aspects are unified and cannot be 
separated. The transformation of industry means going through 
each kind of state capitalism to make industry prosper, so that it is 
able to suit the needs of the national economy. To make, that is, 
industrial productive relations correspond to the developing 
requirements of the productive forces. The transformation of the 
individual occurs by going through state capitalism, under the direct 
leadership of the socialist economic sector, to teach and transform 
the private industrialists, to make them become patriotic 
industrialists.59
This sanguine approach to ideological reformation owed everything to the 
ambiguous position of national capital in China. A violent struggle against a 
counter-revolutionary class was not, Qian suggests, necessary because these 
capitalists did not dream of restoration. Nurtured under the yoke of semi-feudalism 
and semi-colonialism, this specifically Chinese class was both weak and yet
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somehow progressive, given its apparent willingness to aid construction. This is 
why they could be peacefully transformed 60
And for Qian and Shen this reinforced the distinctions within the generality 
of the socialist experience. The point here is that China might avoid that kind of 
forced liquidation of capital which had occurred in the Soviet Union. "The 
historical responsibility for the progressive transformation of state capitalist 
industry," Qian writes, "is the special responsibility of our socialist revolution. It 
did not previously exist in the Soviet Union, and it does not exist in today's Eastern 
European Democracies."61
In this, the key is of course the idea of difference; the expression of the 
universal as dichotomy. Qian was not trying to celebrate the achievements of 
China's economy in comparison to that of the Soviet Union at a similar stage of 
development; he was, instead, emphasizing the inviolacy of circumstance. What 
has happened in the Soviet past has for him little relevance to China’s present. And 
thus, in what is also a quiet swipe at Ai and Yang, Qian notes that it
severs the historical conditions to quote a section from Lenin's "On 
the Grain Tax" to try to explain the function of state capitalism in our 
transition period. Without question his analysis of the why and 
wherefore of small production is completely unsuited for our 
contemporary practice.62
This emphasis upon particularism seemingly implied a complete freedom to 
Marxist interpretation. The idea of the distillation of general principles appeared to 
be a cover for creation; a formal expression of link which screened a substantive 
independent art. "Within our life, within our practical struggle, according to this 
time, here and now, in these concrete situations and conditions," Shen writes,
we all adapt all workable methods. This is a matter for China’s 
people themselves. The responsibility of creative Marxism is to 
utilize the ideological method of Marxism, based on the spirit and 
essence of Marxism, and unite it with China's concrete situation.63
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But in a situation where meaning was dependent upon a specific realization, 
subjectivity might lack restraint. And voluntarism, unchecked, threatened order. 
This of course is what Stalin understood, and it explains his sharp denial of the 
principle that men may create their own laws. "Some comrades," he says,
deny the objective character of laws of science, and the laws of 
political economy particularly, under socialism. They deny that the 
laws of political economy reflect law-governed processes which 
operate independently of the will of man. They believe that in view 
of the specific role assigned to the Soviet state by history, the Soviet 
state can abolish existing laws of political economy and can "form," 
"create," new laws. These comrades are profoundly mistaken. . . . 
Marxism regards laws of science--whether they be laws of natural 
science or laws of political economy—as reflections of objective 
processes which take place independently of the will of man.64
Indeed the whole conservative trend of his later writings,65 contemporaneous to this 
period in China's history, appears to represent and attempt to reassert, and hence, 
reaffirm the predominance of law over will. This was of course the ideological 
correlative to Party rule.
The point is that neither in China nor in the Soviet Union could the activity 
of synthesis be permitted to exhaust the concept of universality; something or some 
things had to remain outside. What stood apart, elevated, though still providing 
direction, were the laws; the categories of the dialectic and the principles of process.
These clearly were not laws at all. They were simply assertions, 
expressions of state purpose masquerading as norms. Yet, once in play these 
categories did have meaning as rules of the discursive game. They provided a 
critical reference point for historical identity, by helping to establish the formal 
criteria for the transition to socialism. In turn, they structured conceptual thought 
by informing perspective. This of course opened up the possibilities for practical 
theories which could integrate the apodictics of philosophy within subjective intent. 
The activity of synthesis thus allowed adaptation interpretative scope: laws could be 
both maintained and creatively shaped.
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Shen, for example, used Stalin's 'law of correspondence' (which was little 
more than a shell) to argue that China's economy needed to be completely 
overhauled in a gradual and particular fashion. What Shen basically contends is that 
the requirements of this law justify both a primary emphasis upon the development 
of the productive forces, and a prior supersession of the productive relations in 
order to make this all possible. In other words Shen uses this law to legitimate 
whatever he wants, no matter how illogical it might appear. But at the same time, 
he has to invoke the law.
Thus, he begins his analysis with the declaration that,
the general line for our transition period is based on the objective 
laws of social and economic development. . .  the objective law and 
affirmation that the relations of production must be in conformity 
with the character of the productive forces.66
This, he says, means that, "to realize the thorough transformation of the economic 
form, or to realize completely the transformation of the productive relations of each 
economic sector, it is necessary to strive to transform the technical conditions."6? 
At the same time, he also states that,
within our present small agricultural economy there is little 
possibility of being able to improve the situation of technique. The 
key determinant to such an improvement in agricultural technique 
lies in transforming the productive relations of the small agricultural 
economy; transforming the small agricultural system.68
And reason is thereby reduced to a paralogism.
Moreover, Shen is also able to find in all this an injunction against 
subjectivism: 'correspondence' signifies restraint. "In the end, he says,
the line demands that under the prerequisite of the possible and the 
necessary, there be a process of going through each kind of state 
capitalism to realize gradually the socialist transformation of 
capitalist industry and commercial enterprises. This does not 
require, for example, the use of a paper law to nationalize 
immediately.69
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Shen's circular argument expressed the difficulty of attempting to adapt the 
tenets of classical Marxism to what was, in these terms, an unanticipated situation. 
Whatever the spin of Stalin's law, it could not replace the axioms of nineteenth 
century Marxism. And thus the idea of the primacy of the productive forces within 
the developmental process still supposed some sort of dithryambic assent. Yet, in 
non-capitalist formations, specifically China in the early 1950s, this could not 
suffice as a meaningful principle, since adherence invalidated the very idea of a 
transition to socialism through pre-existing socialist relations. And so statements of 
substantive intent, declarations of need, and recommendations as to course, could 
seemingly do no more than try to manoeuver around, but always through a field of 
a priori's.
2.1
Not everyone thought in terms of immanent teleology. There were those 
who sought to define their moment in terms of its immediacy. In this, the grid of 
particularism was both recognized and accepted. And thus the assumption 
underlying response presupposed more novel constructs, for discourse had to be 
appropriate to its new reality. Rubrics which either simplified or subsumed all 
phenomena under the struggle between capitalism and socialism—or resorted to 
convenient expressions—the general prescriptions of Lenin and Stalin, or pejorative 
characterizations such as "leftism" or "rightism"—were in this regard inadequate, 
since they undercut the very principle of uniqueness. The idea instead would be to 
try to move theory vertically; to relocate its discourse in new laws and 
contradictions. Reason would attempt to discover, within the overall commitment 
to the categorical structure of Marxism, that which could make manifest the specific 
nature of China's road.
This said, there were very few theorists who could be identified with this 
approach. It was difficult to separate oneself from allegiance to the line, or to the
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vocabulary that safely reinforced it, and remain a Marxist. It was, in the end, a 
rather singular experience. Ironically, or perhaps logically, it was the translator of 
Capital. Wang Xuewen,70 who recognized most clearly the discontinuous aspects 
of China's moment. And thus it was he who attempted to break through the 
'shibboleths' of theory to re-ground these constructs in their reality.
The economy, Wang says, comprises five, very loosely connected sectors. 
In fact, they are basically self-sufficient entities, each governed by their own 
distinctive laws. "The co-operative economy . . . has its own principal laws, the 
private capitalist economy has its own principal laws, [and] the state run economy 
has its own principal laws."71 This clearly distances Wang from those who held to 
a sum-total theory of the economy, and indeed he chastises thinkers such as Yang, 
who "see a link between each kind of sector in the transition period, but who do not 
recognize the particularity and the certain kind of independence of each kind of 
economy."72
The question though was not one of emphasis, of stressing the parts rather 
than the whole. On the contrary, Wang was arguing that the nature of these sectors, 
their various strengths, prevented a workable concept of unity. In turn, this meant 
that there could not be a fundamental economic law which could characterize this 
period. This was not an epoch 01* an era, such as feudalism, capitalism, 01* 
socialism. This was instead a moment distinguished by complexity, with a 
concomitant series of principal laws. And thus the state run economy could not 
define the method or function of distribution or exchange in these other economies. 
"There are those comrades," Wang writes, "who do not recognize that the co­
operative economy and the individual economy have their own economic laws."73
Because each economy has its own different conditions, the guiding 
function of the state run economy receives, in one respect, the 
limitations of its strengths and conditions; at the same time, it also 
receives the limitations of other economic conditions. Although the 
state run economy has as its basis the guiding economic laws of
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socialism, it certainly is not as it is in socialism, where it constitutes 
the fundamental law determining the whole social economy.?4
Wang's point was to try to redirect analysis towards what was truly specific 
about this economy. This is why the denial of a fundamental law was so critical, 
because it gainsaid the reincorporation of diversity within the nomenclature of 
capitalism and socialism. And, of course, it disavowed the reliance upon past 
quotation. To Wang, theorists who looked back to find in the Soviet past a present 
meaning, failed to grasp the reality of uniqueness.
They do not understand that Lenin's analysis arose from concrete 
economic conditions. They do not understand that it indicated the 
transition to socialism. Our situation in the transition period is very 
complicated, and cannot be seen simply as a transition from 
capitalism to socialism; from these two kinds of particular 
constructs, each with its own tendency. It certainly does not 
summarize the particularism of the five kinds of economic forms of 
our present.75
This redirection of gaze inward had its categorical grounding in "On 
Contradiction." Though Wang substitutes the concept of law for that of 
contradiction, both the formal structure of thought (the descending hierarchy of 
classification—from fundamental to principal to principal aspect) and the overall 
intention (to celebrate the particular) clearly follow from Mao's seminal work. 
Wang's attempt to explain the meaning of China's unique road, by seeing it in and 
for itself, required, that is, a previous philosophical breakthrough.
But in the effort to realize the central assumption of a theoretical discourse a 
dynamic occurs which may lead to unanticipated and politically undesirable results. 
And this in fact occurred here. For Wang argued further, was led to insist, that the 
entire character of the individual economy had been misconceived. It was not, he 
said, simply a small producing economy; it also comprised a large self-sustaining 
sector. The same terms were being incorrectly applied to what were in fact two 
distinct groups: one which produced for the market, and one which tried purely to 
survive. "Within our small peasant economy there are two sectors whose character
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are different and cannot be mixed . . .  it cannot be said that the commodity 
producing sector has killed the naturally producing sector."76 Indeed, in many 
respects it was the latter which was truly the individual peasant economy, which 
gave meaning to the term. And it was this naturally producing sector that 
characterized China's uniqueness.
There are those comrades who do not consider that the individual 
economy has its own economic laws. They think that the individual 
economy is determined by the influence of each kind of society's 
fundamental law. I do not go along with this method, because the 
individual economy has gone through three developmental stages: 
slavery, feudalism, and capitalism, even though the influence of the 
ruling economy kept dying. After capitalism dies, and capitalist 
economies lose their effect, the individual economy will still exist; 
and it certainly is not going to lose its capitalist tendencies.77
For Wang, the refusal to separate the subsistence and marketing sectors
meant that in the purchase of grain, the state would unknowingly extract that which
many peasants needed to exist. "If one mistakenly believes that the small peasant
economy is equivalent to small commodity producers," Wang writes, "it will lead to
the effect that there will be a purchase of residuary food stuffs and a compulsory
purchase of the daily intake of the peasant will be inevitable."78
This was written in 1954; a year later, as is now known, there was a grain
supply crisis effected by the system of unified purchase. After some time, the Party
did admit that there were cases where peasants never received enough food. But
this, of course, was blamed on a variety of factors—cadre insufficiency,
bureaucratism, and hoarding by rich and middle peasants.79 Here, it may be
suggested that the problem was also caused by the lack of a clear and detailed
understanding of the nature of the countryside. Ultimately, it was far easier, and
certainly more politically acceptable to see the small producing economy as
coherent, whole and therefore manageable; to see it for some time, as an element
within the capitalist economy to be utilized and vanquished, than to understand it as
a primitive economic form, subject to its own laws.
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In turn, Wang's argument redefined the concept of transition. For the 
process now involved the transformation of a small producing sector, and a 
subsistence level economy. "Our country," Wang writes,
is not simply in a transition from capitalism towards socialism, but is 
still in transition from an individual economy towards socialism.
The individual economy, within our state economy, occupies the 
moving force, and it is not simply a commodity producing sector.
There are still many kinds of self-sufficient sectors.^
This appeared to put the idea of a transition somewhat on hold. The 
problem of capitalism and socialism, of transcendence, was clearly less meaningful, 
almost without purpose, in the context of an economy dominated by a backward 
agricultural sector. Indeed, according to Wang, this was not really a complete 
economy, but instead was a composite series of economies; each characterized by 
their own principal laws.
The inherited language of discourse thus seemed inadequate. The 
particularism of underdevelopment suggested a demand for new analytical 
constructs. Yet, uniqueness was only categorically intelligible in terms of its other, 
the universality of Marxism. A synthesis was needed therefore which recognized 
and tied China's economic reality to the political suppositions of transition. This 
Wang found in the co-operative movement. Following the lead of his colleagues on 
the editorial board of New Construction. Wang disguised the low level of China's 
development by celebrating the distinct achievement of co-operativization. His 
description of this movement as semi-socialist (which it was, only in respect to 
primitive communism) allowed a subsistence level economy to be seen positively, 
as part of a specific but generally planned future. In all this, time was understood 
as that which was historically relative but within a Marxist continuum. And thus, 
Wang underscored the uniqueness of China's co-operative movement through 
contrast.
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The transitional period in the Soviet Union had a primitive form of 
small commodity agricultural economy. In our country this is the 
individual economy (it contains the natural economic sector and the 
small commodity sector). In the beginning of the Soviet Union's 
transition period, the cooperative economy was a state capitalist 
economy, afterwards it was a socialist economy. Our co-operative 
economy certainly is not a capitalist co-operative economy, and it is 
not a state capitalist economy, but is a semi-socialist and socialist co­
operative economy.81
In passing, it should be noted that Wang was not always consistent in his 
understanding of the socialist character of these economies. Though he was firm in 
drawing a distinction between the processes of transition in China and in the Soviet 
Union, there were times when he saw the co-operative economy as possessing 
some socialist elements. Thus, in 1953, he wrote,
our present agricultural producing is neither a capitalist, state 
capitalist, nor socialist co-operative economy. But in the transition 
from the individual economy to socialism, this co-operative society 
has a semi-socialist essence. It cannot be seen as the same as the co­
operative society in the Soviet Union.82
Wang's pressing concern was not, of course, with the extent of socialism 
within the co-operative movement. His point, rather, was that a new moment 
supposes new ideas. And that, in turn, gives rise to, becomes the expression of 
more contemporary norms. Thus he writes,
Marxist-Leninist political economy is without a study of semi­
socialist co-operative economies. It is, of course, without a study of 
the laws of semi-socialist co-operative economies. China's 
revolutionary practice created the semi-socialist co-operative 
economy. This kind of co-operative society possesses its own 
economic conditions; naturally it produces its own economic laws.83
To take the discontinuity of discourse within the spectrum of Marxism- 
Leninism seriously, to attempt to realize the consequences of particularism within 
original concepts, threatened the discursive order. It stated that the intellectual 
moorings of the grid needed to be rethought. But to the degree that this could ever 
occur, this most certainly was an elite judgment. Moreover, the specific emphasis
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here upon the complex status of the individual economy clearly undermined state 
intention. It demanded a re-evaluation of the reality of transition.
This did not pass without comment. And in, "Several Problems Concerning 
the Essence and Laws of Our Country's Transitional Economy," Du Ruzhi and Yu 
Shudong responded to Wang, by arguing that he had got it all wrong: that he had 
misunderstood the nature of the economy. And it is important to summarize their 
point, briefly, though their thesis is long and well considered, because as a 
statement of orthodoxy, it underlined the epistemological closure which 
characterized this theoretical discourse.
They begin with the assertion that there is only one governing law. Laws, 
they say, exist within an hierarchy, unified and defined by that which controls. One 
rules, the rest are ruled; "and the ruling economy influences the other economies in 
such a way that they lose their independent developing character."**4 In the 
transition period, this process of transformation may generally be seen as that which 
sharpens the antagonism between capitalism and socialism. In fact the meaning of 
the transition is made manifest in the imposition of state will upon the private 
sectors.
Thus, as long as it was accepted that the socialist economy—or socialist 
types of economies—determined the complexion of unity, then clearly the 
contradiction with capitalism was the key to this period. Conversely, Wang's 
approach, his emphasis upon discrete laws and sectors, understated this antinomy 
in favor of concomitant tensions. And it was this that Du and Yu found intolerable. 
"If it is taken that in the transition period, each economic sector has 'its own 
principal laws', then by considering all these laws as equal, the struggle between 
fully developing socialism and dying capitalism is destroyed."85 Wang simply does 
not understand that, "our transition period's particular contradiction is that between 
socialism and capitalism."86
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This redirecting of the territory of transition with more conventional 
signposts also brings Lenin and Stalin back to ground. Their insights into the 
fissures endemic to the transitional process once again take on a transcendent value. 
And, according to Du and Yu, Wang's denial of this gainsays in effect almost the 
entire Leninist inheritance. He, "exaggerates the distinction between China and the 
Soviet Union, and thereby destroys the universal significance of Lenin's 
proclamations concerning the transition period."87 They point out that though 
China's particular form of underdevelopment required the era of "New 
Democracy," in terms of a macro-view, especially with regard to commodity 
production in the countryside, China's situation is comparable to that of the Soviet 
Union in the late twenties.
The difference between the commodity production of our small 
agricultural economy and that of the Soviet Union at that time [1928] 
is not that great. Thus, from the aspect of the individual economy 
the difference between the Soviet Union and ourselves is one of 
degrees. It is not a qualitative difference.88
Here, their argument was that the individual economy had to be seen as part 
of commodity production in general. It was not, as Wang insisted, a separate 
economic sector. And though aspects of the natural self-subsisting economy did 
exist—as 'unsurmounted remains'-they were too small to matter. Before, they say, 
peasants treated produce as the ground rent payable to the landlord; now this same 
produce becomes a commodity to be sold. Theoretically, the mistake is to see this 
category in absolute terms; that is, "it is not necessary to have 100 percent 
commodity production to call an economy a small commodity economy. "89
This in turn creates a dangerous situation. For though this kind of economy 
was critical for overall development, left unchecked, a commodity economy 
engenders capitalism. This article of Marxist faith, indeed reinforced the all- 
embracing nature of the conflict with capitalism. And this was for Du and Yu the
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distinguishing aspect of the whole transformation process; the integral reason
underlyng course.
We must guide the individual peasant economy towards socialism, 
and not allow its spontaneous development towards the road of 
capitalism. And it is because the individual economy is a small 
producing economy, that in the transition period we utilize the 
circulation of commodities to promote trade between the state and 
co-operative societies, to promote the circulation between town and 
country, and to strengthen the alliance between workers and 
farmers.90
Wang’s attempt to recast theoretical discourse so that it might be more 
appropriate to its political reality, opened up the possibility for a different 
commitment to the truth of socialism. As such, it represented both an achievement 
and a threat. In realizing the essential tenet of "On Contradiction," in grounding the 
principle of particularity, Wang asked for a postponement of all substantive 
discussion regarding the transition as a somewhat immediate and recognizable goal. 
For, in effect, the categories and concepts attendant upon this process cancelled the 
complexity of uniqueness. And yet, what Wang sought to preserve, denied the 
very certainty, which not only was an assumed right of state, but which, practically, 
had already been summarized and classified in the Constitution. The scope of 
interpretation for economic and political phenomena had, that is, been officially 
bound. And thus, aside from self-belief, and perhaps the writings of Marx, Wang 
had no support in his efforts toward the definition of an alternative stance. In turn, 
there was apparently no further point to dialogue; he seems to have stopped writing 
in 1955.
3
There was another theoretical controversy during this period that it is 
important to mention. This involved the seemingly abstract question as to whether
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01* not antagonistic contradictions presupposed a violent resolution. Though formal, 
the issue was of real concern. Having gone through the bloodshed associated with 
the seizure of power, and understanding that the relationship between capital and 
labor was one of continuous struggle, it made sense to ask whether the dialectical 
logic underlying the transition process dictated violence.
The issue was raised by Shu Weikuang in "A Discussion Concerning the 
Gradual Leap in China's Transition Period," where he argued that the antagonistic 
contradiction between capitalism and socialism could be in fact peacefully resolved. 
The key, he said, was to recognize that in an antinomy it was essence, and not 
form, which determined the substance of resolution. There were, in other words, 
no imperatives within classification.
Although it is unquestioned that an explosive form necessarily 
resolves an antagonistic contradiction, it is not, however, [always] 
necessary to use force to resolve an antagonistic contradiction. 
Towards an enemy in a divided class society, where the counter­
revolutionary class occupies the ruling position, force is required.
Where the revolutionary working class, however, occupies the 
ruling position, though the exploiting class still has not been 
liquidated, an explosive form is not definitely needed. It is correct to 
say that the character of a contradiction determines the method of 
resolution, the form of leap. One cannot, however, say abstractly in 
turn, that in resolving a contradiction, the form of the leap 
determines the character of the contradiction.91
This is quite logical, and it is also a clear example of the way in which the 
general principle of "On Contradiction," the distillation of the general into the 
particular, had become, by 1955, truly integrated within the structure of analytical 
discourse. Here, the concept of the general was not Marxism but contradiction in 
itself. And thus, antinomy, which of course was the ontic principle of this 
particular Marxist transition, supposed a more specified classification. This is why 
investigation had to move from the fundamental to the particular, and then to the 
particular aspect of contradiction. Location was everything. Therefore, Shu 
explains that while the basic conU’adiction is between capital and labor, the principal 
aspect of this contradiction is decided by who is in power; who governs.
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The leading position of the proletariat, the guiding function of the 
socialist sector of the economy, all indicate that within the 
contradiction between the working and capitalist classes, the 
principal aspect of the contradiction is governed by the progressive, 
revolutionary working class. This point is of particular importance 
in grasping the meaning of the capitalist transformation in our 
transition period. Without this situation, the fundamental question 
of socialist transformation could not exist.92
Though this was necessary for creating the possibility of a peaceful 
resolution, it was not entirely sufficient. Shu points out that in the Soviet Union 
and in the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe, the principal aspect of 
contradiction was also revealed in working class rule. But there, as opposed to 
China, the method of resolution required force.
Within the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Democratic 
Dictatorships, the liquidation of the capitalist class was achieved 
through violence. But under our concrete conditions, it's possible to 
undergo a peaceful road of socialist transformation in order to 
achieve the same goal: the liquidation of the capitalist class 9^
According to Shu, there are three reasons why China’s situation is 
historically unique. The first is that Party control is absolute. Second, within the 
struggle between capital and labor there is also an identity of interest; national capital 
willingly supports the task of socialist construction. Third, the international 
situation is peaceful enough to insure that China is not under threat.
The leading and defining role of our working class in each aspect of 
political and economic life; the identity between capital and the 
working class which exists within the unified line of struggle [the 
identity of identity and difference] . . .  makes it clear that capital 
follows the leadership of the working class; and the increasingly 
beneficial international situation, are the three conditions which 
determine why it is possible to resolve the antagonistic contradiction 
between capital and labor peacefully 94
These of course are not philosophical conditions; they simply reflect a 
subjective attitude or a personal hope. He offers an idea as to what should happen 
based upon an ossification of the present, thus turning the future into now. This
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freezes the concept of the dialectic so that its principal aspect—working class rule— 
remains fixed and unchallenged. To support this Shu creates an identity between 
the universal and the particular by raising the latter to the former, allowing him to 
see in this moment a guarantee for the times ahead. And this is disguised by a 
philosophic vocabulary that does little more than veil this reality in notions of the 
inexorable.
This theoretical elision of the general with the specific was noted by Zhao 
Lexing, whose commentary was perhaps the most interesting among those who 
responded to Shu. Zhao's argument, summarized by the editors of Philosophical 
Research, was basically that Shu's point was rather incoherent, as it was logically 
inconsistent.95
Zhao begins by noting where Shu and he agree, and this concerns the 
relationship between a contradiction and its essence. Zhao also accepts the maxim 
that it is the internal aspect which determines the character of an antinomic 
resolution. But, Zhao says, to accept this immediately detaches Shu's second and 
third propositions from their reasoning. For, the idea of a peaceful road based upon 
an identity of interests is as truth, historically specific; it is part of the internal aspect 
of China's particular contradiction. It is not necessarily the case for all states in 
transition to socialism. Instances of one moment are not equivalent to invariant 
laws.96
In addition, according to Zhao, though Shu stresses the firmness of Party 
control, his statements regarding the secondary portion of this particular 
contradiction are unclear and philosophically indeterminate. There are times, for 
example, when Shu suggests that the conservative, or reactionary element might 
cohere to threaten the state or obstruct progress. But if this is the case, Zhao says, 
then Shu has reintroduced, either intentionally or not, the very spectre of violence 
which he had apparently philosophically tried to overcome. Shu's point, that is, 
would imply that in the development from old to new, in the unfolding of the
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dialectic, qualitative transcendence would constantly require a physical act of 
suppression. And therefore, while ideological campaigns might not of necessity be 
total in a revolutionary sense, that is nation-wide, or fundamentally about state 
power, they could be partial, that is, periodic crises within the whole gradual leap to 
socialism. In this, violence would be integral to, part of the very core of the 
dialectic of transition.97 This, Zhao says, Shu in fact recognizes, but avoids; 
preferring instead to try to straddle the fissures in his logic. Both Shu and Zhao 
take seriously the idea of the dialectic, its invariant attributes made manifest within 
subjectively determined events. The difference for Zhao, is that Shu stops short 
when philosophical speculation conflicts with his desire and belief.
Shu in fact did respond to Zhao, though in an extremely oblique manner. 
Rather than continue with the question as to whether 01* not the resolution of 
periodic antagonistic contradictions logically supposed some form of violence, Shu 
concerns himself with the unstated prologue to all this: are explosions that occur 
during a leap formally equivalent to the overthrow of state power? Are all eruptions 
by definition counter-revolutions? And, he contends, this is what Zhao argues. 
Thus, in response, to what is intellectually a straw-man, Shu says that as everything 
depends upon the character of the contradiction, the nature of a leap cannot be 
determined in advance. This is of course how the entire discussion started. In any 
event having avoided the primary question as to the force of the secondary aspect of 
a contradiction, a point noted by the editors of Philosophical Research.98 Shu goes 
on to accuse Zhao of ambiguity regarding the idea of peaceful leap. Shu's 
complaint is that though Zhao is apparently convinced that there are two types of 
leap, either violent or not, defined in terms of the intention to overthrow state 
power, Zhao in fact talks as if they were all the same. But this, according to Shu, is 
not important at all, since they basically agree upon the state of things.
Just as Zhao has said, the relation between the internal unified line
and the beneficial international situation in our countiy's transitional
period, are the necessary conditions for the adoption of peaceful
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methods to extinguish exploitation. And the requisite conditions for 
not using a gradual form of the leap to resolve the contradiction 
between our working class and capital are without foundation."
There are two points to note concerning this somewhat sanitized version of 
the logic of social conflict. The first is that following the typology of "On 
Contradiction," meant that Shu's and Zhao's understanding of the dialectic had little 
to do with its substantive content. The notion of interaction, of preservation and 
cancellation as simultaneous acts, was rejected in favor of the lock of contrary 
opposition: a situation of either/or. This was of course a supposition of state 
reason. For, a real conception of a dialectical process freed all forms of 
phenomena—from speech acts to direct political activity—from rigid constraint. 
Second, this was neither important nor a problem for either Shu or Zhao. Their 
concern was with maintenance, appropriation, and the peaceful suppression of 
potential discord. Their attempt was to try to anticipate the consequences of 
accepted categories; to analyze the meaning and possible significance of 'resistance' 
within a continuous revolutionary moment. And therefore to point out the problems 
of their thought is not to fault them for not having done better. For, to do this 
would be to demand that they could supersede their own system of philosophy. It 
is instead, simply to note that ideas are ill-served when they are leveled as 
instruments. Reason is poor when exhausted by the state.
Finally, it may be suggested that this was a somewhat unique discussion for 
this period. There was no invective, there were no charges that adopting a position 
betrayed the line; instead there was a mutual search for a truth. Perhaps this 
explains why the issue was not soon raised again.
4
The agreement among some of China's leading theorists, who differed 
otherwise, that national policy was somehow unique and not mimetic, may seem
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rather odd. Indeed, given the almost complete adoption of Soviet organizational 
principles and methods, this declaration of independence might appear motivated 
more by pride than by a 'reflective' understanding. But though a feeling of fidelity 
to the state was undoubtedly there, this acted as a support, not a guide, for a set of 
postulates which were unified in their insistence upon difference. In turn, these 
axioms made manifest an arrogant conviction, rooted in and a product of dictatorial 
power, which did not merely separate the idea of essence from technique, but 
crucially, converted this essence into technique, into yet another instrument of 
power. The notion of a mediate relation, that in adaptation a dynamic occurs 
between a subject and its other, the possibility that change (development) was a 
consequence of mutual interaction was not simply unstated; it was not thought.
Now the discussion of China's contemporary political history with respect 
to the dichotomy between essence and technique has already been thoroughly 
analyzed and is certainly not served by repetition.100 But it is, however, important 
to ground this episteme of power as it was revealed, and in turn as it shaped 
theoretical discourse. In this, it is necessary to stress that, philosophically 
speaking, the central, revolutionary work of Chinese dialectical materialism—"On 
Contradiction”-w as undialectical. Mao had categorized the concept of the dialectic 
into a set table of polar opposition. To move beyond this in terms of theory-either 
to use undialectical categories dialectically, or to draw out a conception of the 
dialectic while paying homage to a hollowed out form-was almost impossible since 
it demanded a generic originality, or a secreted continuity with a previous (pre­
revolutionary) understanding. But where the latter situation was possible, as it was 
certainly within the knowledge (even if as a relic) of China's most creative Marxist 
philosopher, Ai Siqi, no such effort occurred. Instead thought remained locked 
within hierarchical relations of power. Indeed, as was previously noted, theory 
encapsulated itself as technique.
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Having little to draw upon-and one begins here to see the originality of 
Wang Xuewen—set within a fixed grid, where conceptual movement bounced 
endlessly off reified categories which themselves could not be (dialectically) 
superseded, but only either preserved or cancelled (cf„ the discarding of the 
negation of the negation),101 it becomes clear how theorists could celebrate 
uniqueness as categorical opposition. How, that is, they could draft in periods 
from Soviet history for points of comparison or contrast, to serve as footnotes or 
textual support, at the same time that Soviet forms of centralized and decentralized 
structures of organization were being reproduced throughout the polity, from within 
the Party and throughout industry; and yet see everything as discontinuous, self- 
contained, and subject to one-sided and intended control. For, consciousness could 
only systematize phenomena in terms of fundamental binary propositions. The 
prejudice of this ideological understanding, in part, was that it serviced an ought.
It would appear then that theory in general, and philosophy in particular, 
could offer little in terms of substantive comment or original interpretation. The 
discursive edifice not only reinforced a subordinate definition of intellectual 
concern, but within this, cardinal principles vitiated their own (supposedly) 
attributable content. Moreover, the clear political consequences of identification 
with a position, the fact that, as the subsequent careers of Ai and Yang attest, there 
could be winners and losers in theoretical controversies among Party members, was 
not a great spur to forthright criticism or recommendation. Though it did take the 
aftermath of the "One Hundred Flowers Movement" to make this clear, it may also 
be noted that neither Ai nor Yang ever wrote again as to the direct meaning of the 
line. They argued instead on the content of consciousness and the dialectic.
Yet this is not to state that as a mode, theory was simply reactive; this would 
be misleading. Within categorical confinement there was a degree of conceptual 
freedom. Philosophers, economists (philosophers of the economy) did take on the 
critical questions concerning the character of the polity and the economy. And this
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had collective meaning, in that theoretical constructs did influence the content of 
elite decisions. Mao's "Co-operativization Speech" of 1955, for example, which 
pushed the movement away from the Leninist emphasis upon mechanization, had its 
source, in part, in the anterior theoretical distancing from the Soviet experience 
which had been commonplace among Party intellectuals. What Mao initiated with 
"On Contradiction" was concretized conceptually by Party theorists, so that in turn, 
it had an impact upon his later, more definitive and practical enunciation of 
transitional independence. But, in this, the end-points, the axioms were always the 
same-unless of course they were simply abolished.
This created a noticeable similarity to many of the intellectual controversies 
in the Party before and after 1955. Theories, particularly those concerned with the 
political economy, basically divided along the same alternative assumptions, and, at 
best, refined the same pre-existing, generally recognized contradictions. Arguments 
were either about whether the condition of the productive forces within a given 
sector were in conformity with the relations of production, or whether they were 
lagging behind. Turned over, the argument could either be, that advanced 
productive relations were an aid to development, or that they were not. And here, 
an article by Yan Beiming concerning the question as to whether or not socialist 
relations had been introduced too soon into agricultural co-operatives—were the 
relations of production in advance or in conformity with the character of the 
productive forces—is most apposite, and deserves some comment. His analysis is 
particularly useful in that it serves as an account; it brings out quite clearly the 
contrasting positions over the set issue of necessity and the law of correspondence.
To put it briefly, Yan contends that the socialist co-operativization 
movement had occurred at precisely the right time, following from the law of 
conformity. The key he says is not to isolate the problem of the relationship 
between the productive forces and the relations of production simply in terms of 
agriculture; instead it is to understand the problem properly, with respect to the
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relationship of agriculture to the overall economy. To do so, makes it clear that the 
backwardness of the agricultural productive system contradicts the developing 
needs of the socialist sector; it obstructs the requirements of the established socialist 
relations. Therefore new productive relations had to be introduced in order to 
liberate the productive forces. This has been and continues to be accomplished in 
the co-operativization movement
We know that socialist industrialization cannot be split from 
agriculture and developed independently, just the same as the 
development of agriculture cannot be split from industrialization. To 
resolve the contradiction of agriculture lagging behind industry, 
thereby strengthening the alliance between agriculture and industry, 
it must be through agricultural co-operativization . . ,  with this kind 
of transformation of the relations, in a situation where tractors are 
not yet present, the productive forces will be able to obtain an even 
quicker development from that of land reform.102
At the same time, Yan notes that there are two views opposed to this. The 
first is premised upon the idea that the key to any contradiction lies in its internal 
aspect—the external passes through the internal. Accordingly, the only question is 
whether or not there has been a qualitative development in the productive forces in 
agriculture, in this sphere alone, to warrant changes in the system of productive 
relations. And the advocates of this position argue that this has not occurred, and 
that new productive relations presuppose mechanization. 'Without tractor farms 
there are not the requisite conditions for socialist co-operativization'.
This Yan labels as revisionist, as that which focuses exclusively upon the 
productive forces, thereby ignoring the critical importance of the relations of 
production. And Yan quotes from "On Contradiction" to make the further point that 
there are times when in fact the relations of production may reverse its role as a 
determinant to become the determining element in the economic process. Thus, Yan 
concludes that those who argue a kind of 'tractor waitism' are really saying that "the 
people should not struggle to transform the old productive relations but should wait 
to be determined by the productive forces."103
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On the other side, Yan says that there are those who press for even more 
rapid changes in the system of productive relations as a means for spurring 
development. This he notes is based upon a misunderstanding of the concept of 
reversal in "On Contradiction," regarding the possible determining role for the 
relations of production. The point Yan says, somewhat disingenuously, is to 
understand that the relationship between the relations of production and the 
productive forces is interlocked; each aspect cannot exist independently. And in 
this, the movement of the productive relations is ultimately governed by the 
character of the productive forces. Moreover, Yan also points out, quite subtly, that 
the argument of those who want quicker change in the relations of production is 
somewhat analogous to that of the 'mechanists' in that both seemingly assume that 
the productive forces may be isolated and will somehow develop by themselves. 
To accept this means that people, "can discard effort, that it is not necessary to 
transform the relations of production by promoting the development of the 
productive forces."104
In the end, Yan says that the line makes manifest the law of conformity, and 
is completely appropriate to the moment. The changed relations of production suit 
the developing needs of the national economy.
A view which attempted to justify its moment and did not see an essential 
contradiction on either one side or the other—where the productive forces or the 
productive relations were lagging behind-could not last. It ignored the constancy 
of political flux. Thus, Yan's argument was soon superseded by the Party's 
directive "On Strengthening Production Leadership and Organizational Construction 
of Agricultural Producer Co-Operatives," where it was stated that productivity was 
low and not yet satisfactory105 (in passing, it may be noted that this point had been 
anticipated by Guan Mengjue, in his article "Concerning the Problem of the 
Relations of Production and the Forces of Production in the Higher Stage 
Agricultural Producers Co-Operatives).106 But, in turn, this was itself soon
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reversed by Mao in "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the 
People," where he stated that the relations of production were inadequate to the 
requirements of the productive forces. "Socialist relations of production have been 
established . . .  but they are still far from perfect, and their imperfect aspects stand 
in contradiction to the development of the productive forces."107
This either/or approach illustrates a discursive logic that substituted polar 
opposition for dialectical thought. And thus, in general there were only two sets of 
pictures which could be filled in. These in turn usually divided along a 'left-right' 
political axis10*5—though this was not logically necessary; or, sometimes, according 
to divisions concerning pace. The difference between the "go slower" approach of 
the Eighth Party Congress, and Mao’s repudiation of this in "On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions" is illustrative of this latter point.
There were, of course, philosophic controversies concerning subjects other 
than die status of the productive relations. Shu, for example, continued to explore 
the conceptual meaning of contradiction. In 1956, for instance, in a rejoinder to Hu 
Sheng, Shu explained that contradiction involved both unity and antinomy within 
itself, and was not, as Hu seemed to understand, the synthesis of antagonisms; 
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.109 Just as almost twenty years earlier, Ai had 
chastised Ye Qing over the latter's misunderstanding of the dialectic, so now Shu, 
though without the rancor, criticizes Hu for an equivalent failure. And this is not 
surprising, questions concerning the meaning of the dialectic were as common and 
relevant in this modern China, as were the continuous references (always 
pejorative) to Bernstein, Mach, etc.—to all those who fought with Lenin, or of 
whom he disapproved. This is because ultimately the issues facing these non­
capitalist, underdeveloped economic formations, which were politically dictatorial, 
were basically the same.
Inevitably, the tension between orthodoxy and originality took on the aspect 
of creative encirclement, since the fundamental questions—how to classify and
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organize the peasantry, forced or voluntary collectivization, whether industry 
should be emphasized in terms of light or heavy, or in terms of some balance 
between the two—the problems which a relatively economically deprived socialist 
state had to confront, defined and united China's present with the Soviet past. The 
differences between the two states concerning strategies, tactics, methods, and 
philosophies of approach were real and qualitative. But that should neither obscure 
nor gainsay those reference points of identity which survived the insistence upon 
uniqueness, and in this, circumscribed imaginative possibility. The telos of 
socialism, the intentions of Marxism prescribed, to a real degree, the dimensions of 
choice. In this conceptual sense, both China and the Soviet Union were, as states, 
the predicates of an intended subject. But of course each leadership was truly only 
subject to itself. And thus both states were characterized by chaotic and horrific 
attempts to short cut the developmental process; attempts which were as much the 
product of a declared goal, as they were of a political structure which sanctified 
leadership whim.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: THE CHARACTER OF REASON
Within the continuum of revolutionary practice, the role of political theory might be 
contrasted between the periods before and after the seizure of power. The writings 
of Ai, for example, in the thirties, his original attempt to explain both the immediate 
and immanent significance of Marxism (the idea of theory in practice and a theory of 
praxis) in essays ranging from discussions of Hegel's dialectic to the war in 
Abyssinia, appear to differ sharply with those later works where concepts were, at 
times, so stupefyingly bound. The constriction of purpose, made manifest in the 
felt need to refashion an emphasis upon the virulence of class struggle within the 
superstructure to accord with a hierarchical assumption of secure state power, 
speaks not only of compromise and subservience, but also of distance, of 
intellectual separation from that time when Ai could simply and honestly point out 
the deficiencies in Mao's philosophical understanding.
Yet, this sense of division must not be exaggerated. For, it was the prior 
commitment to the Party, to the State, which informed thought. In this, 
interpretation began with the acceptance of parameters, of constriction of its 
movement. Political thought did not presume sacrifice or compromise, but declared 
itself to be of service, of legitimizing use from the start. Clearly, intellectual 
responsibility was, logically at least, to some degree self-defined, so that, as in the 
case of Wang Xuewen duty did not necessarily demand unreflective obedience. But 
political acceptance did suggest a need for temporal relevance; a desire (demand) to 
be 'appropriate'. And thus, the vicissitudes of thought expressed and were the 
expression of changes in the political line. This created an almost ephemeral quality 
to theoretical work, since a position previously argued would be forgotten, or self­
denied, as soon as it was recognized that it was no longer politically apposite.
226
This is why theorists did not attempt to define the postulates governing their 
form of political association. For rules were Party rules, and were not subject either 
to discussion or reformulation. In a figurative sense, the position and function of 
thought corresponded to its essence: consciously it "reflected" the political line.
At the same time, it should be noted that this state had been declared in terms 
of a specific definition. From the start, meaning was understood (and was always 
to be understood) in relation to the set goals of socialism and communism. Political 
society was not 'open-ended', rather purpose was exclusive. In general terms the 
state resembled what Oakeshott has called a 'managerial state', where the condition 
of integration is decided through the attempt to realize a specific enterprise.1 Within 
the framework then of teleological determination, Party thought in China could only 
be instrumental, could only be concerned with knowing how, instead of ever asking 
why. In a situation where knowledge was the adjunct of state intention, theory 
could, at best, only engage in thoughtful discussions over the means of process.
This, of course, stripped thought of its creative potential. It leveled the 
possibility of intellectual dialogue--of a dialectic-and, in the case of philosophy, 
turned reason into an index. The endless discussions of Hegel's dialectic, for 
example, remained fixed within the static attempt to understand meaning solely 
through the significance of Marxist reception. There was neither a concept, a 
category, nor the will to move outside this to try to see Hegel's, or any other 
philosophy, individually, in itself, as a possible source of knowledge. This could 
not be otherwise; since the premise of "un-acceptable" thinking required a 
recognition of value that was discursively denied by the supposed superiority of 
dialectical materialism. The epistemological break of dialectical materialism with all 
else did not merely isolate truth, in China, it defined truth through a somewhat 
arrogant separation. Historical investigations were, of course permissible. Chinese 
philosophers played their own classification game of the two-line struggle from 
Confucius onwards.2 And there was the precedent of Lenin's slightly peculiar,
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though certainly interesting fascination (flirtation) with Hegel. But labelling past 
thinkers is not equivalent to substantive understanding, and Lenin's interests 
remained personal-there were no Friends of Hegel Societies in China.
Restriction was not, however, a collective decision. The limits upon 
interpretation and the overall substantive determination of acceptable conduct—the 
complete identification of self and thought with the goals of the state—was neither 
postulated by nor the effect of common agreement. On the contrary, will was an 
dlite conception, a designated attribute. This, of course, was central to the state's 
legitimizing supposition; that all events could be categorized and thereby managed. 
This, the argument of "On Contradiction," was made manifest in the serial process 
of domestic reorganizations which were periodically announced as new policies. 
And with the state conceived as its own subject, everything else became reduced to 
its predicate. Thus it was almost inevitable that, as with nature, people would come 
to be objectified as things, as other types of productive instruments to be used and 
developed. Mao's appalling "poor and blank" thesis was, that is, dictated as much 
by the logic of state reason, as it was the contemptuous expression of a particular 
thought.
The absorption of consciousness within the productive process does, at the 
same time, owe something to Marx. For Marx seemingly defines all aspects of 
social interaction and knowledge in terms of the system of production,3 The 
problem is that this rather strongly implies an identity between two different 
spheres, such that the supersession of an 'injurious' mode of production somehow 
guarantees the resolution of all antagonisms and 'false' ideologies. This is a basic 
confusion; and while Marx does posit a moment where there has been a qualitative 
change regarding control over the means of production, he leaves untouched almost 
all questions relating to the civic organization of socialist society. He makes no 
attempt to discuss the formal conditions of freedom: the problem of positive liberty 
within the collective.^ This simply is not an issue for him. At the very least, this
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has created a vacuum which historically has been filled by vanguard groupings that 
have abjured all talk of personal freedoms in favor of self-interested declarations.
In this regard, the Chinese Communist Party may thus be said to have acted 
to type. And this, in passing, might be seen as the practical rejoinder to the young 
Ai's theory of praxis. For here, there would be nothing in the process of 
Sinification that would have been left out. On the contrary, despotic authority 
would be the exhaustive and justifiable form of distillation; would be the essence of 
adaptation. The truth of method would thus be the attempt to create a vast 
elemental, but productive, labor camp.5
The doctrines of cheap labor--the primitive visions of a community of self- 
sacrificers (a concept which even Marx abhorred)—found their ground in the 
political masterstrokes of sinification: "On Contradiction" and "On Practice." 
These were the philosophical works which localized the ideas of service and duty 
by setting out the a prion's of phenomenological experience and then directing labor 
toward their discovery. For it is clear that practice presupposed ideological 
guidance, that 'in-itself it could never be the criterion of truth, since knowledge 
was mediated socially, and politically class determined. All labor could do was 
validate the correctness of a revolutionary position or attitude. And this it could do 
best by staying at home, by working the territory for the real varieties of 
contradiction. In short, by offering a use for the turn of the contingent into the 
necessary.
Thus the focus upon man, and the celebration of his subjective capabilities, 
must be understood as the necessary component of an ideology which defined itself 
through state reason. For ultimately all praxis was to be seen as the expression of 
one principle: that economic achievement could be, had to be, politically
determined. This axiom was the ground of the ground of socialist power; the 
condition which structured Marxism as a national method.
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But this in turn meant that the claim to a Marxist identity supposed a 
category, a convention which could absorb what were basically the voluntarist 
impulses of an dlite and re-order them as constituent of basic principle. In other 
words, there had to be a concept or a philosophical trope of some kind which could 
integrate the criterion of economic development within the episteme of a particular 
political desire. Objective need required a subjective account. And this was the 
great value, what was provided for, by the laws of conformity and contradiction; 
which of course were not laws at all, but were merely inventions. Their insistence 
that there were times when the superstructure could in fact determine the course of 
the base, both preserved the fundamental principle as to the primacy of the base 
(since the reversal was qualified temporally), thereby extending a legitimizing 
orthodoxy, while it placed this binding injunction at the service of an dlite will. The 
recognition of circumstance was a prerogative of the state.
And therefore what might appear as philosophically irreconcilable was in 
fact harmonized by the more direct requirements of political power. The seemingly 
impossible synthesis of a case of invariant laws, and the condition of their negation 
and transcendence through the will (what is socialism, if not in this sense a new 
'lawless' state)6 disappears here as a problem, and becomes instead reinterpreted as 
the parameters to action; the bounds for encouragement. For, finally, these laws 
were to insure control as they provided direction; their neutrality guaranteed the 
specificity of restraint. But this could not simply be an external condition or 
relation. For, if economic growth was dependent upon human labor, if political 
commands supposed a reception in the collectivity of tireless effort, then this could 
only occur (politically, not logically) if these laws intervened directly and 
established themselves as the correct modes of thought. The proper functioning of 
the will assumed an imposed set of ideological assertions. And this, the imperative 
of construction, was what was to be brushstroked upon consciousness. The role of
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Party philosophers, in turn, was to clarify and to refine what went in. This is how 
thought "reflected" existence.
The question of sinification was thus resolved through the creation of a 
methodology for craftwork; a dogma for action. In this, declarations remained 
uncontested. Since essence was accepted as a political definition, a philosophy of 
supposed disclosure: the dialectic, was moved continuously to preserve that which 
it could not conceive to question. At the same time, the basic hollowness to these 
categories has helped to sustain them in the effort toward political survival, though 
the meaning of circumstance has changed. "On Contradiction," and, particularly, 
"On Practice," for example, still filter claims to political legitimacy.7 This is to be 
expected since eventually almost all ideas fall to ground.
This constancy to location, this numbness to the categorical game, in turn 
raises a serious question concerning the possible rights of reason. A question 
which here must remain just that.
It is clear that in Mao's time, consciousness was structured according to the 
needs of the state. And therefore reason was based upon a denial of subjective 
freedom as a "right of man." The belief in the rational autonomy of man, the 
freedom to choose one's definition of felicity, could not be integrated with a system 
which absorbed the self within a declared teleological determination. This is 
obvious. And it should also make it clear why more contemporary administrative 
refinements, the democratization of organizations, should not be misread as 
something else. For these kinds of changes in the relations of production are still 
based upon manipulation; are merely techniques, approved by others, to increase 
productivity. They are not statements of independence.
Mao's legacy therefore continues to be of importance, because in explaining 
the meaning of the sinification of Marxism, he set out the rules of the game. This is 
what has been passed on. To change this would require a will (the source for 
which it is difficult to determine) to do away with the edifice once and for all. It
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would, in one sense, be to bring back in effect what Mao discarded in theory: the 
negation of the negation.
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Notes
1 Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, pp.
185-326.
2 Cf., "Bu neng zai zhexue shi de yanjiu zhong qxiao Makessizhuyi de lingdao he 
danagxing yuanze" ("Marxist leadership and party principles cannot be abolished 
in researching the history of philosophy"), Guanming ribao. October 6, 1957, p. 
6 .
3 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests. London: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1972, pp. 25-63.
4 Albrecht Wellmar, "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment," Praxis, 
no. 2, vol. 3, July 1983, pp. 83-103.
5 The metaphor of the workhouse is influenced by the work of the Frankfurt 
School on the dialectic of reason (the suppression of freedom in favor of 
technical control), and its relationship to Marx's project, and by the work of 
Habermas and Wellmar on the latent positivism in Marx's thought. Steven 
Lukes has also written on the problem of moral ends in Marxism. "[Marxism] 
has been unable to offer an adequate account of justice, rights, and the means- 
end problem, and thus an adequate response to injustice, violations of rights, and 
the resort to impermissible means, in the world we must live in." Steven Lukes, 
Maixism and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 141.
6 On the problem of objectification and free expression see Charles Taylor's 
discussion in Hegel. Chapter XX, "Hegel Today," particularly pp. 546-558; 
Charles Taylor, Hegel, see Chapter 3, n. 27.
7 For a discussion of the significance of "On Practice" in the post-Maoist era see 
Stuart R. Schram, "Ideology and Policy Since the Third Plenum, 1978-1983," 
Research Notes and Studies, no. 6, Contemporary China Institute, 1984.
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